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Abstract of Morality, Dignity and Pragmatism
This thesis is an examination and reconstruction of morality. It divides into 
three parts.  
Part one argues that morality is best considered as the tradition of ethical 
thinking that begins with the Stoics, develops  in  Christian thought and 
reaches its  apotheosis in  Kant.  This tradition structures ethical  thinking 
around three basic concepts: cosmopolitanism, or universal applicability to 
human beings as such, the  dignity of human beings  and  reciprocity.  It is 
this tradition of morality that Nietzsche sets out to destroy. 
Part one criticises pre-Nietzschean theories of morality, such as Kant’s, that 
take  universal  and exceptionless  rules  to  form the  core  of  morality.  It 
critiques both the possibility of putting forward an adequate set of such 
rules and the proposed relationship between morality and human life that is 
implicit in these theories. 
Part two begins with Nietzsche’s challenge: that morality is a system of 
values  rooted  in  nihilistic  resentment  at  the  vitality  of  other,  stronger 
modes of living. It argues that this challenge must be taken seriously, and 
that the best way to do this is to make it clear that morality has as its 
fundamental basis a responsiveness to the value of human life; hence it is 
Nietzsche’s ethics that should be called nihilistic. 
The rest  of part  two examines  the possibility  of answering Nietzsche’s 
challenge  by  demonstrating  a  necessary  connection  between  human 
selfhood and the acknowledgement of the dignity of human beings. Here I 
criticise Christine Korsgaard’s  arguments and consider  Charles  Taylor’s 
more promising approach to the self. 
Part  three  turns  towards  pragmatism,  and in  so doing gives  up  on the 
attempt to show that morality is somehow necessary for all human beings. 
Nietzsche’s  challenge  is  answered  more  subtly:  an  empirically  backed 
theory of human selfhood explains the point of morality in terms of our 
basic need for recognition.  
I complete the reconstruction of morality by reinterpreting the dignity of 
human beings in a naturalistic way and adopting a conception of moral 
rules that is informed by Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics. 
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PREFACE
This thesis is a constructive work in the tradition of morality. 
Although  the  argument  is  long  and  complex,  the  aims  are  simple:  to 
explain  the  point  and  value  of  goodness  without  straying  into  wishful 
thinking or  laughable  metaphysics;  to  maintain  the idea  of  moral  duty 
whilst  frankly admitting that  the heart  of morality  is  elsewhere;  and to 
provide an honest document that may actually be of some use to those who 
read it in the conduct of their lives. 
It  is  also in  large  part  an  essay  about  the  meaning of  Kant  for  moral 
philosophy. Although I  see no good reason why this  should be so,  my 
position on Kant appears to be somewhat unusual, combining as it does a 
profound respect and admiration for his contribution to moral philosophy 
with a series of searching and rather brutal criticisms of it. 
I can only say that this has always seemed to me to be the best way to do 
philosophy: to take the work of those whom one admires most and submit 
it to a thorough critique, in the hope that one can build something better on 
the foundations that they have laid.
NOTE ON REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS
References to Kant’s texts are abbreviated as follows: G – Groundwork to  
the Metaphysics of Morals; C1 – Critique of Pure Reason; C2 – Critique  
of Practical Reason; C3 – Critique of Judgment; MM – Metaphysics of  
Morals;  PP  –  Toward  Perpetual  Peace:  A  Philosophical  Sketch;  R–  
Religion within the limits of reason alone. All page references are to the 
Akadamie edition, except in the case of the Religion and Perpetual Peace, 
where the translations used do not carry the Akadamie page numbers. Here 
references are to pages in the translations used.
References  to  Nietzsche  are  to  section  numbers  rather  than  pages. 
References to Aristotle are to the standard Bekker page numbers. Other 
classics (e.g. Seneca) are referenced by book and chapter number.
Where an author’s articles have been collected into a book form, and that 
book is also cited in the bibliography, page references will be to the book 
reprint. 
PART ONE:
TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS 
OF MORALITY
MAP OF PART ONE 
Chapter one, The Very Idea of Morality, aims to define the basic territory of 
morality. It begins by distinguishing the usage of ‘morality’ adopted in this 
thesis from three others that are current in philosophy and discusses briefly 
how the concerns manifested in these usages of morality are taken up in the 
rest of the thesis. Next, it fills out the usage of morality adopted, both by 
putting  it  in  a  historical  context  and by discussing  its  central  ideas  of 
cosmopolitanism,  reciprocity  and  human  dignity.  Finally,  it  briefly 
addresses  the  variety of  positions  within  morality,  and the  end state  at 
which morality aims. 
Chapter two, Against Kant, for the sake of Morality, is a critique of Kant’s 
account of morality, insofar as it makes the purity of morality central. It 
argues that i) there is no reason to follow Kant’s purifying assumptions 
about  the possibility  of morality;  for morality is  quite  possible without 
these assumptions. ii)  Moral obligation is in fact  impossible  if  we take 
Kant’s presuppositions about the moral law seriously; iii) Kant’s account of 
morality gets the basic structure of human life so wrong that it  renders 
itself inappropriate for the general regulation of human behaviour.
C h a p t e r  O n e
The Very Idea of Morality
In this thesis, I shall use ‘morality’ to name the tradition in Western ethical 
thinking that is  inaugurated by the Stoics and centres on  universalistic  
interpersonal justice. What marks this tradition out from all others is i) its 
account of what  constitutes  interpersonal justice, and ii) the seriousness 
with which it attempts to reconstruct the world as it finds it in its own 
image.  Put  otherwise,  to  bring  it  about  that  the  world  does  operate 
according to moral rules.
i) While morality follows the familiar and banal underlying idea of justice 
(‘to give to each what is due to them’), it brings three inter-related ideas 
into play to fill out what it takes to constitute giving each what is due to 
them. These ideas are: 
Cosmopolitanism - the idea that we are all citizens of the world, and thus 
should always at least treat one another as fellow citizens. 
Reciprocity  -  the idea  that  there should be always be a  reversibility  in 
action, so that before A acts, he should ask himself if he would be happy 
for B to act in that way to him (or, more generally, if he would be happy for 
everyone to act in that way). 
Human dignity - the idea that human beings possess a worth that both sets 
them above things, plants and other animals, and makes them equal to one 
another, and that this dignity must be respected at all times. 
ii) Morality believes that it matters that, in the world as it stands, people do 
not get what is due to them as human beings; and it believes – stubbornly 
believes – that we can make progress towards a situation in which people 
do, generally, get what is due to them as human beings. Living and acting 
morally is to take up the challenge that the world as we find it offers and 
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impel it in the right direction. (This is composed of two parts;  first,  an 
anger – a rage – against the world as it now is, and second, a hope – a 
yearning – for the world as it might be.)
This  usage  diverges  quite  considerably  from  others  in  use  in  the 
philosophical  literature.  The  first  half  of  this  chapter  explains  the 
relationship of morality as I shall use it to three other usages of ‘morality’; 
the second half gives a further explication of my usage of ‘morality’. 
There  are  three  other  usages  of  ‘morality’ that  it  will  prove helpful  to 
compare and contrast with my own. They are as follows: 
i) ‘Morality’ as devoid of normative connotations: on this usage, a morality 
is nothing more than the mores or social customs that happen to obtain de 
facto in a given society, and there will be as many moralities as there are 
systems of mores. No judgment is implied about the value of any of these 
moralities. 
ii) ‘Morality’ as consequentialists understand it. These accounts i) separate 
the right (that is, the procedure for working out what is to be done) and the 
good (that is, the account of what is intrinsically valuable); ii) define the 
right as the attempt to promote the good impartially. 
iii) ‘Morality’ as Nietzsche uses it. On this usage, a morality is a table of 
values  to  be  lived  by  that  may  be  either  individual  or  society-wide. 
Nietzsche argues that these tables of values – moralities – should be ranked 
by  the  quality  of  the  life  that  they  express  and/or  make  possible.  On 
Nietzsche’s view, morality in my sense should first be demoted to just one 
morality amongst many; then, sloughed off, after it fails the test by which 
moralities should be measured.
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1.1 My usage of ‘morality’ as compared to the others I have canvassed
i) Non-normative usage
The first (non-normative) usage of ‘morality’ differs in three chief ways 
from mine; first, it will let any system of mores count as a morality, whilst 
mine only includes those standards that aim at justice understood in terms 
of cosmopolitanism, reciprocity and human dignity. Second, even within 
the one tradition that I have picked out, for the non-normative usage there 
will  be  many  moralities. What the non-normative account would see as 
many, my account sees as unified by the common search for universalistic 
justice. Third, the non-normative usage brackets the purported normativity  
of  the  standards  of  the  ‘moralities’ it  looks  at;  my  account  takes  the 
purported normativity of moral standards as key to understanding them.
On my usage  morality  is  a  living  tradition  in  the  sense  that  Alasdair 
MacIntyre  uses  the  term,  that  is,  ‘an  historically  extended,  socially 
embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part  about the goods 
which constitute that tradition.’ (1981, p. 222) The argument, of course, 
concerns  the  meaning,  defensibility  and  practicality  of  a  cosmopolitan 
conception  of  justice.  This  tradition  has  a  unity  invisible  to  the  non-
normative conception of morality, which can only see an endless play of 
different  figurations.  Those  inside  the  tradition  see  in  these  same 
figurations  a  narrative,  in  which  themes  are  introduced,  developed, 
dropped then re-introduced; they are able to see what comes later as an 
advance or a decline, based on their understanding of cosmopolitan justice.
ii) Consequentialism
Consequentialism  has  much  more  in  common  with  my  conception  of 
morality: both will agree only one morality, and that it lays down standards 
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appropriate to human conduct as such. Both will agree that these standards 
take everyone into consideration in some respect. 
They differ in two chief ways: my usage centres around justice, whilst the 
teleological account centres around the promotion of the good; my usage 
takes morality to be  internal  to the goal of living one’s life as a human 
being, whereas consequentialism takes morality to be external. The first 
concerns the  content of morality; the second its relationship to selfhood 
and to being a human being. 
The  first  is  of  less  importance  than  the  second.  For,  the  emphasis  on 
interpersonal justice versus the emphasis on the pursuit of the good does 
not necessarily lead to a difference in what one thinks should be done in 
given circumstances; nor in the reasons that one gives in support of one’s 
case.  For  example,  a  value  pluralist  consequentialist  such  as  Jonathan 
Glover has very similar normative views (and counter-factual normative 
views) to the ones I would associate with morality in my sense.1 
The important difference is the second: that of the relationship between 
morality and human life. This difference is best expressed in Aristotelian 
terminology.  We can distinguish between two different  types  of action: 
those in which one acts to produce something separate from that activity 
(poiesis), as when a man makes a cabinet; and those in which one acts 
merely for the sake of the activity itself (praxis), for example laughing.2 
Where a poiesis aims at some further end, a praxis is its own end. Using 
this distinction, we could say that consequentialism takes morality to be a 
poiesis, with the aim of producing as much good as possible; morality on 
my understanding takes it to be a praxis, the activity, broadly speaking, of 
treating other human beings justly. 
1 See, for example Glover (1977) and (1999).
2 I am here ignoring cases where laughing is not a praxis, where one laughs in order to bring about 
a further end (such as making someone appear funny).
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Where consequentialism suggests that there are certain ends that should be 
pursued in action, morality (on my usage of it) takes it that there are certain 
ends  that  should  be  implicit  in or constitutive  of  action.  For 
consequentialism, the ends of morality are external,  and the question is 
how  best  to  promote  them.  For  morality  the  end  is  internal,  and  the 
question is the shape that this end imposes on human life. At this level of 
abstraction, the difference amounts to this: morality on my understanding 
of it rules out a priori the possibility of doing what is morally prohibited, 
even  in order to  bring about a good result;  this consideration does not 
apply  to  consequentialism  as  it  does  not  have  a  criterion  of  morality 
external to consequences.
Consequentialism  understands  the  moral  point  of  view  in  impersonal  
terms: as a vantage point one adopts in order to see how the good is to be 
impartially promoted. Hence for the consequentialist, the moral point of 
view needs to be brought back into dialogue with the personal point of 
view, the point of view from which we live. This is a result of the fact that 
it considers morality to be an external check on the personal point of view. 
Morality, on my understanding of it, takes the moral point of view to be 
implicit in or constitutive of human decision making in general, and hence 
experiences no difficulty in relating the moral point of view to the personal 
point of view. 
However,  no one  should  take the  above as  an attempt  at  an  argument 
against consequentialism: it is not the business of this thesis to attempt to 
provide any arguments against consequentialism, or indeed to consider it at 
all.  We  are  simply  exploring  a  different  tradition  in  ethical  thinking: 
looking at its basic structure, the limitations it has suffered from through its 
history, and how to reconstruct it in such a way that it becomes believable 
for us: I mention consequentialism merely so that we can put it to one side. 
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iii) Nietzsche
Nietzsche’s approach to morality is much more relevant to the project of 
this thesis. Nietzsche is a pervasive presence throughout this work, often 
hovering in the background, even where he is not explicitly mentioned. I 
shall  comment briefly  on Nietzsche’s  relationship to the project  of this 
thesis, and then consider his account of morality in a brief and preliminary 
manner. 
Nietzsche’s greatness and his usefulness for our project of reconstructing 
morality  lie  in  his  astonishing skill  as  an interpreter.  His  training  as  a 
philologist  leads  him to  treat  pretty  much everything  –  people,  ethical 
systems, religions, science, his own life – as texts to be interpreted and, 
more  importantly  re-evaluated  through  the act  of  interpretation.  This 
applies  particularly  to  morality,  which  occupies  more  and more  of  his 
attention as his career as a writer hastens towards its unfortunate end. 
His importance to the project of this thesis is immense: I have found both 
the content of his interpretations of morality and the underlying approach 
to interpretation to be of great help, though in somewhat different ways. 
His interpretations of morality show more clearly than anywhere else what 
is wrong with the tradition of morality as it reaches its apotheosis in Kant.  
But the approach to interpretation is one of the major sources of inspiration 
for the reconstruction of morality that is undertaken through the course of 
this  thesis.  In  a  word,  we  use  methods  of  interpreting  borrowed  from 
Nietzsche to revivify morality, reinterpreting it piece by piece until we have 
constructed a system of ethical thought we are happy with.3 
3However, it is clear that Nietzsche himself would be far from happy with the way I have used 
motifs from his method of interpreting to render plausible a system of ethical thinking that places 
mutual respect and the dignity of each and every human being at the centre of ethical thinking. For  
Nietzsche, such an ethical system is a sign of decadence and ultimately of an unhealthy approach to 
life. 
However,  I  argue  in  chapter  six  that  Nietzsche  is  just  wrong  here:  what  leads  him  to  this 
conclusion is just ‘an audacious generalization on the basis of very narrow, very personal,  very 
human, all too human facts’ (1886, Preface). His conclusions have no general validity, rather they 
point up his own particular weaknesses and inadequacies.
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Nietzsche’s thought on morality can best be apprehended as working in 
two directions  simultaneously.  First,  it  attempts  to  ridicule  the  account 
morality gives of itself, by showing this account to be partial, based on 
inversions of cause and effect and shot through with bad metaphysics: in 
short, incoherent as an interpretation of the world. Second, it attempts to 
insinuate a new interpretation of human life,  that makes morality seem 
coherent again, but which recontextualises morality in such a way that it 
loses all its attractiveness.4  
We can  see  these  two  processes  going  on  quite  clearly  in  Nietzsche’s 
account of what morality is. He begins by noting that the tradition just 
assumes that that there is only one morality, and that philosophy’s task is to 
furnish its rational ground. He then proceeds to ridicule these assumptions:
Philosophers  one  and  all  have,  with  a  strait-laced 
seriousness that provokes laughter ... wanted to furnish the 
rational  ground of  morality  –  and  every  philosopher 
hitherto has believed he has furnished this rational ground; 
morality itself, however, was taken as “given”. (1886, §186)
Against  this,  Nietzsche  insinuates  an  interpretation  according  to  which 
there are many moralities – for on this new interpretation a morality is just 
a table of values – and which makes the fundamental problem of moral 
philosophy seem quite different: 
One should,  in all  strictness, admit  what  will  be needful 
here for a long time to come,  what alone is provisionally 
justified  here:  assembly  of  material,  conceptual 
comprehension  and  arrangement  of  a  vast  domain  of 
delicate  value-feelings  and  value-distinctions  which  live, 
grow, beget and perish – and perhaps attempts to display 
the  more  frequent  and  recurring  forms  of  these  living 
crystallizations – as preparation of a  typology  of morals. 
(1886, §186)
4 In  this  new context,  for example,  signs of the triumph of morality,  such as  the growth of 
democracy and the flourishing of human rights discourse seem like signs of society’s decline, rather 
than, as most people might assume, signs of progress.
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This  new interpretation  invites  two further  questions:  first,  why is  the 
tradition of morality  so keen to deny that  it  is  just  one ethical system 
amongst  others?  And  second,  what  is  the  right  way  to  construct  our 
typology of ethical systems? Nietzsche’s reply to these questions will take 
us deep into his theory of master and slave moralities: we shall take it up in 
chapter three. 
1.2 An introduction to morality
Now it is time to give a fuller exposition of morality.5 I have already stated 
that morality takes itself to be about giving human beings what is due to 
them, and that it  understands what is due to human beings in terms of 
cosmopolitanism, reciprocity  and  human dignity.  I shall  discuss each of 
these in a little more depth; then consider some of the explanations that 
morality puts forward of why people on occasion fail to do what (morally 
speaking) they ought to; then consider the variety that is possible within 
the tradition of morality; and finally, the end at which morality aims. 
Cosmopolitanism
Cosmopolitanism proclaims that each person is a citizen of the world, and 
hence  every  person  should  treat  everyone  else  as  if  they  were  fellow 
citizens. Historically speaking, the most important formulations of the bare 
idea of cosmopolitanism6 have been in terms of natural law and circles of  
concern. 
5 Henceforth I shall use ‘morality’ in my own sense.
6 We shall see below how the ideas of reciprocity and human dignity can also lead us very strongly 
towards cosmopolitanism. 
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The  Stoics  argue  for  cosmopolitanism on  the  basis  of  natural  law7 as 
follows: 
only man of all the animals has reason;8 reason is  divine;9 and reason is 
common  to  all  human  beings.10 Putting  all  these  together,  we  get  the 
following: 
Since, then, there is nothing better than reason, and reason 
is  present  in  both  man  and  God,  there  is  a  primordial 
partnership in reason between man and God. But those who 
share reason also share right reason; and since that is law, 
we men must also be thought of as partners with the gods in 
law. Furthermore, those who share law share justice. Now 
those  who  share  all  these  things  must  be  regarded  as 
belonging to the same state. (Cicero, De Legibus I.23)
Hence it follows that there must be a law applicable to all men and gods; a 
natural law that is cosmopolitan in form. The result will be an enlarged 
view on the world.11
Hierocles, in another Stoic  argument,  suggests  a  different  approach;  he 
suggests that the trick is to stop thinking of others as so distant from us. On 
his  model,  we should  think  of  ourselves  as  surrounded by a  series  of 
7 The classic definition of natural law is Cicero’s: ‘True law is right reason in agreement with 
nature;  it  is  of  universal  application,  unchanging  and  everlasting;  it  summons  to  duty  by  its 
commands, and averts from wrong doing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or 
prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. We cannot be  
freed from its  obligations by senate  or  people,  and we need not  look outside ourselves  for  an 
expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different 
laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and 
times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, 
its promulgator and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying 
his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes 
what is commonly considered punishment.’ (Cicero, De Re Publica, III.23)
8 ‘Of all the types and species of living creatures he is the only one that participates in reason and 
reflection, whereas none of the others do’. (Cicero)
9 Cicero asks, ‘what is there, I will not say in man, but in the whole of heaven and earth, more 
divine than reason?’ Seneca puts it thus: ‘What is best in man? Reason: with this he precedes the  
animals and follows the gods.’ (Letters 76.9; Long & Sedley 1987, p.395) Note how closely tied this 
notion of the divinity of reason is to that of the dignity of human beings.
10 ‘Reason in fact – the one thing in which we are superior to the beasts ...  that certainly is  
common to all.’ Cicero, De Legibus I.30
11 In Seneca’s words: ‘Let us take hold of the fact that there are two communities – the one, which 
is truly great and truly common, embracing gods and men, in which we look neither to this corner 
nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our state by the sun; the other, the one to which we have 
been assigned by our birth.’ (Seneca, De Otio)
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concentric  circles;  the  first  encompassing  our  body,  the  second  our 
immediate family, the third, more distant relatives, the fourth our fellow 
tribesmen, then our fellow countrymen, and the next,  the whole human 
race. On his view, what is required is that we keep drawing people towards 
the centre; both by transferring individual people from outer circles into 
more inward ones, and by moving the circles themselves towards us.12 The 
appeal  of  this  model  is  that  it  is  a  gradualist  one:  it  can  understand 
cosmopolitanism as part of a process of trying to bring other people closer 
to one.13 
Reciprocity
The key idea of reciprocity is reversibility in action; that it is due to others 
to treat them as you would agree to were the tables turned. The simplest 
and most influential formulation of the central idea of reciprocity is the 
golden rule. There are two canonical formulations of it: a negative one, 
‘what is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbour’; and a positive one, 
‘whatever  you wish  that  men would do to  you,  do so to  them’.14 The 
negative formulation is most naturally read as intending to forestall the 
ever-present danger of the agent taking advantage of the power he has, and 
imposing his will on the recipient of his action.15 The positive formulation 
is most naturally read as requiring something more: as a way of living in 
which one gives out to other people what one would like to receive from 
them. What is important is that both require the agent to cast herself into 
the role of the patient of her action, in order to appraise what she is doing. 
12 See Long & Sedley 1987, p.349
13 My reading of cosmopolitanism is indebted to Martha Nussbaum: see especially Nussbaum 
(1997). 
14 These  formulations  are  put  forward  by  Rabbi  Hillel  (Shabbath  31a)  and  Matthew (7.12) 
respectively. For a good discussion of both, see Wattles (1996). 
15 Ricoeur  (1992,  p.219) underscores this point ‘The most remarkable thing,  however, in the 
formulation of this rule is that the reciprocity demanded stands out against the background of the 
presupposition of an initial dissymmetry between the protagonists of the action – a dissymmetry that 
places one in the position of agent and the other in that of patient. ... it is upon this dissymmetry that  
all the maleficent offshoots of interaction, beginning with influence and culminating in murder, will  
be grafted.’.
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There are two important movements within the account of reciprocity; the 
first attempts to go beyond the golden rule, and demonstrate that a more 
carefully constructed principle of reciprocity can be shown to hold a priori; 
the second stays within the ambit of the golden rule, and seeks to clarify 
the spirit of the reciprocity that is required by it.16
In the first case, the golden rule is seen as a defective (even if intuitively 
appealing) statement of a more formal principle of reciprocity, which is 
supposed to hold a priori. Marcus Singer (1961, p.16) speaks for this whole 
approach when he says: 
In any of its traditional formulations this rule is not only 
imprecise, but if taken literally would be an abomination ... 
Such  literal  interpretations  of  the  rule  are  undoubtedly 
misinterpretations of what is intended by it. But what this 
shows is that as it stands the rule is imprecise and needs 
qualification. It neither says what it means nor means what 
it says.
Sidgwick (1962, p.380) thought that the golden rule when properly stated 
was self-evident, and must take the following form:
it cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it 
would be wrong for B to treat A, merely on the ground that 
they are two different individuals, and without there being 
any difference between the natures or circumstances of the 
two  which  can  be  stated  as  a  reasonable  ground  for 
difference of treatment.17
This seems to be the best place to slot Kant’s formula of universal law: 
‘Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will 
that it should become a universal law’. This carries the formalist reworking 
of the golden rule to its logical conclusion. Not only does it exclude all 
reference to  any contingent  matters  such as  what  the agent happens to 
16 There is a parallel here to the two ways of expressing the idea of cosmopolitanism: in both cases 
we have two different approaches to an abstract idea; one which attempts to show its objective 
necessity, and one which attempts to bring it closer to the agent’s own concerns.
17 Cf also Samuel Clarke’s ‘principle of equity’: ‘Whatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable for 
another to do for me; that, by the same judgment, I declare reasonable or unreasonable, that I in the 
like case should do for him.’ (Clarke 1705; quoted in Marcus Singer 1961, p.16).
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want, but it is also an extension by generalization of it: where the golden 
rule imagines that there is a situation with only two people, A and B, and 
attempts  to  equalize  the  relationship  between agent  and patient  in  this 
relationship,  the  categorical  imperative  attempts  to  equalize  the 
relationship between the agent and all other human beings.18
In the second approach, the true intent of reciprocity is uncovered through 
reflecting on the golden rule. In doing so, it tackles head on the following 
problem  (which  is  left  untouched  by  even  the  most  accurately  stated 
formalization  of  the golden rule):  the rule  merely  requires consistency. 
While it might require that I not harm others, it seems to say little about my 
benefiting  them if they are in need (as Kant put it, ‘many a man would 
gladly consent  that  others should not  benefit  him,  if  only he might  be 
excused from benefiting them’ (G, p.430n). This response to reciprocity 
attempts to make clear that such a reading of it is contrary to its spirit. It 
aims  to  take  the  underlying  idea  of  reciprocity,  and  infuse  it  with  a 
generosity,  so that  treating others  as one would like  to  be treated then 
contains within it  the idea of helping others, and not just refraining from 
harming them. 
The Sermon on the Plain, which introduces the command to love one’s 
enemies, provides a good example of this approach to reciprocity. I shall 
not attempt to engage with the vast amount of literature and commentary 
that this passage has engendered; nor shall I comment on any  religious 
meaning that the passage may be supposed to have. I shall merely follow 
Paul Ricoeur’s reading of how the rhetoric of this passage is supposed to 
impact on the idea of reciprocity and of morality in general. The passage in 
question runs as follows:
18 Interpreted in  this  way, reciprocity is closely linked to cosmopolitanism (and, in the process, 
gives a new way of understanding cosmopolitanism): for we can get to the idea of cosmopolitanism 
by laying down as a rule of reciprocity that each must act on purposes that are capable of being 
universal laws.  (Note,  however,  that  Kant himself  is quite  dismissive of  the golden rule in  the 
Groundwork; see his note at (G, p.430.))
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But I say to you that hear, Love your enemies, do good to 
those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray for 
those who abuse you. To him who strikes you on the cheek, 
offer the other also; and from him who takes away your 
cloak do not withhold your coat as well. Give to everyone 
who  begs  from  you;  and  of  him  who  takes  away  your 
goods, do not ask for them again. And as you wish that men 
would do to you, do so to them. If you love those who love 
you, what credit is that to you? For even sinners love those 
who love them. And if you lend to those from whom you 
hope to receive, what credit is that to you? For even sinners 
lend to sinners, to receive as much again. But love your 
enemies,  and  do  good,  and  lend,  expecting  nothing  in 
return; and your reward will be great, and you will be sons 
of the Most High (Luke, 6.27-35)
For  Ricoeur,  the  command  to  love  one’s  enemies  is  deliberately 
paradoxical. It is deployed strategically as part of an attempt to undermine 
the mean-minded idea of reciprocity, in which practice of the golden rule is 
merely a veiled form of self-interest,  where one ‘does unto others...’  in 
order  to  further  one’s  own  interests.19 The  idea  of  unilateral  love for 
enemies  is  deployed  to  stretch  the  underlying  bilateral  notion  of 
reciprocity  almost  to  breaking  point,  so  that  once  this  idea  has  been 
released, the underlying idea of reciprocity has been permanently enlarged. 
In  Ricoeur’s  words,  in  disorienting  us  with  the  paradox  of  love  for 
enemies, it ‘rescu[es] true reciprocity from its caricature’ – that is, from 
‘the merchant’s economy of exchange and its logic of equivalence’, by the 
‘substitution of the new motive of generosity for the ancient motive of self-
interest’. (1992, p. 395)
As before with the Hierocles fragment, a key factor in morality turns out to 
be the agent rethinking her own understanding of herself, in order that the 
pursuit  of  universalistic  justice  does  not  seem  to  her  as  something 
aberrant, but rather as something that flows naturally from herself. 
The dignity of persons 
19 As the Romans said, in sacrificing to their gods: do ut des. (‘I give so that you may give.’)
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The third way that morality attempts to render more concrete what it is to 
give each person what is due to them is through the claim that human 
beings as such have a dignity. In the tradition, this has been taken to entail 
the following three claims. 
1. Human beings have a worth that is categorially above anything non-
human
2. Human beings are  equal in worth to one another  (though, of course, 
each  is  categorially  more  valuable  than  anything  that  is  not  a  human 
being).
3. Human dignity must be respected at all times. 
Kant is the exponent par excellence of this conception of human dignity: 
Man as a person, i.e. as the subject of a morally-practical 
reason,  is  exalted  above  all  price.  ...  [H]e  possesses  a 
dignity  (an  absolute  inner  worth)  whereby he exacts  the 
respect  of  all  other  rational  beings  in  the  world,  can 
measure himself against each member of his species, and 
can  esteem himself  on  a  footing  of  equality  with  them. 
(MM, p.435)
This  conception  of  human  dignity  obviously  leads  back  to 
cosmopolitanism; if each human being has this absolute inner worth, and it 
is the same in each person, then it is easy to see how it could give another 
ground for  cosmopolitanism as  follows:  the  scope of  justice  should be 
universal because all human beings have dignity. This account of human 
dignity leads to a new formulation of the idea of acting well: acting well 
consists, above all, in  respecting  the dignity of each human being in the 
way that one acts. Hence the formula of the categorical imperative usually 
referred to as the formula of humanity:
Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in the person of another, always at the same 
time as an end and never simply as a means.20 (G, p.429)
20 See also (G,  p.428):  ‘[R]ational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature already 
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It  is  from this  strand that  we get  an  absolute  prohibition  on  forms  of 
treatment designed to degrade, to destroy humanity in a person, such as 
torture: 
To show contempt (contemnere) for others, i.e., to refuse 
them the respect which is owed man in general, is in all 
cases contrary to duty; they are, after all, men. ... So it is an 
outrage  to  inflict  punishments  that  dishonour  humanity 
itself (such as drawing and quartering, letting someone be 
torn to pieces by dogs, cutting off noses and ears).  Such 
punishments are not only more grievous to one who loves 
honour (who claims the respect of others, as everyone must) 
than is the loss of life and possessions; they also make a 
spectator blush to belong to a race that can be treated that 
way.21 (MM, p.463)
There is much that is unmistakeably attractive in this conception of human 
dignity. For it solves brilliantly the central problem of moral motivation, by 
explaining the point of morality in terms of the incomparable worth of each 
and every human being. So it is with a heavy heart that we conclude in part 
two that this Kantian conception of human dignity is untenable, and in part 
three  attempt  to  construct  something to  replace  it  out  of  the  resources 
available to us. 
1.3 On the varieties of morality
Morality  (as a tradition) also contains within it  deep disagreements.22 I 
shall consider two: first, the dispute about the status of rules in morality; 
second,  the  more  wide-ranging  and  intractable  dispute  about  the 
relationship between morality and human nature. 
marks them out as ends in themselves, i.e. as something which is not to be used merely as means and 
hence there is imposed a limit on the arbitrary use of such beings, which are thus objects of respect.’  
Note how this dovetails with the requirement of morality that it be a praxis, not a poiesis.
21 This underlying idea has of course now been given a legal sanction in the United Nations 
Declaration on Human Rights: Article 5 states that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,  
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, and incorporated into British Law via the 1998 
European Convention on Human Rights and Human Rights Act, article 3.
22 Remember MacIntyre’s definition, quoted above, of a tradition as ‘an historically extended, 
socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that 
tradition.’
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i) Duty, rules and moral life
All positions that fall within the tradition of morality must make a place for 
universal moral rules and for the motive of duty. No ethical position could 
claim to be a part of the tradition of morality if it refused to admit that there 
must be a coercive, rule based side to morality whose aim is to ensure that  
the  dignity  of  human  beings  is  respected  at  all  times.  It  cannot,  for 
example, merely leave it up to the individual’s own choice whether or not 
he chooses to respect the dignity of others. The reason for this is simple: 
the  tradition  of  morality  believes  that  respect  is  due  whether  or  not 
someone happens to want to give it at a particular time, and hence it must 
take steps to ensure that there are moral rules in place that can be enforced 
and which serve to protect the dignity of each.
The motive of duty (acting out of respect for moral rules) is the internal 
analogue of  universal  moral  rules:  its  aim is  to  create  a  psychological 
structure  such that  the  individual  is  able  to  coerce himself  into  acting 
morally if need be. Such self-coercion is necessary if we are to do what is 
morally required in a situation in which we find ourselves shrinking from 
it: for example, when we are faced with a person whom we greatly dislike, 
but must nonetheless treat with the respect due to them as a human being. 
However, there is a deep dispute within morality as to whether moral rules 
and accountability to them constitute the essence of morality, or if they are 
just its baseline, below which we must not fall, but beyond which more 
spontaneous and joyful expressions of the spirit of morality are possible. 
Kant is the leading spokesman for the part of the tradition that takes moral 
rules and duty to form the essence of morality: on his view it is dangerous 
arrogance to suppose that we can raise ourselves above the need to hold 
ourselves continually accountable to moral rules. Moreover, if we insert 
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any motive other than doing our duty for its own sake into our doing what 
is morally required, we deprive our action of all moral worth: 
It  is a  very beautiful  thing to  do good to human beings 
because  of  love  and  a  sympathetic  good  will,  or  to  do 
justice because of a love of order. But this is not yet the 
genuine moral maxim of conduct, the maxim befitting our 
position among rational beings as men, when we presume, 
like volunteers, to flout with proud conceit the thought of 
duty and, as independent of command, merely to will of our 
own good pleasure to do something to which we think we 
need no command. We stand under a  discipline  of reason, 
and in all our maxims we must not forget our subjection to 
it, or withdraw anything from it, or by an egotistical illusion 
detract from the authority of the law (even though it is one 
given by our own reason), so that we could place the motive 
of our will (even though it is in accordance with the law) 
elsewhere than in the law itself and in respect for it. (C2,  
p.82)
This approach has a knock-on effect  on theories of moral  judgment.  It 
places the primary locus of moral judgment in the rules themselves: moral 
judgment consists in bringing the case under a rule, ‘regarding its concrete 
features as ethically salient insofar as they are instances of the universal.’ 
(Nussbaum, 1986, p.300) It tends to talk not of rules, but of moral  laws,  
which  it  will  take  to  hold  universally  and to  be  as  implacable  and  as 
unconditional as all  laws. We find this approach to moral judgement is 
marked  in  the  Cicero’s  definition  of  natural  law,  in  the  formalistic 
reworkings of the golden rule, and above all in Kant’s account of morality.
On the other hand, we have positions which see moral rules and acting 
from the motive of duty as only part of morality. On this view, morality 
appears under the light of moral rules and of duty only to those who are not 
truly good. For those who have made more progress towards goodness, 
morality expresses itself more typically in a spontaneous generosity and 
giving: duty and moral rules are still there in the background, and may 
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come into play when the more spontaneous goodness is for some reason or 
other not currently firing, but they do not form the soul of moral life.23 
This conception of rules leads to its own account of moral judgment. It 
tends to play down the importance of moral rules: rather than seeing moral 
rules as unconditionally valid in their own right, it will suggest that we do 
better to think of them as imperfect attempts to spell out in a perspicuous 
and easily understood way the meaning of the morally basic notions of 
reciprocity,  cosmopolitanism  and  human  dignity.  Moral  rules,  on  this 
conception  are  summaries  of  good  concrete  judgments;  their  force  as 
principles comes from the wisdom of these judgments not from anything 
intrinsic in the rule as such. Moral rules will be subject to revision in the 
light of further insight; and it may even allow exceptions to be made to 
these moral rules  in the name of morality. In this camp would be Paul 
Ricoeur’s reworking of reciprocity, and (I think) Hierocles’ understanding 
of cosmopolitanism in terms of the concentric circles. 
ii) The relationship between morality and human nature
This terrain is far more difficult to map; the disagreements within morality 
about  its  relationship  to  human  nature  are  deep  and  tangled.  But  our 
purposes do not require us to produce a complete map of all the variations 
that are possible on this topic within morality; it will be sufficient for this 
introductory chapter if we roughly indicate some of the terrain that such a 
map would provide the key to.
a) There is a dispute about whether morality, as such, even stands in need 
of an account of human nature; as we shall  see in the next chapter, on 
Kant’s account of it, it does not (‘when applied to man, it does not in the 
23 I take it that this is the view expressed for example by Iris Murdoch, and it is close to the view I 
shall argue for in chapter eight. “A realistic view of morality cannot dispense with the idea [of duty]; 
duty is for most people the most obvious form of moral experience: Kant’s starting point. One might 
say that morality divides between moral obligation and spiritual change. The good life becomes 
increasingly selfless through an increased awareness of, sensibility to, the world beyond the self. But 
meanwhile requirements and claims, which we still recognise abstractly and as it were externally, 
demand to be met.” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 53)
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least borrow from acquaintance with him (anthropology) but gives a priori 
laws to him as a rational being’ G, p. 389). Alternatively (as I shall argue 
against  Kant)  knowledge  of  human  beings  could  be  most  relevant  to 
morality. 
b) Next, there is a dispute about the relationship between moral virtue and 
normal human development; that is, is morality something that normally 
brought up human beings just grow into? We have positions here ranging 
from Aristotle-inspired accounts, which take inculcation into moral virtue 
to be normal and natural, to Augustine-inspired accounts, which take it that 
human beings are naturally bad, and must be kept in line by the firm force 
of moral law. 
c) Next there is a similar dispute that  occurs, not in relation to human 
development, but in relation to the general goal of human life; that is, how 
is morality related to human flourishing? Here we have positions ranging 
from the highly optimistic, such as Aquinas’, which see morality and the 
best life for a human being as of one piece to positions, which state that 
there is  no necessary relationship at  all,  but  duty is  still  duty (see e.g. 
Prichard 1912).
d) Last, there is a dispute as to why human beings deviate from what is 
morally  required; or in more traditional language,  why does moral evil 
occur? There are many answers within the tradition, and they do not form a 
natural  continuum.  Important  answers  would  be:  human  beings  are 
naturally bad; our bodily nature tempts us away from the pure path of duty; 
human beings find it easier to divert their attention away than to respond to 
the call of morality. 
To  sum  up:  morality  has  both  a  common  core  –  consisting  in  the 
interwoven ideas of cosmopolitanism, reciprocity and human dignity, and 
an internal diversity – based both on different understandings of the role of 
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rules and on manifold different understandings of the relationship between 
morality and human nature. 
I conclude this chapter with a few brief words on the end at which morality 
aims. What we can say about the end of morality in general is slight, but 
yet  important;  it  consists  in  the  realization  of  the  ideals  of 
cosmopolitanism,  reciprocity  and  respect  for  human  dignity  in  a 
community, and it is in acting in such a way as to make this community 
possible that morality consists. But any attempt to further specify this end 
will  be  subject  to  variation  within  the  tradition;  there  will  be  disputes 
related  to  the  variations  we  have  just  mentioned  as  to  what  would 
constitute a realization of this end, what practical steps we should take to 
move  towards  it  and  the  degree  to  which  it  is  possible  for  a  human 
community to approximate to it.
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 C h a p t e r  T w o
Against Kant, for the sake of Morality
2.1 Introduction
This  chapter  is  devoted  to  Kant’s  account  of  morality.  Kant  bears  a 
complex relationship to the project of this thesis: I have no quarrel with the 
usual evaluation that Kant is the greatest systematizer that the tradition of 
morality has known, but at the same time the conception of morality for 
which I shall argue in part three is as far as it is possible to get from Kant’s 
whilst still remaining within the tradition. 
Kant’s claim to greatness as a systematizer lies in the way he takes the 
fundamental ideas of morality (cosmopolitanism, reciprocity and human 
dignity)  and  interlinks  them  in  a  new  and  rigorous  way  through  his 
different formulations of the categorical imperative.  We saw in the last 
chapter how the formula of universal law could be seen as an extension 
and generalization of the reciprocity of the golden rule; how the formula of 
humanity is a brilliant exposition of what it is to respect the dignity of other 
human beings; and the end at which morality aims is well captured in the 
formula of the kingdom of ends. 
However,  Kant  combines  these  insights  into  the  fundamental  ideas  of 
morality with certain other ideas that, whilst unnecessary to morality as 
such,  make  his  account  of  morality  both  self-undermining  (and  hence 
impossible) and offensive to many of the ethical insights morality should 
be trying to safeguard. As we shall see, there are several such ideas. What 
draws all these ideas together is their common desire to make morality as 
pure  as possible, both by sharply demarcating morality from every other 
field  of  human  endeavour  and  by purging  morality  of  all  elements  of 
contingency. Thus for example, moral rules are said to hold a priori, and to 
have no element of empirical determination in them; respect for the moral 
law is posited as a special form of motivation that is not contaminated by 
anything  sensuous  or  emotional;  acting  on  any  motivation  other  than 
respect for the moral law is denigrated as not possessing true moral worth. 
This  chapter  critiques  this  emphasis  on  purity  in  Kant’s  conception  of 
morality. It falls into three parts. Section 2.2 argues that there is no reason 
to follow Kant’s purifying assumptions about the possibility of morality: 
morality is quite possible without these assumptions.
Section 2.3 argues that morality is in fact  impossible  if we take Kant’s 
presuppositions about the moral law seriously. Section 2.4 argues that there 
are good reasons for thinking that the view of human life that comes out of 
it gets so much wrong that Kant’s account of morality is inappropriate for 
the general regulation of human behaviour. 
2.2 Kant’s presuppositions about morality 
Kant thinks that if there is to be such a thing as morality (and hence moral 
obligation) at all, it is only on the basis of an account that makes morality 
totally pure and free from all contingency, as his account does. What is 
essential to Kant’s account of morality is his insistence that the obligatory 
character of morality can be understood only if we recognize that moral 
rules  must  be  valid  a  priori  for  all  rational  beings  and we,  as  rational 
beings, are so constructed that we can and should act on the basis of a 
priori moral rules alone. 
In the preface to the Groundwork, Kant purports to find this requirement 
for purity in ‘the common idea of duty and of moral laws’. He continues as 
follows: 
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Everyone must admit that if a law is to be morally valid, 
i.e., is to be valid as a ground of obligation, then it must 
carry  with  it  absolute  necessity.  He must  admit  that  the 
command, “Thou shalt not lie,” does not hold only for men, 
as if other rational beings had no need to abide by it, and so 
with all other moral laws properly so called. And he must 
concede that the ground of obligation here must therefore 
be sought not in the nature of man nor in the circumstances 
of the world in which man is placed, but must be sought a 
priori solely in the concepts of pure reason; he must grant 
that every other precept which is founded on principles of 
mere  experience  –  even  a  precept  that  may  in  certain 
respects be universal  – insofar  as it  rests in the least on 
empirical grounds – perhaps only in its motive – can indeed 
be called a practical rule, but never a moral law. (G, p.389)
Kant  has a  Janus-faced argument  for his  conception  of  morality  in the 
Critique  of  Practical  Reason.  I  call  it  Janus-faced  because  it  seeks 
simultaneously to explain how an a priori moral law of the sort Kant thinks 
that there is is possible, and to show that moral obligation would not be 
possible on any other basis. But before we can evaluate this argument, we 
must introduce some Kantian technical terms.
2.2.1 Definitions of terms
Kant’s  argument  requires  us to distinguish  maxims,  practical  rules  and 
imperatives.  All  are  practical  principles,  that  is,  ‘propositions  which 
contain  a  general  determination  of  the  will’ (C2, p.18).  Maxims  are 
subjective,  and describe the general  conditions under which an agent is 
acting or will act (e.g. ‘I will steal whenever I think I can get away with it, 
and the stealing would not harm a friend’).24 Practical rules are objective,  
and  are  expressive  of  rationality.  We,  as  finite  (embodied)  beings, 
experience practical rules as imperatives, that is, as instructions telling us 
how  we  ought  to  act.25 In  Kant’s  words,  an  imperative  is  a ‘rule 
characterized by an ‘ought’ which expresses the objective necessitation of 
24 Cf the definition of a maxim at G, p.421n.
25 A holy being cannot be tempted to deviate from practical rules, and so automatically acts in 
accordance with the deliverances of morality. A holy being therefore does not experience the moral 
laws as accompanied by an ‘ought’, or feel commanded by morality. 
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the act and indicates that, if reason completely determined the will,  the 
action would without exception take place according to the rule.’26 (C2,  
p.20) 
It is obvious that any account of morality must hold that moral rules are 
imperatives of some sort. For, by its very nature, morality says that there 
are  standards  implicit  in  cosmopolitanism,  reciprocity  and  the  human 
dignity  that  human beings  ought  to  live up to.  Moreover,  it  is  equally 
obvious that we are not holy beings for whom acting in accordance with 
these standards ‘inheres by an inner necessity,’ (MM, p.222) so morality as 
such must go along with the idea that moral rules are (for us) imperatives. 
Kant  subdivides  the  class  of  imperatives  into  two:  hypothetical  and 
categorical.  The way that Kant draws the distinction in the  Critique of  
Practical  Reason  is  somewhat  elusive,  so  I  shall  draw  also  on  the 
Metaphysics of Morals. The Critique of Practical Reason account goes as 
follows:
Imperatives determine either the conditions of causality of a 
rational  being as an efficient cause only in respect to its 
effect  and  its  sufficiency  to  bring  this  about,  or  they 
determine only the will, whether it be adequate to the effect 
or  not.  In  the  former  case,  imperatives  would  be 
hypothetical and would contain only precepts of skill; in the 
26 The counter-factual reference to what would happen were reason to solely determine the agent’s 
will  is  problematic,  and  reveals  that  Kant  has  not  yet  fully  thought  through the  Wille/Willkür 
distinction. In MM, Kant distinguishes between the will, considered as practical reason (Wille) from 
choice, considered as lack of determination by any sensible determining grounds (Willkür). The point 
of  this  distinction  is  to  explain  how  we  can  be  responsible  for  our  actions  when  we  act 
heteronomously – something that is somewhat opaque on the account given in C2 as it stands. 
In this reconstruction I factor the Wille/Willkür distinction into my account, and interpret Kant’s 
writing in terms of it whenever it is needed by what he wants to say, even if he is not explicit in 
adverting to the distinction. In MM, Kant defines an imperative in a way that is compatible with the 
Wille/Willkür distinction: ‘An imperative is a practical rule by which an action in itself contingent is 
made necessary. An imperative differs from a practical law in that a law indeed represents an action  
as necessary but takes account of whether this action already inheres by an inner necessity in the 
acting subject (as in a holy being) or whether it is contingent (as in man): for where the former is the 
case there  is  no imperative.  Hence  an imperative  is  a  rule  the  representation  of  which  makes 
necessary an action that is subjectively contingent and thus represents the subject as one that must be 
constrained (necessitated) to conform with the rule.’ (MM, p. 222)
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latter  they  would  be  categorical  and  would  alone  be 
practical laws. (C2, p.20)
What he says elsewhere allows us to supplement this account as follows: 
hypothetical imperatives are all means-end – that is, they presuppose some 
end or goal and confer necessity on the means to be followed in pursuing 
this end. A categorical imperative, on the other hand, ‘represents an action 
as objectively necessary and makes it necessary not indirectly, through the 
representation of some end that can be attained by the action, but through 
the mere representation of this action itself (its form) and hence directly.’ 
(MM, p.222) 
On the  most  literal  reading of  the  Metaphysics  of  Morals  account,  the 
distinction would appear to be that hypothetical imperatives presuppose 
some end, and categorical imperatives are completely formal and hence 
abstract from all ends. But this cannot be right. Kant cannot simultaneously 
have claimed that categorical imperatives abstract from all ends  and that 
we can formulate the categorical imperative in terms of treating humanity 
whether in one’s own person or in the person of another as an end and 
never simply as a means. 
But,  if  we  turn  to  the  Groundwork,  we discover  that  what  it  is  for  a 
principle to be formal is subtly different from this. A formal principle does 
not have to abstract from all ends, just subjective ends: 
Practical principles are formal when they abstract from all 
subjective ends; they are material, however, when they are 
founded  upon  subjective  ends,  and  hence  upon  certain 
incentives. (G, p.427)
Thus we can read the formula of humanity as telling us to take humanity as 
an objective end:
If then there is to be a supreme practical principle and, as 
far as the human will is concerned, a categorical imperative, 
then it must be such that from the conception of what is 
necessarily an end for everyone because this end is an end 
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in itself it constitutes an objective principle of the will and 
can hence serve as a practical law. (G, p.428)
I  discuss  below  how  objective  ends  are  related  to  the  categorical 
imperative; for the moment I shall take the idea of objective ends as read. 
2.2.2 Kant’s argument for the a prioricity of moral laws
Kant can now avail himself of the following argument in order to draw the 
conclusion that moral obligation must require a categorical imperative:
1) Morality must present itself in imperatives.
2) There are two types of imperatives: hypothetical and categorical.
3) Hypothetical imperatives are not adequate to moral obligation.
4)  Conclusion:  Therefore  moral  obligation  requires  a  categorical 
imperative.27
There are problems with both 2) and 3). I shall discuss them in turn. 
2)  The  argument  requires  that  the  division  between  categorical  and 
hypothetical imperatives, each defined as Kant defines them, is exhaustive 
of all possible imperatives. 
If  we  can  imagine  an  imperative  that  would  be  sufficient  for  moral 
obligation, but which did not conform to the conditions that Kant places on 
a categorical imperative, then this argument will be shown to be unsound, 
for  it  will  not  follow  from  the  fact  that  hypothetical  imperatives  are 
insufficient  for  moral  obligation  that  morality  requires  a  categorical 
imperative, defined as Kant defines it. 
There are  two obvious sorts  of  imperative that  would be sufficient  for 
moral obligation, but which differ from the categorical imperative as Kant 
conceives it.
27 Kant does not, of course, set the argument out quite so obviously.
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First,  we could conceive of a  substantive  a priori  principle of practical 
reason, of the sort that moral realists believe to hold, for example that pain 
is objectively bad.
Second, we could conceive of the moral point of view as being given a 
priori and capable of generating inescapable moral rules that take priority 
over all other practical reasons, but conceive of the moral rules themselves 
as constructed a posteriori and in relation to our actual human situation. 
Whilst moral imperatives of either of these sorts would not be categorical 
imperatives under Kant’s definition, they would certainly be  inescapable 
and could  claim priority  over  all  other  practical  reasons,  and so could 
provide a law (have unconditional validity) for human beings.28
3)  Much  more  significant,  however,  is  the  assumption  behind  this 
argument, namely that if morality is to be possible at all, moral imperatives 
must have the force of law (have unconditional validity). Kant attempts to 
substantiate this claim by arguing in the following way that hypothetical 
imperatives could not be sufficient for moral obligation: 
i) We could not expect the subjective ends presupposed by hypothetical 
imperatives to hold universally.
ii)  Even  if  the  end  held  universally  and  was  inescapable  for  us,  a 
hypothetical imperative still could not be sufficient for moral obligation, 
because the end would be merely physically necessary and not rationally  
necessary.
iii) The end in a hypothetical imperative would be contingent relative to 
other ends that the agent had, and hence it could never provide a law (that 
28 Another sort of imperative that might plausibly be thought to be sufficient for moral obligation 
would  be  one  resembling  the  hypothetical  imperative,  but  which  posits  an  objective  end,  and 
explains moral obligation as following from the necessity of this end. Kant has a separate argument 
against such a position, that I shall allude to later in the discussion of the relationship between the  
categorical imperative and objective ends.
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is,  have  unconditional  validity),  which  would  be  necessary  for  moral 
obligation.
There is a whiff of circularity here: if you presuppose that moral obligation 
is possible only on the basis of unconditionally binding moral laws, then it 
follows  that  you  cannot  get  moral  obligation  out  of  hypothetical 
imperatives. But why should one suppose such strict conditions attend the 
possibility  of  moral  obligation?  I  believe that  there is  no good reason, 
particularly  given  that  (as  we  shall  see)  moral  obligation  is  in  fact 
impossible  on  the  basis  of  the  account  Kant  gives  of  it.  Rather,  I  am 
inclined to see in Kant a certain (understandable) lack of confidence in the 
worthwhileness of the moral life on his conception of it, and a correlative 
over-compensation by insisting over-enthusiastically on the unconditional 
binding force of moral obligation.29 
For, if we could find a deep desire that is so closely connected to our 
humanity that we think that we would not continue to be the sort of beings 
we are without it, and show that this desire leads inexorably to accepting 
the validity of moral obligations, then it is hard to see why such an account 
of moral obligation would not be sufficient for morality. As we shall see in 
part two, Christine Korsgaard and Charles Taylor develop this thought in 
two different ways. Korsgaard aims to show that valuing one’s self and 
one’s identity at all presupposes valuing one’s humanity (one’s ability to 
value),  and  that  this  chain  of  reasoning  should  lead  one  to  value  the 
humanity of all human beings. Charles Taylor suggests that our deep need 
to make sense of our lives points us on a similar quest, whose end goal is 
the valuing of the dignity of all human beings. 
More radically, and as I shall argue in chapter eight, we could adopt an 
even more hypothetical reading of moral obligation: rather than attempting 
to hitch moral obligation to something that is contingent in human beings 
but yet constitutive of human selfhood, we could explain moral obligation 
29 I spell this thought out in more detail in 2.4. 
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as much more optional. If we take it that the purpose of moral rules is the 
general regulation of human life in such a way that the dignity of each is 
protected, and that the concepts of moral obligation and of duty are to be 
explained in terms of this goal, then we do not need to conceive of moral 
obligations as categorical imperatives. We could develop a system of moral 
obligations  in  which  those  obligations  are  recognised  as  hypothetical, 
dependent on a desire to respect the dignity of others and the desire to 
guarantee that the dignity of others is respected by the promulgation of 
general rules. 
2.3 The impossibility of moral obligation on Kant’s account of morality 
We have seen that the strict bisection of imperatives into hypothetical and 
categorical,  and  the  claim  that  moral  obligation  requires  a  categorical 
imperative,  are in no way necessitated by the project of explaining the 
possibility  of  moral  obligation.  However,  this  strict  bisection  into 
hypothetical and categorical imperatives plays a basic and structural role in 
Kant’s entire account of morality. To see how, let us take up the argument 
of the Critique of Practical Reason again, this time from the point at which 
Kant introduces his first theorem: 
All  practical  principles  which  presuppose  an  object 
(material) of the faculty of desire as the determining ground 
of the will are without exception empirical and can hand 
down no practical laws. (C2, p.21)
This theorem decomposes into two claims:
i)  All  practical  principles which presuppose an object of the faculty of 
desire as the determining ground of the will are empirical.
ii) No empirical practical principle can be a practical law. 
Both  of  these  claims,  on  closer  examination,  turn  out  to  be  merely 
restatements  of  the  fundamental  distinction  between  hypothetical  and 
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categorical imperatives. Thus, the argument he gives in support of i) is as 
follows: 
[T]he  determining  ground  of  choice  consists  in  the 
conception  of  an  object  and  its  relation  to  the  subject, 
whereby  the  faculty  of  desire  is  determined  to  seek  its 
realization. Such a relation to the subject is called pleasure 
in the reality of an object, and must be presupposed as the 
condition of the possibility of the determination of choice. 
But we cannot know, a priori, from the idea of any object, 
whatever  the  nature  of  this  idea,  whether  it  will  be 
associated with pleasure or displeasure or will  be merely 
indifferent. (C2, p.21)
This merely states what I have already adduced as Kant’s first argument 
that morality cannot be based on categorical imperatives; except here that 
claim is not that we cannot expect a desire to hold universally, but that we  
cannot  tell  a  priori  if  an  object  will  provoke  desire.  Similarly,  Kant’s 
argument  for  ii)  is  a  mixture  of  the  second  and  third  arguments  why 
morality cannot be grounded on hypothetical imperatives:
A  principle  which  is  based  only  on  the  subjective 
susceptibility to a pleasure or displeasure ... cannot function 
as a law even to the subject possessing this susceptibility, 
because it lacks objective necessity, which must be known a 
priori. (C2, p.21-22)
I labour this point, because it seems to me to be of fundamental importance 
to understanding the deep structure of Kant’s account of morality. As we 
progress through the Critique of Practical Reason we encounter a series of 
oppositions: empirical vs. a priori; hypothetical imperatives vs. categorical 
imperatives; empirical principles vs. practical laws; material  vs.  formal; 
determination  by  desire  vs.  lack  of  determination  by  desire.  What  is 
important is that all those on the left hand side of these oppositions are 
continually explicated in terms of one another, and likewise for the ones on 
the right hand side. It is somewhat misleading, then, to think of these as a 
series  of  oppositions;  rather,  there  appears  to  be  one  fundamental 
opposition, of which these individual ones are partial explications. 
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This point is most important for the interpretation of Kant’s account of 
morality;  for  it  allows  us  to  see  that,  given  that  these  oppositions 
continually refer back to one another, we have far less room to manoeuvre 
than the sympathetic interpreter of Kant might like. There is no prospect of 
bringing an a posteriori account of moral imperatives such as the one that I 
canvassed  as  an  alternative  to  the  categorical  imperative  into  Kant’s 
account of morality; nor an account of desire and emotion that allows that 
they have a  share in  rationality.  For to  do so would be to unravel  the 
oppositions that are constitutive of Kant’s account of morality. 
There is one final opposition that takes all those we have introduced so far, 
and  extends  them.  This  is  the  opposition  between  ‘self-love  or  one’s 
happiness’ and morality. Kant’s second theorem connects the ‘self-love or 
one’s happiness’ vs. morality opposition to all the others that we have so 
far encountered:
All material principles are, as such, of one and the same 
kind and belong under the general principle of self-love or 
one’s happiness. (C2, p.22)
This  claim  requires  some  interpretation.  Kant  explicates  the  notion  of 
happiness as follows: 
[H]appiness  is  a  rational  being’s  consciousness  of  the 
agreeableness  of  life  which  without  interruption 
accompanies  his  whole  existence,  and  to  make  this  the 
supreme ground for the determination of choice constitutes 
the principle of self-love. (C2, p.22)
The important thing to note here is that the distinction between morality 
and self-love is supposed to lie at the level of determination of the will; the 
principles  of  morality  and  self-love  are  two  fundamental  orientations  
toward the moral law with which one might live one’s life.30 What makes 
material principles fall under the general principle of self-love is that the 
determining ground of the will  is inclination, not a priori principles; we 
30 We  discover  in  the  Religion  that,  according  to  Kant,  these  two  fundamental  orientations 
correspond to the difference between good and evil respectively. (R, p.31f.)
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thus loop back to the discussion of formal vs.  empirical principles, and 
from thence to the initial distinction between categorical and hypothetical 
imperatives. 
Kant now moves to derive the principle of morality. From the definition of 
a practical principle (quoted above) we know that practical principles as 
such ‘contain a general determination of the will’. We have just seen that 
all material principles fall under the principle of self-love. Given that the 
moral  principle is defined in  opposition  to the principle  of self-love,  it 
cannot be a material principle. Putting these two thoughts together Kant 
arrives at his third theorem:
Theorem III: If a rational being can think of his maxims as 
practical universal laws, he can do so only by considering 
them as principles which contain the determining grounds 
of the will because of their form and not because of their 
matter. (C2, p.26-7)
A more expansive working over of this  point  would be as follows: all 
material  principles (that  is,  those that have their  determining ground in 
something  empirical,  i.e.  desire)  have  been  shown  not  to  furnish  any 
practical  laws. Hence if  there  is  to  be a  practical  law, the determining 
ground of the will cannot be material,  and ‘If all material of a law, i.e. 
every object of the will considered as a ground of its determination, is 
taken  away  from it,  nothing  remains  except  the  mere  form  of  giving 
universal law.’ (C2, p.27)
From here, Kant moves swiftly to deduce what a practical law must be 
like: 
Since the material of the practical law, i.e. an object of the 
maxim, cannot be given except empirically, and since a free 
will  must be independent of all empirical conditions (i.e. 
those  belonging  to  the  world  of  sense)  and  yet  be 
determinable,  a  free  will  must  find  its  ground  of 
determination in the law, but independently of the material 
of the law. But besides the latter there is nothing in a law 
except the legislative form. Therefore, the legislative form, 
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insofar as it is contained in the maxim, is the only thing 
which can constitute a determining ground of the free will.31 
(C2, p.29)
It follows from this that a practical law must contain only its fitness to be 
legislated  as  universal  law.  With  this  we come back  full  circle  to  the 
discussion  of  the  distinction  between  hypothetical  and  categorical 
imperatives. Now we discover that the categorical imperative, as what a 
practical law must appear to us as, must take the following form: 
So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the 
same time as the principle giving universal law. (C2, p.30). 
2.3.1 Objective ends and the categorical imperative
It is time to return to a discussion I postponed earlier. We must elucidate 
how objective ends are related to the above formulation of the categorical 
imperative,  which  Kant  describes  as  the  ‘Fundamental  Law  of  Pure 
Practical Reason’ (C2, p.30). There are three basic relations that objective 
ends could have to the above formulation of the categorical imperative: 
they could either be prior to it, simultaneous with it, or posterior to it.
Objective ends would be prior to the categorical imperative if the source of 
the obligation of the objective ends were more fundamental than that of the 
categorical imperative, so that the obligation of the categorical imperative 
was regarded as following from these ends. 
Objective ends would be  simultaneous  with the categorical imperative if 
the source of obligation of the categorical imperative was the same as that 
of the objective ends. This would be the case either if objective ends and 
the categorical imperative logically entailed one another or if taking up 
objective ends were a  necessary effect  of the categorical imperative on a 
finite being.
31 I pass over the preceding section (§5) in which Kant attempts to show that a will that can be 
determined by the mere legislative form of maxims must have its determining ground ‘distinct from 
all  determining grounds of  nature’,  which ‘independence is  called  freedom  in  the strictest,  i.e., 
transcendental sense’. (C2, p.29)
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Objective  ends would  be  posterior  to  the  categorical  imperative  if  the 
source of obligation of the categorical imperative was prior to that of the 
objective ends and did not in any way entail the existence of objective 
ends. On this view, objective ends would be something over and above 
what we are committed to by the categorical imperative. 
Kant explicitly argues that objective ends cannot be prior to the categorical 
imperative. See for example how he lambasts perfectionism:
Only if ends are already given can the concept of perfection 
in relation to them (either internal perfection in ourselves or 
external perfection of God) be the determining ground of 
the will. An end, however, as an object which precedes and 
contains  the  ground  of  determination  of  the  will  by  a 
practical rule – that is, an end as the material of the will – is, 
if taken as a determining ground of the will, only empirical; 
it  could  thus  serve  for  the  Epicurean  principle  in  the 
happiness theory but never as a pure rational principle of 
ethics and duty. (C2, p.41)
Indeed, the whole idea of an ethics of autonomy is based on a rejection of 
the priority of objective ends to the categorical imperative. 
This leaves the other two options. In order to see what is at stake in our 
answer to the question, it may be helpful to consider it from a different 
perspective:  what  is  the  relationship  between  the  formulation  of  the 
categorical  imperative  in  terms  of  universal  law  and  that  in  terms  of 
treating humanity as an end in itself? 
We  can  see  the  remaining  two  options  (priority  and  simultaneity)  as 
attempts  to  explain this  relationship.  The first  form of the  simultaneity 
option states that the two formulations obviously and objectively state the 
same  thing  and  hence  have  the  same  consequences  for  action.  Kant 
suggests this in the Groundwork where he baldly states that:
The aforementioned ways of representing the principle of 
morality are at bottom only so many formulas of the same 
law: one of them by itself contains a combination of the 
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other two. Nevertheless there is a difference in them, which 
is subjectively rather than objectively practical ... But one 
does better  if  in moral  judgment he follows the rigorous 
method and takes as his basis the universal formula of the 
categorical imperative. (G, p.436-7)
The difficulty with this is that it merely asserts its conclusion rather than 
arguing for it or explaining why it is the case: it is far from obvious that the 
formula of universal law and the formula of humanity are the same at the 
objective level.
The second form of the simultaneity option tries harder to explain why the 
formula of universal law and the formula of humanity coincide. Its basic 
thesis is this: the formula of universal law is the categorical imperative 
considered  objectively; the  formula  of  humanity  is  the  categorical 
imperative  considered  subjectively.  When  considered  objectively,  the 
categorical  imperative  abstracts  from  all  ends;  when  considered 
subjectively (that is, in terms of the effect it has on finite rational beings) it 
prescribes humanity as an end in itself, which is then called an objective 
end.  The  formula  of  universal  law  and  the  formula  of  humanity  thus 
coincide because they are, so to speak, the inside and outside of the same 
thing.
In the priority option, where objective ends are taken to be posterior to the 
categorical  imperative,  the  formula  of  humanity  will  be  taken  to  be 
posterior to the formula of universal law and not derivable from it. The 
formula  of  universal  law  will  assume  a  lexical  priority  in  moral 
deliberation. The problem with this approach is that it seems impossible to 
square  with  the  argument  of  the  Critique  of  Practical  Reason.  Kant’s 
argument is dedicated to uncovering what a practical law must be like; the 
whole  structure  of  the  argument  assumes  that  there  can  only  be  one 
practical law. Further, there is no attempt to give the formula of humanity a 
separate derivation. Where we do have an attempt at a separate derivation, 
this either sits side by side with the claim that the various formulations of 
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the categorical imperative are objectively identical (as at G, p.428) or does 
not seem to be compatible with the argument of the Critique of Practical  
Reason (as at  MM, p.385). Now, while it is true that we could attempt to 
reconstruct a Kantian account of morality on the basis of these passages, to 
do so would be to ride roughshod over the way that Kant wants us to 
construe his account of morality: the essence of his account is to be found 
in  its  foundations,  and  not,  for  example,  in  the  applications  of  the 
categorical imperative. 
What  we see here is  that  there is  a  tension  between the  account  Kant 
wishes to adopt to ground moral obligation, and the more sophisticated 
account he sometimes wishes to adopt when actually spelling out moral 
obligations.  We are reconstructing his view from the perspective of his 
attempted justification of the categorical imperative; so we must leave on 
one side attempts such as these which might trace the formula of humanity 
back to a different source of obligation.32
It follows that, for the purposes of the examination we are undertaking 
here, we must assume that there is a congruence between the results of 
correct  application  of  the  formula  of  universal  law and the  formula  of 
humanity; hence it will follow from Kant’s argument that if the formula of 
universal law proves to be defective, then so necessarily must the formula 
of humanity. 
2.3.2 The impossibility charge
The impossibility charge states that i) Kant is committed, as an essential  
and ineradicable part of his account of morality, to certain claims and ii) it 
is impossible for these claims to be true.
I shall investigate only one of the claims of impossibility that could be 
made against Kant’s account of morality – that against the fundamental 
32 In chapter four I give an exhaustive analysis of Christine Korsgaard’s argument in the Sources 
of Normativity,  which attempts reconstruct Kantian ethics through such a separation between the 
formula of universal law and the formula of humanity.
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proposition Kant seeks to demonstrate in the Critique of Practical Reason,  
namely that pure reason can be practical. There are various facets of Kant’s 
account that could be claimed to be impossible, such as the ‘transcendental’ 
freedom, or the postulates of practical reason. I am not unsympathetic to 
these  charges;  but  prosecution  of  them would  not  take  us  any  further 
toward  our  task  of  constructing  a  viable  account  of  morality.  I  have 
therefore left them on one side, and have concentrated on a claim that is of 
immense  importance  for  our  broader  project:  that  pure  reason  can  be 
practical. 
The claim that pure reason can be practical is highly compressed. Kant 
provides an informative gloss on it when he introduces the main question 
of the Critique of Practical Reason as follows:
Is pure reason sufficient to determine the will, or is it only 
as empirically conditioned that it can do so? (C2, p.15)
Pure  reason  can  be  practical,  then,  only  on  the  condition  that  it  can 
determine the will without relying on any empirical conditions. ‘Empirical 
conditions’ are,  first  of all,  desire.  Second, they must include any facts 
known only through experience; that is, facts which cannot be shown to be 
necessary a priori. 
Thus pure reason is sufficient to determine the will if and only if the will 
can be determined by a maxim that incorporates nothing beyond what can  
be given a priori by the nature of reason as such. 
The practicality of pure practical reason requires the truth of three sub-
claims: I call these the moral precepts claim, the moral judgment claim and 
the moral motivation claim. 
i)  Moral precepts:  For the practicality of pure reason to be possible, we 
must  be  able  to  derive  a  priori  a  stock  of  moral  precepts,  which  are 
unconditionally  binding;  for example,  that  one should never tell  a lie.33 
33 Kant sometimes calls such precepts  moral laws  (see e.g.  G,  p.389 - quoted above); I prefer 
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Pure reason would fail to be practical if we could not derive an adequate 
stock of precepts from it. It would also fail to be practical if the precepts 
pure  reason  was  able  to  derive  were  not  those  that  morality  ought  to 
uphold. 
ii)  Moral judgment:  The ability to derive a stock of valid moral precepts 
would not be sufficient for pure reason to be practical, however. For we 
would also need to i) grasp which precepts were relevant to a particular 
situation and ii) grasp what the correct thing to do was, given that a certain 
set  of  precepts  were  relevant  to  the  situation.  Now,  obviously,  if  pure 
reason is to be practical,  then the determination of choice by judgment 
must be able to be completely abstracted from anything empirical. Pure 
reason  will  fail  to  be  practical  if,  for  example,  judgment  leaves  it 
indeterminate  what is to be done, or if there are  irresolvable dilemmas  
about  what  is  to  be done in  a  given situation,  or  if  judgment  requires 
empirical determining grounds of the will. 
iii) Moral motivation: if pure reason is to be practical, then not only must 
we be able to derive a stock of moral precepts a priori, and moral judgment 
must be possible, but also such precepts and/or judgments must also be 
able to lead to action; pure reason in separation from inclination must be in 
itself sufficient to motivate an agent to do what is morally required. 
To demonstrate the impossibility charge we do not need to go so far as the 
moral motivation claim; we shall see that the categorical imperative will 
break down both at  the level of moral  precepts and of judgments, and 
hence the claim that pure reason can be practical cannot be maintained 
whether  or  not  Kant’s  account  of  moral  motivation  is  correct.  Our 
confrontation with Kant’s account of moral motivation will occur in the 
critique of his account of human life in 2.4. 
moral precepts, as it forestalls a possible confusion between ‘middle principles’ and the moral law 
itself.
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2.3.4 The categorical imperative and the practicality of pure reason
We can detect two possibly incompatible approaches in Kant to the task of 
demonstrating that pure reason can both supply moral precepts and provide 
situational  judgment.  The  first  predominates  in  the  Groundwork:  the 
second in the Metaphysics of Morals. 
The  first  approach  collapses  the  problem  of  moral  precepts  and  the 
problem of  moral  judgment  into one another;  it  maintains that  we can 
apply the categorical imperative in a situation, and find out directly what 
we are  to  do.  On  this  view,  the  categorical  imperative  simultaneously 
provides moral precepts and moral judgment. 
The second approach keeps the problem of moral precepts and the problem 
of moral judgments separate. It takes it that the task of moral philosophy is 
to  derive  valid  moral  precepts  by  the  application  of  the  categorical 
imperative. Moral judgment, on this view, cannot be codified, but instead 
relies  on a  certain  skill  which can be learnt  only through practice  and 
experience.
The first approach is exemplified in the Groundwork; here we hear that the 
categorical imperative is the  canon  by which we are to morally estimate 
our  actions.34 Now,  if  pure  reason  is  to  be  practical,  Kant  must  mean 
something quite specific by ‘canon’ here: he must mean that passing the 
test of the categorical imperative is constitutive of the moral permissibility 
of any action. The categorical imperative cannot be, for example, merely a 
good rule of thumb, or a test that is only applicable to certain classes of 
case. For in either of these cases we would need to suppose some standard 
of moral judgment to which the categorical imperative was accountable. If  
(per  impossible)  this  further  standard  were  given  in  pure  reason  then 
perhaps the situation might be salvageable. But, as we saw above, it is 
34  ‘We must be able to will that a maxim of our action become a universal law; this is the canon 
for morally estimating any of our actions.’ (G, p.424)
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essential  to  Kant’s  argument  that  the  categorical  imperative  is  the 
fundamental law of pure practical reason.35
Given that there cannot be a standard behind the categorical imperative 
which could correct it, the categorical imperative must stand on its own as 
the canon for morally estimating actions. The problem, as we shall see, is 
that  the  categorical  imperative,  described  in  terms  of  the  formula  of 
universal law, cannot serve as a canon for morally estimating actions; for it 
simply  fails  to  pick  out  all  and  only  those  maxims  that  it  is  morally 
permissible to act on. This is the case whichever of the different readings 
may be given of the formula of universal law (‘Act only according to that 
maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it  should become a 
universal law.’) 
Any maxim that generates a contradiction when the agent attempts to will 
it  as  a  universal  law is  to  be  rejected;  those  that  do  not  are  morally 
permissible. Kant states that there are two ways in which a maxim can fail 
the test: 
Some actions are so constituted that their maxims cannot 
without contradiction even be thought as a universal law of 
nature, much less be willed as what should become one. In 
the case of others this internal impossibility is indeed not 
found, but there is still no possibility of willing that their 
maxim should  be  raised  to  the  universality  of  a  law of 
nature, because such a will would contradict itself. There is 
no  difficulty  in  seeing  that  the  former  kind  of  action 
conflicts with strict or narrow (irremissible) duty, while the 
second kind conflicts only with broad (meritorious) duty. 
(G, p.424)
These two ways of failing the test are usually referred to as ‘contradiction 
in conception’ and ‘contradiction in the will’ respectively. It is unclear on 
the basis of the examples that he proceeds to give how Kant conceives of 
this contradiction test. However, this exegetical is dispute less urgent than 
35 See, C2, p.30: this is part of the reason why Kant ought to find it suspect to provide a separate  
derivation for the formula of humanity.
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it might be, as the categorical imperative could not constitute an adequate 
canon  for  morally  estimating  actions  on  any  of  the  readings  of  the 
contradiction test. 
There are  three broad strategies for reading the contradiction test;  as a 
logical  contradiction,  as  a  teleological  contradiction  and  as  a  practical 
contradiction.36 The ‘logical contradiction’ interpretation is the one usually 
adopted by those less sympathetic to Kant (e.g. Hegel, Mill). It takes it that 
the  procedure  for  applying  the  categorical  imperative  (hereafter  CI 
procedure) is supposed to uncover a logical contradiction; on this reading, 
the reason why a maxim that contravenes a strict (perfect) duty cannot 
even be conceived as a universal law of nature is that to imagine such a 
maxim made universal is simultaneously to remove the conditions for the 
possibility of the original maxim. The best example to use here is that of 
the lying promise; such a maxim cannot be universalized because 
the universality of a law which says that anyone believing 
himself  to  be  in  difficulty  could  promise  whatever  he 
pleases  with the intention of not  keeping it  would make 
promising itself  and the end to be attained thereby quite 
impossible,  inasmuch as no one would believe what was 
promised  to  him  but  would  merely  laugh  at  all  such 
utterances as being vain pretences. (G, p.422)
Universalizing a permission to promise falsely would destroy the whole 
institution of promising; hence it would not be possible to simultaneously 
will  both  the  maxim  and  its  universalization,  as  the  universalization 
destroys the institution of promising that the maxim itself depends on.
This  interpretation  suffers  from  having  no  account  to  give  of  the 
contradiction in the will: if the CI procedure is supposed to be defined in 
terms of logical contradiction, what do we make of Kant’s claim, quoted 
above, that in cases of contradiction in the will ‘this internal impossibility 
is indeed not found’? 
36 I borrow this schematization from Korsgaard (1985).
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The teleological reading takes the contradictions in question to be provided 
by the natural purpose of human beings (use of their reason), or the natural 
purpose  of  human  interrelations,  which  is  the  kingdom  of  ends.  A 
contradiction  might  occur  either  because  someone  frustrated  their  own 
purpose  qua  human being, or because, if turned into a law of nature, it 
would  frustrate  the  possibility  of  the  kingdom of  ends.  Kant  lays  the 
ground for this argument with the argument about natural purposes in the 
Groundwork pp. 395-6, which starts from the premiss that 
In  the  natural  constitution  of  a  organized being,  i.e.  one 
suitably adapted to the purpose of life, let there be taken as 
a principle that in such a being no organ is to be found for 
any end unless it be the most fit and best adapted for that 
end. (G, p.395)
He then argues that it follows from this that our purpose is  not  our own 
happiness.  His  argument  is  as  follows:  happiness  would  be  far  more 
efficiently  secured  by  a  being  that  was  guided  merely  by  inclination 
without a will and practical reason. But given that we do have a will and 
are endowed with practical reason, it follows that their purpose cannot be 
the furtherance of our own happiness.
Indeed, his approach to the suicide example seems to suggest something 
like this; his argument against the person who feels that his life is no longer 
worth living ending his own life is as follows:
One  sees  at  once  a  contradiction  in  a  system  of  nature 
whose law would destroy life by means of the very same 
feeling  [sc.  self-love]  that  acts  so  as  to  stimulate  the 
furtherance of life, and hence there could be no existence as 
a system of nature. (G, p.422)
The point seems to be that i) the purpose of self-love and inclination in 
general is to ensure the furtherance of life; ii) hence if  from self-love one 
commits suicide, one is acting against the natural purpose of self-love. The 
problem  is  that  this  reading  of  the  categorical  imperative,  however 
plausible as exegesis of what Kant says in these particular passages of the 
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Groundwork, is in flat contradiction with the idea of autonomy. As we saw, 
any positing of an end for human beings that is prior to the moral law and 
that is to be made a determining ground of the will is explicitly ruled out 
by Kant’s argument against perfectionism, quoted above. No such reading 
can therefore explain how pure reason can be practical.37
The third reading is that the contradiction in question is practical; that the 
agent would not be able to  act  on his maxim in a world in which the 
maxim were universalized. What is supposed to be tested here is whether 
you would be able to act on your maxim to achieve your purpose in a 
world in which it was a general law that people acted on that purpose. It is 
impossible to  act  on a maxim that presents a contradiction in conception 
(say, giving a lying promise) because in a world in which such behaviour 
was  generalised  it  would  be  impossible  to  achieve  what  one  intended 
through  giving  a  lying  promise,  as  promises  would  not  be  generally 
believed. As Korsgaard puts it, “What the test shows to be forbidden are 
just those actions whose efficacy in achieving their purposes depends on 
their being exceptional.” (Korsgaard 1985, p.92)
This  interpretation  allows  us  to  discriminate,  in  addition,  between  the 
contradiction in conception and the contradiction in the will. There is a 
contradiction in the will, on this reading, when a purpose to be pursued 
goes against an  essential  end of the will – so that, although a world in 
which acting on such a purpose were universal is possible, willing such a 
world contradicts some essential feature of the will. 
37 Kant expresses an understanding of the relationship between morality and teleology that is 
compatible with the autonomy later in the Groundwork:
‘Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends; morals regards a possible kingdom of ends as a 
kingdom of nature. In the former the kingdom of ends is a theoretical idea for explaining what exists.  
In the latter it is a practical idea for bringing about what does not exist but can be made actual by our  
conduct, i.e. what can be actualized in accordance with this very idea.’ (G, p.437n)
To paraphrase: morality requires that we act so as to make actual the ideals of morality, and so 
make it the case that  the world  is  teleologically ordered. (cf:  G,  p.434: ‘Morality consists in the 
relation of all action to that legislation whereby alone a kingdom of ends is possible.’) Teleology, on 
the other hand, is a mode of explanation that presupposes that the world is (already) teleologically 
ordered. Morality does not proceed from teleology, but towards it. For an illuminating reconstruction 
of Kant’s account of this, see Äpel (1997).
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But  there  is  a  deep  weakness  that  affects  both  this  and  the  logical 
contradiction interpretation. There are many maxims that ought to be ruled 
out, but which are not ruled out by this test, regardless of whether we adopt 
the logical or the practical contradiction test.38 The simple problem is this: 
there are many maxims that ought to be deemed impermissible, but which 
generate  no  contradiction,  because  there  is  nothing  either  logically  or 
practically impossible about the maxim becoming a law of nature and the 
agent still acting on it in these circumstances.
Let us take as our example the maxim ‘I will hunt down and kill anyone 
over the age of 30, in order to keep the population down’. Now, I take it 
that  this  ought  not  to  be  judged  a  morally  permissible  action  by  pure 
practical reason. But yet it  is perfectly conceivable that a world should 
exist in which the results of following such a maxim held as a general law. 
(All we need imagine is that there are no human beings over the age of 
thirty and that people are eliminated as they reach their thirtieth birthday).39 
Hence this world passes the contradiction in conception test on the ‘logical 
contradiction’ interpretation. 
It  will  also  pass  the  contradiction  in  conception  test  on  the  ‘practical 
contradiction’ interpretation. For it will still be perfectly possible for the 
agent to act on the same maxim in this world. Indeed, it might be positively 
required of the agent that he act on this maxim in such a world.40 
Can the contradiction in the will interpretation help us out here? It depends 
on how we interpret it. Korsgaard suggests the following: 
If a thwarted purpose is a practical contradiction, we must 
understand the contradiction in the will test this way: we 
38 I  shall  henceforth ignore the teleological  contradiction interpretation,  on the ground of  its 
fundamental inconsistency with the idea of autonomy.
39 The example here is (of course) indebted to the bad Seventies film, Logan’s Run.
40 I am assuming here that the agent willing the maxim is under the age of thirty. Otherwise things 
get a bit complex: would a 35 year old be able to act on this maxim in this world? (If so, would his 
first act have to be suicide?) However, any contradiction generated would be wholly inadequate to 
the purposes of morality; a restriction on murder that only applied to the over-thirties would be (to  
put it mildly) sub-optimal.
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must  find  some  purpose  or  purposes  which  belong 
essentially to the will, and in the world where maxims that 
fail these tests are universal law, these essential purposes 
will be thwarted, because the means of achieving them will 
be unavailable. Examples of purposes that might be thought 
to be essential to the will are its general effectiveness in the 
pursuit of its ends, and its freedom to adopt and pursue new 
ends. (1985, p.96)
It is highly questionable whether there is any contradiction of the will’s 
essential  purposes  involved  in  the  ‘Logan’s  Run’ maxim  if  they  are 
described  in  a  way  that  is  as  formal  as  this.  In  fact,  Kant  seems  to 
presuppose a ‘thicker’ account of the essential purposes of the will in the 
two examples of the contradiction in the will in the Groundwork – willing 
not to develop one’s talents and willing never to help others. What seems to 
be contradicted is the requirement that we take humanity to be an objective  
end. (Note how these two examples correspond exactly to what he gives as 
the two ends of ethics in the Metaphysics of Morals – one’s own perfection 
and the happiness of others.) 
Though this makes sense of what Kant says and how he applies the test, it 
would lead to a circle in his account. Unless we take the end of humanity 
to  be  separate  from  the  categorical  imperative  (which,  we  said,  was 
incompatible with the structure of the  Critique of Practical Reason), we 
cannot  use  the  objective  end  of  humanity  to  explicate  the  categorical 
imperative. For to do so would be to attempt to pull ourselves up by our 
own bootstraps. If we wish Kant’s account to avoid this vicious circle, we 
can only require something completely formal of these essential features of 
the will; but such formal features are unable to exclude maxims such as the 
Logan’s Run one.
This problem is serious.  If it  is followed out, it  is rather disturbing for 
Kant’s account of morality. Those actions such as violence, murder and 
rape, that morality should be strongest in its condemnation of, suffer no 
contradiction in conception if we attempt to will them as a universal law. 
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The attempts to convict them of a contradiction in the will remain dubious. 
In fact it seems that all the categorical imperative can do is to disbar those  
that  depend  on  the  existence  of  a  particular  institution  and  which  if 
universalized  would  undermine  that  institution.41 The  claim  that  the 
categorical imperative provides a canon for morally estimating actions is 
therefore false. 
Kant’s second approach to the practicality of pure reason removes some 
problems by making the  distinction  between rules  and judgment.  Kant 
argues that this distinction is necessary in the Critique of Pure Reason and 
in the essay on Theory and Practice. He argues as follows that we need a 
faculty of judgment over and above any general rules we have. 
i) No rule contains the conditions for its own application.
ii) If we supplement a rule with a second rule to tell us how to apply the 
first rule, then we will need a third rule to tell us how to apply the second 
rule, and so on ad infinitum.
iii) If there were this regress, then we would never be able to correctly 
apply a rule.
iv) On the assumption that we do correctly apply rules, then we must have 
a  faculty  of  judgment  ‘whereby  the  practitioner  distinguishes  instances 
where the rule applies from those where it does not.’42
41 I am indebted to Korsgaard’s discussion of where the formula of universal law goes wrong. 
Korsgaard thinks that all is not lost for Kant however, as the formula of humanity can step in in such 
troublesome cases (1985, p.100). I have two points here: first (as I have already said) Kant cannot,  
consistent with his position in the  Critique of Practical Reason,  accept a separation between the 
formula of universal law and the formula of humanity. Second, once you admit that i) the formula of 
humanity and the formula of universal law proscribe different maxims,  and ii)  must be used in 
tandem so that they give a result that tolerably matches our ordinary moral beliefs, you have already 
given up on the claim that the categorical imperative is the canon for estimating actions and on the 
claim that pure reason can be practical. One would instead have transplanted the two formulations of 
categorical imperative into a general process of reflective equilibrium.
42 ‘On the Common Saying: “This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice’, p.61. 
See  C1, A133/ B172: ‘If [the understanding] sought to give instructions how we are to subsume 
under these rules, that is, to distinguish whether something does or does not come under them, that 
could only be by means of another rule. This in turn for the very reason that it is a rule, again  
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It follows that the task of moral philosophy is to give us rules, not to give 
us judgments in particular situations. But this ‘purer’ conception of the task 
of moral philosophy only serves to make manifest a deeper problem with 
the very idea of pure reason being practical.43
The problem is this: the formula of universal law, which as we have seen 
should be taken to be the fundamental form of the categorical imperative, 
depends on the ability of maxims to generate contradictions when they are 
universalized.  But  it  follows  from  Kant’s  account  of  the  categorical 
imperative that such contradictions cannot have any normative force unless 
the institution whose existence is responsible for the contradiction can be 
shown to be necessary a priori. 
Even if we agree that a maxim could not be simultaneously willed with its 
universalization, then there is no reason to assign any normative force to 
this contradiction unless we take the institution to be necessary. Suppose, 
for example, that someone takes as his maxim ‘I shall dress in such a way 
that I subvert the assumptions about manliness present in society’; now 
there is a contradiction in conceiving this as a universal law, because the 
maxim  promises  to  subvert  an  institution  (namely  manliness),  and  if 
everyone aimed at  such  subversion,  then there would no longer be any 
such conception of manliness to subvert.  But unless this institution can 
itself be  shown to  be  necessary  by  pure  reason  then  the  fact  that  the 
universalization  of  a  maxim  would  undermine  or  destroy  it  has  no 
normative force.44
Hence the relevance of Hegel’s example of property. Now, if a society has 
an institution of property, then we can quite easily generate a contradiction 
demands guidance from judgment. And thus it appears that, though understanding is capable of being 
instructed, and of being equipped with rules, judgment is a peculiar talent which can be practised 
only, and cannot be taught.’
43 This problem as applying to the idea of pure reason’s being practical as such will also affect any 
account that seeks to combine moral judgment with moral precepts.
44 Indeed we could go further: if an institution is such that it ought to be destroyed, (slavery, for 
example) then acting on maxims that preserve the possibility of the institution may itself be culpable.
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with the maxim ‘I will give according to my ability, and take what I need’; 
for this would destroy the notion of property. But what needs to be shown 
is that the institution of property is necessary a priori. It will be only on this 
condition that any maxim that would dissolve it if universalized must be 
abandoned.45 
This  difficulty  does  not  escape  Kant’s  notice.  In  the  Metaphysics  of  
Morals,  he  draws  a  distinction  between  what  he  has  done  in  the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science and what he believes to be 
necessary in morality:
It has been shown elsewhere that for natural science, which 
has to do with objects of outer sense, one must have a priori 
principles, and that it is possible, indeed necessary, to prefix 
a system of these principles, called a metaphysical science 
of  nature,  to  natural  science  applied  to  particular 
experiences,  that  is,  to  physics.  Such principles  must  be 
derived  from  a  priori  grounds  if  they  are  to  hold  as 
universal in the strict sense. But physics (at least when it is 
a question of keeping its propositions free from error) can 
accept  many  principles  as  universal  on  the  basis  of 
evidence. .... 
But it is different with moral laws. They hold as laws only 
insofar as they can be seen to have an a priori basis and to 
be  necessary.  Indeed,  concepts  and  judgments  about 
ourselves  and  our  deeds  and  omissions  signify  nothing 
moral  if  what  they  contain  can  be  learned  merely  from 
experience.  And should anyone let  himself  be led astray 
into  making  something  from  that  source  into  a  moral 
principle, he would run the risk of the grossest and most 
pernicious errors. (MM, pp. 214-5)
In other words, we will need to perform a transcendental deduction of each 
of  these  institutions. Whilst  we can  imagine  this  working for,  perhaps, 
45 I take this argument to follow from the one that Kant uses in the Critique of Practical Reason to 
establish that moral obligation requires a categorical imperative that is a priori necessary (see above). 
Just as in that argument inclinations were debarred from serving as the basis for the moral law 
because they do not have a priori necessity, so here any institution that cannot be demonstrated to be 
necessary a priori must be debarred from serving as the basis for moral precepts. It follows that if  
anyone objects to this argument against Kant, they should really object to his initial argument that  
moral obligation requires a categorical imperative and moral laws that are given a priori.
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promising and property,46 the most basic institutions connected to morality, 
such as the family cannot be shown to be necessary a priori simply because 
they must be deemed empirical  and contingent  from the perspective of 
pure reason. 
Pure reason thus fails to be practical. If used as a canon of moral judgment 
it will fail to pick out those maxims that are expressive of morality; even 
more seriously, the formula of universal law will not be able to generate 
moral  precepts  without  relying  on  institutions  that  are  themselves 
contingent from the perspective of pure practical reason. Pure reason as 
Kant conceives it is simply not capable of generating a way of deciding 
which maxims are morally permissible and what the moral precepts are 
that does not surrender the determination of the will to something outside 
pure reason.
It  follows  that  Kant’s  account  of  morality  makes  moral  obligation 
impossible: he argues, as we saw, in the Critique of Practical Reason that 
moral obligation is possible only if pure reason can be practical. But we 
have now shown that pure reason cannot  be practical; hence Kant would 
have  to  admit  that  moral  obligation is  not  possible.  As  we have  seen, 
though, this impossibility does not affect morality as such: for morality as 
such need not make such inflated claims about the conditions under which 
moral obligation is possible. 
Interestingly,  it  turns  out  that  the  very idea  of  pure  practical  reason is 
incoherent. Kant argues that normativity must go all the way down; he also 
argues that normativity is confined to the a priori. He is thus in trouble now 
46 Kant’s argument for the necessity of property is, however, pretty feeble. He urges that it is a 
postulate of practical reason that ‘It is possible for me to have an external object of my choice as 
mine, that is, a maxim by which, if it were to become a law, an object of choice would  in itself  
(objectively) have to belong to no one (res nullius) is contrary to rights.’ (MM, p.246) He attempts to 
show the necessity of this postulate a priori, because, if the contrary held, then there would be objects 
that could not be rightfully used by anyone, and ‘freedom would be depriving itself of the use of its  
choice with regard to an object of choice, by putting usable objects beyond any possibility of being 
used.’ (MM, p.246) This might have some force as an a priori argument  against  someone who 
claimed that certain things cannot be rightfully used by anyone. But this is not the point at issue: the 
alternative to property is rather the claim that all things are rightfully usable by everyone.
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that it is clear that practical reason must be at least partly determined by 
grounds  that  are  empirical;  for  it  now  appears  that  pure  reason  is 
insufficient  to determine what is to be done, because it is insufficient to 
determine the relevant moral precepts. But for Kant, the idea of a reason 
that  is  not  responsible  for  its  own judgments,  but  rather  acquiesces  in 
having its mind made up for it is a nonsense: 
Now we cannot possibly think of a reason that consciously 
lets itself be directed from outside as regards its judgments; 
for in that case the subject would ascribe the determination 
of  his  faculty  of  judgment  not  to  his  reason,  but  to  an 
impulse. (G, p.448)
It  follows  that  (on  good  Kantian  grounds)  Kant’s  conception  of  pure 
practical reason is incoherent; for it transgresses the basic conception of 
what it is for a being to have reason. 
2.4 Why Kant’s account of morality gets human life wrong
What I say about Kant’s conception of human life will be overwhelmingly 
negative; though it goes without saying that I do not think that is unfairly 
so. I should perhaps explain in advance why I shall not address in any 
detail the neo-Kantian attempts to get Kant off the hook on various of the 
charges I shall make. 
My  reasons  for  doing  this  fall  into  two  camps:  first,  and  perhaps 
paradoxically,  they  come  from  a  respect  for  Kant’s  greatness  as  a 
systematic  philosopher. Kant’s way of understanding human ethical life 
follows directly from his understanding of the morality, and his account of 
morality forms a highly integrated system, in which the various parts are 
supposed to necessitate one another. Once we understand this, we see that 
there is much less room for manoeuvre in interpreting him than we might 
like.  We  cannot,  for  instance  accept  some parts  of  his  theory  without 
accepting all of it, unless we have explicit arguments against Kant to show 
that the entailments between different parts of his theory do not in fact 
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hold. As we have already seen, it is the a prioristic conception of the moral 
law which forms the centrepiece of this theory; and it is this conception of 
the moral law which causes the problems.
Second, our interest in this thesis is in the tradition of morality, not in Kant 
per se:  reading Kant in  this  strict  way is  very helpful  for our  broader 
project,  as  it  both allows us  to  see the  ways in  which the tradition of 
morality can and has failed to live up to its own best insights, and provides 
a  valuable  context  for  the  Nietzschean  assault  on  morality  in  the  next 
chapter.
Kant’s conception of human life follows from his account of the moral law. 
I shall argue that this theory of human life fails both on a factual level, and 
presents a rather stunted expression of the sort of life that morality should 
involve. I shall begin by explaining what this theory is, and then explain 
why it gets human life wrong. 
This account of the moral law is, as we have seen, first of all a prioristic. 
The following two passages are indicative of his general position:
Ethical duties must not be determined in accordance with 
the capacity to fulfil the law that is ascribed to man; on the 
contrary,  man’s moral  capacity must  be estimated by the 
law, which commands categorically, and so in accordance 
with our rational knowledge of what men ought to be in 
keeping with the Idea of humanity, not in accordance with 
the empirical knowledge we have of men as they are. (MM, 
p.405)
The teachings of morality... command for everyone, without 
taking  account  of  his  inclinations,  merely  because  and 
insofar as he is free and has practical reason. He does not 
derive instruction in its laws from observing himself and his 
animal nature or from perceiving the ways of the world, 
what  happens  and  how  men  behave...  Instead,  reason 
commands how men are to act even though no example of 
this could be found.47 (MM, p.216)
47 See also, for example, G, p.425: ‘Duty has to be a practical, unconditioned necessity of action; 
hence it must hold for all rational beings (to whom alone an imperative is at all applicable) and for 
this reason only can it also be a law for all human wills.’
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For Kant, the moral law plays a constitutive role in human life: it sets up 
the conditions under which human life is to be lived, and qua constitutive it 
is itself beyond criticism. If we bear this in mind, then much of the rest of 
Kant’s conception of human life follows automatically. 
The most important result that follows is that there is an automatic ‘fit’ 
between the moral law and the world: while we are not to look to man to 
define what our duty is, it is nonetheless true that it is always possible for 
each  person  to  do  their  duty  at  each  time.  Kant  explains  how  this is 
possible  in  terms  of  his  i)  theory  of  transcendental  freedom,  which 
guarantees that, whatever habits a person may have formed, and whatever 
their  upbringing,  they  are  still  absolutely  free  to  do  what  is  morally 
required,  and ii)  an  a  priori  thesis  which  legislates  that  genuine  moral 
dilemmas are impossible, since
duty and obligation are concepts that express the objective 
practical necessity of certain actions and two rules opposed 
to each other cannot be necessary at the same time, if it is a 
duty to act in accordance with one rule, to act in accordance 
with the opposite rule is not a duty but even contrary to 
duty;  so  a  collision  of  duties  and  obligations  is 
inconceivable (obligationes non colliduntur). (MM, p.224)  
Hence  we  can  know  a  priori  that  it  will  never  happen  that  by  an 
unfortunate accident a person will finds themselves forced to do something 
that is morally wrong.48 
Now, if it is always possible to do what is right and moral dilemmas are 
impossible it follows that it is always fair (and, indeed, morally required) to 
blame someone if they fail to do their duty. 
48 Kant’s reasoning continues: ‘However, a subject may have, in a rule he prescribes to himself 
two grounds of obligation (rationes obligandi), one or the other of which is not sufficient to put him 
under obligation (rationes obligandi non obligandes), so that one of them is not a duty. When two 
such grounds conflict with each other, practical philosophy says, not that the stronger obligation 
takes precedence (fortior obligatio vincit), but that the stronger ground of obligation prevails (fortior  
obligandi ratio vincit).’ (MM, p.224)
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Actions and character too are to be measured from the perspective of the 
moral law. On Kant’s account, what matters, morally speaking, is not the 
result of the action – it is not what is brought about by it – but the maxim 
from which the agent acts: 
An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the 
purpose  that  is  to  be  attained  by  it,  but  in  the  maxim 
according  to  which  the  action  is  determined.  The  moral 
worth  depends,  therefore,  not  on  the  realization  of  the 
object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition 
according to which, without regard to any objects of the 
faculty of desire, the action has been done. (G, pp. 399-400)
The only motive which it is morally worthy to act from is respect for the 
moral law: it follows that all other motives are deprecated. Only actions 
done  from duty (that  is,  respect  for  the  moral  law) have moral  worth; 
otherwise, they may have  legality  (that is, outward conformity with the 
moral  law),  but  not  morality.  Acting  from  emotions  such  as  love  or 
compassion has no moral worth.49
Kant defines the good life for a human being  in terms of  the moral law. 
Moral virtue is the supreme good for a human being: all morally virtuous 
lives enjoy a lexical priority over all non-virtuous ones. But moral virtue is 
not the complete good, for it possible to imagine a life that is  better than 
one that is merely morally virtuous, namely one that in which that person 
was also happy in proportion to  their  virtue.  Such a  life  would be the 
complete good for a human being. 
The moral law also pervades his account of evil. According to Kant, human 
beings stray from morality because their sensuous nature brings with it 
inclinations, which aim at natural good (that is, our own happiness), not at 
what is required by morality.50 Although there is nothing wrong with these 
49 ‘It is of the utmost importance in all moral judging to pay strictest attention to the subjective 
principle of every maxim, so that all the morality of actions may be placed in their necessity from 
duty and from respect for the law, and not from love or leaning toward that which the action is to 
produce.’ (C2, p.81)
50 I have found Silber (1960) helpful on this point.
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inclinations per se, they tempt us to subordinate the claims of morality to 
them;  evil  just  is  the  subordination  of  the  moral  law to  inclination  in 
choice.51 Immorality is always a matter of making oneself an exception to a 
general  rule  for  the  sake  of  one’s  inclinations,  which  in  a  sense  is 
understandable (for we cannot help being moved by our inclinations), but it 
is definitely not excusable.52
Taken together, we get the following picture: we are to live in accordance 
with immutable standards; to live in such a way is always possible; and to 
live dutifully  in accordance with such standards  is  the  supreme human 
good.
2.4.1 Some criticisms of Kant’s worldview 
By presupposing this  a prioristic conception of moral  rules,  Kant gives 
himself  carte blanche simply to ignore any complaints that  might  arise 
from a deeper or broader sensitivity to the contours of human life. For it 
will follow a priori that no empirical understanding of human beings and 
of  human  life  could  in  any  way  alter  or  have  anything  to  say  about 
morality. 
However, we should not let Kant get away with this, for two reasons: first, 
it is a question-begging manoeuvre. Kant attempts to forestall criticisms of 
his theory of human life on the grounds of empirical knowledge of human 
nature by simply ruling any such challenges out of court in principle. But 
given that the critic is arguing from empirical claims to the inadequacy of 
51 See for example, Religion within the limits of reason alone, where he says ‘Natural inclinations, 
considered in themselves are good, that is, not a matter of reproach, and it is not only futile to want to 
extirpate them but to do so would also be harmful and blameworthy.’ (p.51) For Kant, ‘only what is 
opposed to the moral law is evil in itself’ (ibid); hence human evil consists in  subordinating the 
moral law to the goods aimed at by sensuous nature.
52 See also G, p.424: ‘If we now attend to ourselves in any transgression of a duty, we find that we 
actually do not will that our maxim should become a universal law – because this is impossible for us 
– but rather that the opposite of this maxim should remain a law universally. We only take the liberty 
of making an exception to the law for ourselves (or just for this one time) to the advantage of our 
inclination.’ (This might cited as further evidence that the coherence of Kant’s account of morality 
requires the formula of humanity and formula of universal law to coincide.)
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Kant’s theory of human life, it is no reply to the critic to argue that given  
that the moral law is given a priori, the critic’s charge has no weight.
Second, we saw in 2.3 that moral obligation is in fact impossible if we 
follow Kant’s presuppositions about the moral law, and in 2.2 that there 
does  not  seem to  be  any  very  good  reason  for  following  him  in  his 
assumption that these presuppositions are necessary for morality, and so we 
should take the very idea of an a prioristic account of morality to be in the 
dock, and certainly should not presuppose it.  
Hence in what follows I shall take it that we should test the a priori claims 
that Kant makes against our empirical  reality,  and that  if  what  he says 
seems to offend against the unavoidable structures of human life, that this 
is a problem for his account, rather than a problem with human beings. 
Just about every aspect of Kant’s world view as we have just explained it is 
deeply problematic. 
The most fundamental problem is Kant’s idea of the moral law itself: as we 
have seen this is foundational to Kant’s account. Put simply, it is simply 
not a live option any more to believe in the moral law in the way Kant 
does. This is not to deny that Kant himself took the belief that seriously, 
but  simply  to  register  the  fact  that  we  cannot.  We can  see  this  most 
obviously when we see how badly Kant’s attempts backfire when he raises 
to the heights of his rhetoric to expound the majesty of the moral law: 
Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace 
nothing charming or insinuating but requirest  submission 
and yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught 
that  would  arouse  natural  aversion  or  terror,  but  only 
holdest forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the 
mind and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always 
obedience) – a law before which all inclinations are mute 
even though they secretly work against it: what origin is 
worthy  of  thy  noble  descent  which  proudly  rejects  all 
kinship  with  the  inclinations  and  from  which  to  be 
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descended is the indispensable condition of the only worth 
which men alone can give themselves? (C2, p.86)
This strikes me as comical in its bathos; and I have never yet met anyone 
who is rendered suitably awestruck by it. 
It is not open to Kant to argue that this shift in consciousness is a symptom 
of our moral decline, because if his theory were true, such moral decline 
would, in fact be impossible. If his account were true, we would no more 
be able to escape thinking of the moral law in this way than we would be 
able to escape thinking of ourselves as existing in time or thinking of the 
world as ordered according to causal laws. 
Kant, we may assume, correctly describes the phenomenology of his own 
moral experience, but goes badly wrong in assuming that human ethical 
experience must have this form: what we have instead is no more than ‘an 
audacious generalization on the basis of very narrow, very personal, very 
human, all too human facts’ (Nietzsche, 1886, Preface)
In fact there have always been many people for whom Kant’s theory of the 
necessary structure of the human will seems just plain false, both those 
who are morally good, and those who are morally bad.
From the perspective of the morally good, there are many who are critical 
of any position that places rules before human beings, and which effaces 
the differences between human beings. For them, it is human beings that 
matter, not rules: the rules must exist for our benefit, not vice versa.53 We 
must  look again  and  see  what  the  differences  are  between people  and 
between peoples; we must notice that persons are different in ways that 
render problematic the very idea of moral precepts.54
53 A thought that first gains entrance to the tradition of morality through the ethics of Jesus, I think 
(see Mark 2.27: ‘The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath.’)
54 See  for  example,  George  Eliot:  “All  people  of  broad,  strong  sense  have  an  instinctive 
repugnance to the men of maxims; because such people early discern that the mysterious complexity 
of our life is not to be embraced by maxims, and that to lace ourselves up in formulas of that sort is 
to repress all the divine promptings and inspirations that spring from growing insight and sympathy. 
And the man of maxims is the popular representative of the minds that are guided in their judgement 
solely by general rules, thinking that these will lead them to justice by a ready-made patent method, 
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The case of the morally bad is particularly interesting: Kant’s account of 
the  moral  law  forces  him  to  assume  that  even  the  worst  person  must 
constantly have the moral law before them. The only space that he can find 
for evil in his account, as we saw, is to declare that evil consists in placing 
self-love  (one’s  own  happiness)  above  the  moral  law.55 Whilst  this 
obviously  fits  some cases,  it  is  desperately  implausible  as  a  theory  of 
human wrong-doing, because it rules out a priori  two ways of living a 
human  life  that,  though  destructive  are  nonetheless  common:  first,  the 
ethical code held by most career criminals, where one’s pursuit of one’s 
own happiness or self-interest is in no way bound by moral considerations; 
and second, sheer wanton malevolence, bounded by neither self-love or the 
moral law, a possibility which unfortunately appears to be all too real in 
human life.56 
Once we have broken the spell of Kant’s account of the moral law, we can 
see that there is something deeply problematic in the attempt to construct a 
moral theory that applies to rational beings as such and which applies only 
as a side effect to human beings. For such an account can only take into 
account  those features of  human beings  that  are  entailed  in what  Kant 
considers to be pure practical reason. This has the unfortunate effect of 
making the account peculiarly unreceptive to the relationships that human 
beings the world over value most, such as the bond between parents and 
child, true friends, and relationships between lovers: all of these come to 
without the trouble of exerting patience, discrimination impartiality – without any care to assure 
themselves whether they have the insight that comes from a hardly-earned estimate of temptation, or 
from a life vivid and intense enough to have created a wide fellow-feeling with all that is human.’  
(1860, Book VII; The Final Rescue II, para. 29)
55 In the Religion, Kant does briefly canvass the possibility of a ‘reason exempt from the moral 
law, a malignant reason as it were’, but then states that such a being would be ‘devilish’, and that  
man is not such a creature (p.30); he addresses the issue again at MM p.320n, where he states that 
‘As far as we can see, it is impossible for man to commit a crime of this kind, a formally evil (wholly 
pointless) crime’. The reasons why Kant cannot allow the possibility of human ‘devilishness’ is that  
this would disrupt the morality vs self-love dichotomy that (as we saw) plays a key role in the 
Critique of Practical Reason account, and second, that it would force him to admit that the moral law 
is more contingent to the human makeup than he would like it to be.
56 Richer and more psychologically plausible accounts of human badness are provided by Glover 
1999 and Oppenheimer 1996.
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seem to be dangerous and to require a watchfulness lest one overstep the 
proper boundaries and come closer than a proper respect demands.57 
This  problem is  exacerbated  by  making  duty  the  sole  morally  worthy 
motive:58 if we emphasize duty then we will misunderstand the most basic 
human ethical interactions – the parent-child bond; friendship; sexual love, 
in  fact all  those elements  which are  the  cradle of  moral  goodness.  We 
prefer to be treated from motives other than duty by those people we care 
about (few people would be happy to discover that their parents had acted 
merely  from  duty  in  bringing  them  up);  and  in  turn  become  worried 
ourselves if we find nothing but duty to motivate us in our encounters with 
them. 
Further, this conception of moral motivation sits very ill with our common 
sense judgment about those cases in which we are most certain of attaching 
moral worth: cases of supererogatory or heroic action, where a person goes 
far beyond what  could be expected of a rational  being in general  (and 
hence beyond their duty). Further, whilst such actions may conceivably be 
done from respect  for  the moral  law,  rather  more  often  they are  done 
spontaneously or ‘because it was the only thing to do in the situation’. 
But perhaps most important, there are systematic problems that attend to 
the living life for the sake of duty alone: what happens to the agent’s own 
life when he is reduced to acting all the time from duty, and disregarding 
anything else that he might deem worthwhile to the extent that it interferes 
with this goal? 
57 Kant theorizes friendship as a struggle between two forces – love which brings the friends closer 
together and respect, which forces them to keep a proper distance from one another, and he opines 
that ‘even the best of friends should not makes themselves too familiar with each other’ (MM, p. 
470), on the grounds that ‘Although it is sweet to feel in such possession of each other as approaches 
fusion into one person, friendship is something so delicate (teneritas amicitiae) that it is never safe 
for a moment from interruptions if it is allowed to rest of feelings, and if this mutual sympathy and 
self-surrender are not subjected to principles or rules preventing excessive familiarity and limiting 
mutual love by requirements of respect.’ (MM, p. 471)
58 I do not dispute that duty must play an indispensable role in morality, as I said in chapter one; 
but to make duty the sole morally worthy motive is a deep mistake.
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Kant sees this problem and thinks that it is serious. He frames it as follows: 
first, as we saw, he conceives of moral virtue as the supreme good, though 
not the complete good; he conceives of virtue as worthiness to be happy 
and  hence  lack  of  moral  virtue  as  worthiness  to  be  unhappy.59 The 
complete good would then be virtue and happiness proportionate to this 
virtue.  The  problem  then  is  that  although  happiness  ought  to  be 
proportional to virtue, in the world as we experience it, this is far from 
being the case. But given that morality presupposes this, there must then be 
an afterlife in which this deficiency is made up and a God who sees to it 
that the good finally get their reward and the bad are finally punished. 
Bringing God in by the back door in this way as a ‘postulate of practical 
reason’ is highly implausible: but the fact that Kant thinks we need God to 
explain how the life of moral goodness can make sense tells us that there 
are important mistakes in his system. 
The mistakes are as follows: first, it is a mistake to think of moral virtue as 
the supreme good: our own welfare cannot  be that  self-contained. It  is 
obvious that things may happen to me or to those I care about which render 
laughable the claim that, in virtue of my moral virtue, I have in my hands 
an enviable life. We human beings are not invulnerable.60
Second,  it  is  a  mistake  to  attempt  to  hold  moral  virtue  apart  from 
happiness: we do better if we bring the pursuit of morality closer to the 
pursuit of a humanly fulfilling life by making the morally virtuous life one 
that  incorporates  within  it  those  activities  and  relationships  of  mutual 
recognition which make for valuable human life.61 
59 Kant thus believes firmly in retributive punishment: “When, however, someone who delights in 
annoying and vexing peace-loving folk receives at last a right good beating, the beating is certainly a 
bad thing, but everyone approves of it and considers it as good in itself even if nothing further results 
from it; nay, even he who gets the beating must acknowledge, in his reason that justice has been done 
to him, because he sees the connection between well-being and well-doing, which reason inevitably 
holds before him, here put into practice.” (C2, p.61)
60 I discuss this claim further in chapter seven.
61 I discuss these claims further in chapter six.
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Third, it  is a mistake to insist that that virtue should be proportional to 
happiness. We can simply give up on the idea of virtue as worthiness to be 
happy: we can still argue that there are certain goods that are only available 
to  those  that  are  morally  good  and  are  realised  in  morally  decent 
relationships, without thinking that there has to be an additional reward for 
the good and an additional punishment for the bad. If we have confidence 
in the life of moral goodness, we can happily admit that the good person’s 
‘reward’ is nothing other than being the sort of person he is, and the bad 
person’s ‘punishment’ no more than being the sort of person he is. 
2.5 Conclusion
After the breakdown of the credibility of Kant’s conception of the moral 
law, we must start again with morality from the question of why we should 
take morality seriously. We take this up in the next chapter by looking at 
Nietzsche’s critique of morality. As we shall see, through his account of the 
dignity of human beings, Kant has the beginnings of an answer to this 
problem, even though it unfortunately remains largely hidden in his theory 
of human life. 
But what then of the great positives of Kant’s account of morality with 
which I started this chapter? These will be retained as far as possible and 
redeployed in the gradually changing framework we develop throughout 
this work. 
Here it might be appropriate to remember something that Kant says about 
his  own system and its  relation to previous  philosophy;  as he suggests 
previous philosophy should be treated, so must we treat him: 
Yet  since,  considered  objectively,  there  can  only  be  one 
human reason, there cannot be many philosophies; in other 
words,  there can only  be one true  system of  philosophy 
from  principles,  in  however  many  different  and  even 
conflicting ways men have philosophized about one and the 
same proposition. ... Although the new system excludes all 
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others,  it  does  not  detract  from  the  merits  of  earlier 
moralists ... since without their discoveries and even their 
unsuccessful  attempts  we  should  not  have  attained  that 
unity  of  the  true  principle  which  unifies  the  whole  of 
philosophy into one system. (MM, p.207)
We can admire Kant’s ambition and his subtlety in attempting to carry out 
his purpose; but we should not let respect for the man stop us from doing 
what  is philosophically  necessary – putting his  whole system of moral 
philosophy to the test of reason. Now that  this  system has been found 
wanting, we need to find a new framework within which to construct a 
moral philosophy that is both internally consistent and fits the essential 
structure of human life. In this Kant will be of great value; but only after 
we start to build a new house to a new design will we find that we are able 
to reuse the raw materials that the destruction of Kant’s account of morality 
has left us.62 
62 Perhaps a less charitable critic than myself might remind me of something Pa Ubu says in Ubu 
Enchained:  “Hornstrumpot!  We shall  not  have succeeded  in  demolishing  everything  unless  we 
demolish the ruins as well. But the only way I can see of doing that is to use them to put up a lot of  
fine, well designed buildings.”
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PART TWO:
DIGNITY
MAP OF PART TWO
Chapter three, Nietzsche’s Critique and the Necessity of Affirmation, begins 
with  Nietzsche’s  critique  of  morality.  Nietzsche  objects  to  morality  on 
three  basic  grounds:  it  attempts  to  legislate  one  ethical  system  as 
appropriate for everyone; it attempts to make everyone equal rather than 
respecting the distinctions of rank between human beings; and it is based 
on a resentment of other more vital modes of living rather than on the 
positive value of moral goodness.
I  argue that the idea of the dignity of human beings is  morality’s  best 
resource for answering these charges: through it we can explain why one 
mode of life is appropriate for all; why all human beings are equal and why 
morality in fact has a positive and affirmative value at its base. 
The rest of part two examines the possibility of justifying the claim that all 
human beings have a dignity. 
Chapter  four,  Korsgaard’s  Argument  for  the  Normativity  of  Morality, 
examines  Christine  Korsgaard’s  complex  and  subtle  argument  for  the 
normativity of morality. This aims to show that the form of reflective self-
consciousness we have leads, by an inexorable chain of reasoning, to the 
necessity  of  us  valuing  ourselves  as  moral  beings  with  a  dignity  and 
valuing all other human beings in the same way. I reconstruct the argument 
in some detail, but finds that it breaks down at the crucial point: the move 
to the claim that we must value our humanity and thus attribute a dignity to 
ourselves. 
Chapter five, Charles Taylor’s Ethics of the Good, looks at and extrapolates 
further from Charles Taylor’s writings. The argument I reconstruct aims to 
show that i) we have a basic need to find our lives meaningful; ii) this need 
must be expressed in finding some things good; iii) where this sense of the 
good does not include the affirmation of the dignity of human beings, it is a 
result of a form of self-deception or unwillingness to see on the agent’s 
part;  iv) therefore  if  an agent  sees  things  rightly,  she will  perceive the 
dignity  of  human  beings  and  act  accordingly.  I  argue  that  whilst  this 
account is promising, we simply have no way of demonstrating either iii) 
or iv).
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e
Nietzsche’s Critique and the Necessity of Affirmation
3.1 Introduction
In moving over to part two of this thesis, we cross over a dividing line 
between  the  pre-Nietzschean  and  the  post-Nietzschean  approaches  to 
morality. We saw in the first chapter how Nietzsche’s approach to morality 
attempts  to  do  two  things  simultaneously:  first  to  demonstrate  the 
incoherence of the account morality gives of itself, and second to interpret 
morality in way that makes it coherent once more, but which places it in a 
bad light.
Any post-Nietzschean account of morality needs to be able to withstand 
the squeeze from both of these sides: it must be both coherent, and find a 
way of deflecting the criticisms Nietzsche makes. The positions we shall 
be looking at in Parts Two and Three are designed to do precisely this. 
3.2 Nietzsche’s interpretation of morality
Nietzsche’s  interpretation  of  morality63 presupposes,  following  ancient 
ethics, that the fundamental standard by which ethical systems should be 
judged is  the  flourishing of the individual.  Where  it  differs  from these 
ancient  accounts is that it  does not presuppose that there are  universal 
standards for human flourishing, and on the contrary thinks that it  is a 
dangerous mistake to apply the same standards to everyone: 
63 Here and elsewhere when ‘morality’ is used unaccompanied, I intend it to be taken in the way I 
explicated it in chapter one, not in Nietzsche’s usage of the term. Later, when I refer to ‘master 
morality’ and ‘slave morality’ these will be following Nietzsche’s usage.
Every  unegoistic  morality  which  takes  itself  as 
unconditional  and  addresses  itself  to  everybody  is  not 
merely  a  sin  against  taste:  it  is  an instigation  to  sins  of 
omission,  one  seduction  more  under  the  mask  of 
philanthropy  –  and  a  seduction  precisely  for  the  higher, 
rarer, privileged. Moralities must first of all  be forced to 
bow  before  order  of  rank,  their  presumption  must  be 
brought  home  to  them  –  until  they  at  last  come  to 
understand that it is immoral to say: ‘What is good for one 
is good for another.’ (1886, §221)
What is worse, the values morality attempts to make universal are those 
that  are  suitable  only  for  weak  people,  and  so  universalizing  them  is 
harmful above all to the strong. This is an important problem because the 
sort of values that make human life worth living can only be created by the 
strong,  and the strong can  only  create  such values  in  situations  where 
distinctions of rank are observed (in Nietzsche’s terms, out of a pathos of  
distance). All in all the charge is that in moving away from elitist values, 
where  one  values  according  to  one’s  rank  as  a  human  being,  towards 
universalistic and  democratic  values,  morality  sacrifices  the  chance  of 
greatness and diminishes mankind, reducing everything to the level of a 
dull, insipid mediocrity.64 
For Nietzsche, morality is an  inversion of the proper order of values: as 
such there is  something strange and problematic  about  it.  How did we 
come to believe it in the first place? Nietzsche’s suggestion is that we see 
the  sort  of  mode  of  valuation  involved  in  morality  as  powerlessness 
becoming creative and expressing itself in resentment at the uninhibited 
powerful outflowing of vitality that belongs to the elite. By sheer cunning 
this mode of valuation has insinuated itself into general consciousness to 
such an extent that even the strong feel guilty in exercising their strength.65 
64 “What if a regressive trait lurked in ‘the good man’, likewise a danger, an enticement, poison, a 
narcotic, so that the present  lived at the expense of the future? Perhaps in more comfort and less 
danger, but also in a smaller-minded, meaner manner? . . . So that morality itself were to blame if 
man, as species, never reached his highest potential power and splendour? So that morality itself was 
the danger of dangers? ….” (1887, Preface, 6)
65 Nietzsche argues (1887, I.13) that the invention of freedom of the will has been the major way 
in which this inversion has been managed: “no wonder then, if the entrenched, secretly smouldering 
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Nietzsche  expresses  this  theory  in  the  first  essay  of  the  Genealogy of  
Morals. His foundational claim is that valuation starts with those who are 
pre-eminent seeing themselves as vastly superior to the mass of common 
riff-raff  and praising themselves as superior.66 It  is precisely out  of the 
awareness  of  the  vast  gulf  between  themselves  and  the  others  (in 
Nietzsche’s terms, this  pathos of distance) that ‘they claimed the right to 
create values and give these values names.’ (1887, I.2)
On this mode of valuation ‘good’ enjoys a conceptual priority to ‘bad’. The 
good first of all pick themselves out as the good, and the bad are merely 
those who are left over. ‘Bad’ is only ever a shadowy existence, an after 
thought.67 But  what  about  the  naturally  weak?  They  cannot  affirm 
themselves as the weak in the face of those who are naturally stronger. 
Rather, they ‘project feelings of hatred and vengefulness onto the noble 
caste, feelings which, however, they cannot actually act upon, precisely 
because of their inferiority, and therefore take refuge in imaginary revenge. 
These revenge fantasies harden into  ressentiment  – into jealousy of the 
superior individuals’ qualities and suspicion of everything that makes their 
superiority manifest.’ (Joas, 2000, p.24)
Nietzsche  calls  the  first  mode  of  valuation  ‘master  morality’ and  the 
second,  ‘slave  morality’.  Where  master  morality  is  affirmative  –  the 
masters  affirm  themselves  as  ‘the  good’,  slave  morality  is  by  its  very 
nature reactive:
Slave morality says ‘no’ on principle to everything that is 
‘outside’,  ‘other’,  non-self’:  and  this  ‘no’ is  its  creative 
emotions of revenge and hatred put this belief to their own use and, in fact, do not defend any belief 
more passionately than that the strong are free to be weak, and the bird of prey are free to be lambs: - 
in this way, they gain the right to make the birds of prey responsible for being birds of prey…” See 
also Williams (1993) on this.
66 “The judgment ‘good’ does not emanate from those to whom goodness is shown! Instead it has 
been ‘the good’ themselves, meaning the noble, the mighty, the high-placed and the high-minded, 
who saw and judged themselves and their actions as good, I mean first-rate, in contrast to everything 
lowly, low-minded, common and plebeian.” (Nietzsche 1887, I.2)
67 ‘[I]ts negative concept ‘low’, ‘common’, ‘bad’ is only a pale contrast created after the event 
compared to its positive basic concept, saturated with life and passion. “We the noble, the good, the 
beautiful and the happy!”’ (Nietzsche, 1887, I.10)
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deed. This reversal of the evaluating glance – this inevitable  
orientation to the outside instead of back onto itself – is a 
feature  of  ressentiment:  in  order  to  come  about,  slave 
morality first has to have an opposing, external world, it 
needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to 
act at all, – its action is basically a reaction. (1887, I.10)
Whereas in a master morality ‘good’ has a conceptual priority and ‘bad’ is 
an after-thought, a slave morality must make what it is opposed to – which 
it denominates ‘evil’ – conceptually prior, and make its ‘good’ an after-
thought. And who is ‘evil’ on the slave morality's account? ‘The stern reply 
is:  precisely  the ‘good’ person of the other morality, the noble, powerful, 
dominating man, but re-touched, re-interpreted and re-viewed through the 
poisonous eyes of ressentiment.’ (1887, I.11)
Putting all  these thoughts together, Nietzsche expresses his fundamental 
charge against morality in the following way:
To  refrain  from  mutual  injury,  mutual  violence,  mutual 
exploitation, to equate one’s own will with that of another: 
this may in a certain rough sense become good manners 
between  individuals  if  the  conditions  for  it  are  present 
(namely  if  their  strength  and value standards  are  in  fact 
similar and they both belong to one body). As soon as there 
is  a desire  to take this  principle  further,  however,  and if 
possible even as the fundamental principle of society, it at 
once reveals itself for what it is: as the will to the denial of 
life,  as  the principle  of dissolution and decay.  Even that 
body within which, as was previously assumed, individuals 
treat one another as equals – this happens in every healthy 
aristocracy – must, if it is a living and not a decaying body, 
itself do all that to other bodies which the individuals within 
it refrain from doing to one another: it will have to be the 
will to power incarnate, it will want to grow, expand, draw 
to  itself,  gain  ascendancy  –  not  out  of  any  morality  or 
immorality, but because it  lives, and because life is will to 
power.  … ‘Exploitation’ does not pertain to a corrupt or 
imperfect or primitive society: it pertains to the essence of 
the living thing as a fundamental organic function, it is a 
consequence  of  the  intrinsic  will  to  power  which  is 
precisely the will of life. – Granted this is a novelty as a 
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theory – as a reality it is the primordial fact of all history: 
let us be at least that honest with ourselves!’ (1886, §259)
To sum up, Nietzsche’s charge is that the tradition of morality, is flawed, 
first in its very idea of setting universal ethical standards for human beings; 
second in its insistence on equality and its attempt to efface distinctions of 
rank; and third because it is a slave morality, powered by a resentment of 
others, whom it denominates evil, and not by the life affirming power of its 
conception of goodness. Nietzsche is interested, fundamentally,  in what 
makes life worth living and his charge is that the general regulation of 
society according to the standards of morality stands in the way of this. 
It is best to begin by repaying Nietzsche’s perennial honesty in like kind, 
and admit that Nietzsche’s attack is not totally without foundation; and to 
simply accept with gratitude his uncovering of the myriad occasions in 
which morality has through its history indeed had a corrosive effect on the 
lives both of those who live according to it, and those who interact with 
them. 
But it no way follows that morality must of necessity lead to these negative 
effects. Rather it is open to us to take Nietzsche’s analyses as a challenge. 
We can agree that if morality can only be motivated by sickly resentment, 
then it is indeed indefensible: but the door is open to us to explain how 
morality might make life worth living for each and every person.68 
Morality’s most obvious resource for doing this is to invoke the dignity of 
human beings. The dignity of human beings, as it has been understood in 
the tradition of morality, undercuts Nietzsche’s complaints about universal 
standards and about equality: as we saw in chapter one, morality has taken 
68 As Charles Taylor puts it: ‘Nietzsche’s challenge is based on a deep insight. If morality can only 
be powered negatively, where there can be no such thing as beneficence powered by an affirmation 
of the recipient as a being of value, then pity is destructive to the giver and degrading to the receiver, 
and the ethic of benevolence may indeed be indefensible. Nietzsche’s challenge is on the deepest 
level,  because  he  is  looking  precisely  for  what  can  release  such  an  affirmation  of  being.  His 
unsettling conclusion is that it is the ethic of benevolence which stands in the way of it. Only if there  
is such a thing as agape, or one of the secular claimants to its succession, is Nietzsche wrong.’ (1989, 
p.516)
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all human beings to have a dignity, and this dignity to make them equal in 
worth  to  one  another,  and  to  require  a  respect  for  each  that  can  only 
properly be captured in universal rules. 
Indeed, the dignity of human beings, one could argue, has always been the 
positive affirmation of worth at the heart of morality: it is worthwhile being 
moral simply because human beings – oneself and others – have a dignity 
that  merits  respect.  The idea  of  the  dignity of  human beings,  in  other 
words, instantiates the sort of affirmation of life that Nietzsche looks to the 
strong to create from their pathos of distance: but instead of coming from 
imposing one’s will and one’s interpretations on the world, this affirmation 
comes from recognizing the value of human beings, oneself included. 
Any account of morality that takes the dignity of human beings seriously is 
very far indeed from being a  will to nothingness,  a ‘practical nihilism’.69 
(Nietzsche 1895, §7) Such an account of morality will, in fact, be a great 
bulwark  against  nihilism. The assertion of the dignity of human beings 
thus constitutes an act of affirmation of the value and worthwhileness of 
human life on a huge scale: an act of communal affirmation, through which 
each person affirms  the  value  both  of  themselves  and all  other  human 
beings.70 
69 This charge is levelled (not unfairly) at Schopenhauer’s (1841) account of morality, though this 
should invite the question  why  he takes Schopenhauer’s position to be the logical conclusion of 
‘Christian morality’.
70 If we place the dignity of human beings at the forefront of our account of morality in this way, 
we get a different conception of moral rules from Kant’s: we retain the idea of universal moral rules,  
but take them to follow as a corollary of the affirmation of human beings involved in according them 
a dignity. Paul Ricoeur explains the structure of such an ethics better than anyone: ‘[Y]ou shall not 
take life, you shall not steal, you shall not kill, you shall not torture. In each case, morality replies to 
violence. And if the commandment cannot do otherwise than to take the form of a prohibition, this is 
precisely because of evil: to all the figures of evil responds the no of morality. On the level of the 
ethical aim, however, solicitude, as the mutual exchange of self-esteems, is affirmative through and 
through. This affirmation, which can well be termed original, is the hidden soul of the prohibition. It  
is what, ultimately, arms our indignation, that is, our rejection of  indignities  inflicted on others.’ 
(1992, p.221)
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3.3 The very idea of dignity
Reading Nietzsche presents us with two sorts of problem for this approach 
to morality. The first problem is that on Nietzsche’s view, the dignity of 
human beings is a human invention, and moreover one that works from 
factually false premisses:
The four errors. –  Man has been educated by his errors. 
First, he always saw himself only incompletely; second, he 
endowed himself with fictitious attributes; third, he placed 
himself in a false order of rank in relation to animals and 
nature; fourth, he invented ever new tables of goods and 
always  accepted  them  for  a  time  as  eternal  and 
unconditional: as a result of this, now one and now another 
human impulse and state held first place and was ennobled 
because  it  was  esteemed  so  highly.  If  we  removed  the 
effects  of  these  four  errors,  we  should  also  remove 
humanity, humaneness, and “human dignity.” (1882, §115) 
Now, from Nietzsche’s perspective, the fact that something is false is not in 
itself  an objection to it:  but those who have believed in the dignity of 
human beings have generally been rather more absolutist in their approach 
to truth. For them it has been important to say that it is true that all human 
beings have a dignity, and to provide arguments in support of this claim. 
So, even though this does not represent a serious objection to the idea of 
the dignity of human beings from  Nietzsche’s perspective, it is one that 
morality will want to take seriously. 
The  second  problem  is,  as  we  have  seen,  Nietzsche’s  contention  that 
distinctions of rank are a prerequisite for vital human life and hence that it 
is a mistake to attempt to install a table of values in which everyone is 
equal. 
I shall address the first in the remainder of this chapter. The second must 
wait until chapter six for a proper consideration. 
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We could reply to the first problem Nietzsche raises in two ways.71 The 
first  reply  would  argue  that  pace  Nietzsche,  the  affirmation  of  human 
beings required by the concept of dignity does latch onto something real: 
there is an identifiable special trait or traits that all human beings have that 
makes it appropriate to accord them a dignity.72 
The  second  reply  would  be  more  circumspect,  and  possibly  more 
conciliatory to Nietzsche’s way of proceeding. It would eschew the claim 
that there is an identifiable special trait or traits that human beings have in 
virtue of which  it is appropriate to accord them a dignity. It will suggest 
that we only need defend the attitude of affirmation of other human beings, 
and that the defence of such an attitude need not require there to be special 
value-inducing traits of human beings that are identifiable separately from 
our attitude of affirmation.73
I shall spend the rest of this chapter examining the possibility of giving a 
positive justification,  before  concluding that  the possibility  of so doing 
seems remote, and that the sceptical justification seems to be much the best 
way to proceed. The next two chapters then examine Christine Korsgaard’s 
and Charles Taylor’s unsuccessful attempts to make something out of the 
sceptical justification: I give my account of the dignity of human beings in 
chapter seven and eight.  
3.4 The positive justification
When we introduced the topic of the dignity of human beings in chapter 
one, we said that it could be decomposed into the following three thoughts:
71 Margalit, whose work I have found helpful has a similar discussion, on the topic of how to 
justify respect for human beings. He also considers a third option, which he calls the ‘negative  
justification’, which would not attempt to ‘provide a justification for respecting people, but only for  
not humiliating them.’ (1996, p.84) I leave this on one side as it does not even aspire to give the sort  
of affirmation which we require of human life.
72 Margalit calls this a ‘positive justification’
73 Margalit  calls  this  a  ‘sceptical  justification’:  In  his  words,  it  ‘giv[es]  up the search  for  a 
justifying trait that is prior to the attitude of respect. Instead, the attitude of respect becomes the 
starting point, while the respect-evoking trait of being human is derived from this attitude itself.’ 
(1996, p.77)
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1. Human beings as such have a worth that is categorially higher  than 
anything non-human (animals, things etc.).
2. Human beings are equal in worth to one another.
3. The dignity (‘absolute inner worth’) of human beings entails that we 
treat them with respect.
There  are  three  questions  to  be  asked:  first,  what  sort  of  a  value  is  a 
dignity; second, how could a special trait bestow dignity on its possessor; 
third, are there any special traits that could at all plausibly fit this bill?
I shall consider each in turn.
3.4.1 What sort of a value is dignity?
On the face of it, it  is not at all clear what is supposed to tie the three 
thoughts  that  compose dignity  together:  Even if  we accept  the  posited 
radical  discontinuity  of  value  between  humans  and  other  things,  why 
should it follow that all humans are of equal worth? And even if we accept 
both the first two thoughts, why should it follow that the correct way to 
respond to this equal and higher value of human beings is to ‘respect’ them 
and treat them as ‘end in themselves’? Why should the higher value of 
human  beings  entail  a  ban  on  sacrificing  one  human  being  to  benefit 
several others?74
Insofar as we are attempting to explain dignity in terms of the possession 
of a special trait, we have two options.75 Either we posit dignity as a  sui  
generis kind of value, which necessitates the three thoughts, or we attempt 
to explain how dignity is possible in terms of a more familiar sort of value. 
The first is Kant’s approach. I shall suggest that the second is unfortunately 
not too promising,  as it either must  either implicitly  presuppose Kant’s 
74 A sceptic might here push the point that if human beings are fundamentally of equal worth, then 
it would only be reasonable to do as the consequentialist would and seek to maximise the amount of 
worth in the world.
75 When we turn to the possible sceptical justifications, our choice is wider, as we shall see.
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theory of value, or simply have no coherent account to give of how we get 
from 1 and 2 to the third claim, that respect is due to human beings. 
A positive justification of the dignity of human beings that did not rest on 
Kant’s theory of value would have to have something like the following 
form:
1. There is a feature or set of features (F) which human beings have, but 
which nothing non-human has; suitable candidates might be a soul, being 
made in God’s image, or rationality.
2. F accounts for the categorially higher value of human beings.
3. F is present in all human beings to an equal degree; hence human beings 
are of equal value.
4. Human beings are thus intrinsically valuable insofar as they have F. 
The difficulty is in how we are to get from this claim to 
Conclusion: Human beings should be respected.
For it in no way follows from the concept of what is intrinsically valuable 
that it should thereby be respected; we need some further consideration to 
close the gap. We could attempt to bridge the gap by adding an additional 
premiss 
5. What is intrinsically valuable ought to be respected.
But the problem is that (5) does not seem to me to be true. I cannot think of 
any other way of bridging the gap, and am thus inclined to think that there 
is a gap between (4) and the conclusion, of a sort similar to an is-ought 
gap, but one that is a gap between two different sorts of value claim. It 
seems to me best therefore that we follow Kant’s theory of value.
On Kant’s theory of value, dignity is a specific type of value, and the three 
thoughts about dignity are necessitated by the nature of this sort of value. 
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Dignity,  as a type of value,  is  defined in opposition to another type of 
value, which Kant calls  price. Price and dignity are mutually exclusive, 
and divide the realm of objects between them: hence everything that does 
not have a dignity has a price.76 Price and dignity are not commensurable: 
that is, there is no way of translating between a dignity and a price. Price 
and dignity are distinguished by their  differing  underlying logics.  Kant 
expresses these as follows: 
Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else as 
its  equivalent;  on  the  other  hand,  whatever  is  above  all 
price, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity. 
(G, p.434)
Expanding this, we can say: what has a price can, as such, have something 
else substituted for it; what has a dignity, as such, cannot have something 
else substituted for it. Therefore, anything that has a price is replaceable; 
anything  that  has  a  dignity  is  irreplaceable.  In  the  realm  of  price, 
everything may be traded or substituted for its equal: the other in which 
nothing may be traded or substituted for anything else. 
What has a dignity must be valued for its own sake, and hence it cannot be 
used just as we please. Kant attempts to explain this by calling something 
with a dignity an  end in itself. He gets to this description as follows: he 
assumes that anything that doesn’t have a dignity may be used as a means 
to whatever ends we may happen to have, and so in trying to capture the 
thought that there are some things which may not legitimately be used as a 
means to just any ends, but call for a response to them for their own sake, 
he introduces the term end in itself.77
76 ‘In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity.’ (G, p.434)
77 It is important to note that the distinction between price and dignity is logically separable from 
the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value. The intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, considered in 
itself, refers to the location of the value of an object; not to the way we should respond to the object‘s  
value. It is conceptually possible that something could have an intrinsic value (has its value in or 
through itself) but could still legitimately be used as a means to whatever ends we would want to put 
it to; correlatively it is possible that something might be extrinsically valuable (not having value in 
itself, but perhaps having valued conferred upon it by us) but yet valued for its own sake (a work of 
art might be a possible example here). See Korsgaard (1983) on this.
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Once we grant  this  distinction  between price  and dignity,  the  unity of 
dignity and the internal relation of the three thoughts about higher value, 
equality  and respect  becomes clear.  Whatever  has  a  dignity  is  as such 
categorially distinct from whatever has a price, and above price. Hence the 
first thought about the dignity of human beings amounts to no more than 
this:  human beings have a dignity; everything else, a price. The second 
thought, about the equality of human beings, also drops directly out of the 
distinction between price and dignity; but the nature of this equality turns 
out to be different from what one might imagine. 
The most obvious way to envisage the equality  of human beings is by 
analogy to an equality of physical magnitude (as when we say two sticks 
are of equal length); that is, to imagine that the equality of human beings 
must  consist  in  their  possession  of  an  equal amount of  some  special 
feature. But once we make the distinction between price and dignity, we 
can no longer explain the equality of human beings in this way. For this 
way of thinking belongs to the logic of price. To value something as having 
a dignity is to refuse to measure its value against that of other things and to 
insist that we value it  for its own sake. Insofar as we wish to attribute a 
dignity to human beings we cannot talk of a literal equality of value for 
human beings: we cannot say that human beings are equal because there is 
some scale of value on which they all score, say, 10.
Rather, the equality of human beings must be understood in a somewhat 
metaphorical sense. They are said to be equal, instead because each must 
be valued for his or her own sake. The equality lies in the  attitude with 
which each must treat others and with which each may in turn expect to be 
treated by them. For Kant, this attitude is respect:
The respect that I have for others or that another can require 
from  me  (observantia  aliis  praestanda)  is  therefore 
recognition of a dignity (dignitas) in other men, that is, of a 
worth that has no price, no equivalent for which the object 
evaluated (aestimii) could be exchanged. ... Every man has 
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a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow men and is in 
turn bound to respect every other.78
So the higher worth of human beings, the equality of human beings, and 
the fact that they ought to be respected all fall out of this basic distinction 
between price and dignity. 
3.4.2 How could a special trait bestow dignity on its possessor?
If we now wish to justify the attribution of a dignity to all human beings by 
reference to a special trait or traits, it is clear that any candidate trait must 
meet the following constraints:
1. This trait must in fact be possessed by all those to whom morality wishes 
to attribute a dignity, and not possessed by any being to whom morality 
does not wish to attribute a dignity.
2. The goodness of this trait must be such that respect is an appropriate 
response to its possessor. 
3. The trait must underwrite equality of treatment.
4. The respect-worthiness of the trait must be compatible with the rest of 
what we know about human beings. 
The point of the first three constraints should be relatively obvious: on the 
first, given that morality advocates the dignity of  all  human beings, it is 
clearly deeply problematic if it then argues for this dignity on the basis of a 
trait  that  not  all  human  beings  in  fact  have.  But  it  would  be  equally 
problematic if the special trait were distributed too widely, and so failed to 
distinguish human beings from other animals (consider, for example, the 
capacity to feel pain).
78 MM, p.462. See also MM, p.435 (quoted in chapter one): man ‘possesses a dignity (an absolute 
inner worth) whereby he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world. He 
can measure himself with every other being of this kind and value himself on a footing of equality 
with them’. 
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On the second, it would clearly be problematic if we picked as our special 
trait  something  like  the  capacity  for  instrumental  reason,  that  whilst 
undeniably a good thing, scarcely seems sufficient to render its possessor 
incomparable in value to anything that does not possess it.
The third should follow from the first and second, but it is as well to be 
explicit here: suppose someone claimed that the special trait is the capacity 
for rational thought. Now this capacity is clearly present in different human 
beings to differing degrees: why shouldn’t this imply a greater value for the 
more  rational?  Or  we  could  press  the  same  point  from  the  opposite 
direction: higher primates are by no means totally lacking in the capacity 
for rational  thought.  How do you justify their  total  exclusion from the 
realm of dignity? 
The fourth should be obvious too. It is no good to refer to an attribute such 
as possession of an immortal soul, or being made in God’s image unless 
one has some way of demonstrating that this is in fact true. 
Kant’s theory of value requires that i) everything either has a price or a 
dignity, and ii) there is a radical discontinuity between price and dignity, 
and iii) hence there must be some definite answer to the question which 
category we should place a particular object in. 
There are two main problems with this: first, the distinction between price 
and dignity is supposed to be an all  or nothing affair;  a thing must  be 
definitely in one camp or in the other. Given the discontinuity between 
price and dignity, if we attempt to underwrite the distinction with reference 
to traits that vary continuously, our attempts are likely to look arbitrary.
Second, our firmly held moral intuitions rebel against  such a simplistic 
model:  to  do  justice  to  our  moral  intuitions  we would  require  a  more 
gradualist model which allows a certain fuzziness around the edges, and 
especially a sort of value between price and dignity. 
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Think, for example of the question of at what stage a human life should be 
accorded the value of a dignity. Can we plausibly maintain that there is a 
certain  time  during  which  a  human  life  has  merely  a  price,  and  then 
suddenly  a  threshold is crossed and that  life has a  dignity?  Unless we 
believe in supernatural claims such as that there is a specific moment of 
ensoulment,  then it  is difficult  to see how we could justify the idea of 
crossing over from price to dignity in this way: for all we seem to see is 
continuous development, and hence a gradualist account of value would 
seem to be more appropriate.
3.4.3 Are there any special traits that could at all plausibly fit this bill?
Kant thinks that it is our humanity (which the same as our rational nature 
and our ability to legislate universal law) which is the special trait that 
gives us our dignity:
[T]he dignity of humanity consists  just in its  capacity to 
legislate  universal  law,  though  with  the  condition  of 
humanity’s being at the same time subject to the very same 
legislation. (G, p.440)
He constructs  an explicit  argument  (which he thinks  holds  a  priori)  to 
justify why we should believe in the dignity of all rational creatures: 
If then there is to be a supreme practical principle and, as 
far as the human will is concerned, a categorical imperative, 
then it must be such that from the conception of what is 
necessarily an end for everyone because this end is an end 
in itself it constitutes an objective principle of the will and 
can serve as a practical law. The ground of such a principle 
is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. In this way man 
necessarily  thinks  of  his  own existence;  thus  far  it  is  a 
subjective principle of human actions. But in this way also 
does every other rational being think of his existence on the 
same rational ground that holds for me; hence it is at the 
same time an objective principle, from which, as a supreme 
practical ground, all  laws of the will must be able to be 
derived. (G, pp.428-9)
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Admittedly, it is slightly unclear how this argument is supposed to work: 
but  for  our  purposes  we  can  content  ourselves  with  looking  at  the 
underlying idea that Kant is attempting to express.79 This is the thought that 
it is the  same trait, ‘humanity’ which is responsible  both  for the dignity 
that  each person has,  and  for  their  ability  to  respond to the dignity of 
others.80 
However, this account falls foul of the first constraint we canvassed. Kant 
is  committed  to  the  claim  that  only those  things  that  are  capable  of 
respecting dignity themselves have dignity; but if we sincerely carried this 
thesis through then we would not longer be able to hold on to many of the 
moral beliefs we feel most sure about; for example that infants who have 
not yet developed the capacity for respect, and those who through senility 
have lost it, are still themselves to be treated as if they had a dignity and 
not just a price.
We can explain this point more fully if we make a distinction between what 
I shall call the subjects and the objects of dignity. We can define them as 
follows: a  subject of dignity is a being who is capable of  appreciating 
dignity in other things; an  object of dignity is a thing which should be 
appreciated as having a dignity. Kant’s explanation of the dignity of human 
beings, could be re-expressed in this language by saying that all subjects of 
dignity are objects of dignity, and they are objects of dignity just because 
they are subjects of dignity. 
Kant’s further assumption could be expressed as follows: the only objects 
of dignity are those that are simultaneously subjects of dignity: that is that  
there is nothing is worthy of being appraised as having a dignity which 
cannot itself appraise other things as having a dignity. It is this further 
assumption that is dubious: there would appear to be things such as infants 
79 Korsgaard attempts to rework this argument: we shall examine her attempts to do so in the next  
chapter.
80 Velleman helpfully elucidates as follows: ‘people have a capacity whose value we appreciate by 
respecting them; and that capacity, at its utmost, is their capacity for respect.’ (Velleman 1999, p.365)
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that we ordinarily take to be objects of dignity without their being subjects 
of dignity.
But  other  potential  special  traits  fare  no  better  either:  it  is  extremely 
difficult to suggest a trait that would satisfy even ourselves as defenders of 
morality, let alone a more suspicious mind such as Nietzsche’s. The basic 
problem is that the only features that could at all plausibly meet the four 
constraints  focus  on  elements  of  human  subjectivity:  for  example,  the 
possession of a unique point of view, the capacity to find things valuable, 
the capacity for autonomy, or being rational, or the capacity to be a moral 
agent, perhaps our capacity for repentance. But for each proposed trait, 
there are categories of human being whom the tradition of morality has 
always  deemed  worthy  of  respect  (infants,  the  mentally  defective,  for 
example) who cannot be said with any degree of plausibility to share in the 
relevant feature or features. 
This leaves us in an unfortunate quandary: we have three options available 
to us. All are unpalatable. The first would be to bite the bullet and come out 
and say that  those  who do not  have  the  special  feature  should  not  be 
accorded a dignity: so that infants, for example, would be excluded from 
the full protection of morality. The second would be to attempt to weaken 
one’s specification of the special feature so that it, for example, required 
only the potential to exercise it at some later date. The third would be to 
claim that even though  strictly speaking  such persons do not make the 
grade, there are good reasons for treating them as if they did (we claim, for 
example,  that  they  are  members  of  a  species  which  in  normal 
circumstances develops the traits which are sufficient for dignity, and so 
should be treated as if they had a dignity.) 
Each  approach  has  its  defects.  The  first  risks  squandering  the  moral 
insights  that  morality  is  attempting  to  safeguard;  the  second  risks 
weakening the special feature to the extent that possession of it no longer 
94
seems to render appropriate the affirmation we associate with dignity. The 
third, absent some rather better arguments than it is usually presented with, 
is just ad hoc.
3.5 Conclusion: the necessity of a sceptical justification
The difficulties involved in attempting to give a positive justification thus 
lead me to think that we are better off going down the route of a sceptical 
justification. If we pursue a sceptical justification, we will still be able to 
explain how morality makes life worth living through the concept of the 
dignity of human beings, but we will not have to give an account of what 
special trait this dignity consists in. 
There  are  a  variety  ways  in  which  we  might  work  with  a  sceptical 
justification of the dignity of human beings. In the remainder of this thesis 
I shall consider three. 
The  first  is  Christine  Korsgaard’s  reworking  of  Kant’s  arguments;  the 
second Charles Taylor’s position and the third my own. Korsgaard and 
Taylor both put forward transcendental arguments which aim to show that 
believing in  the dignity of  all  human beings  is  necessary  for  us.  Both 
attempt to argue from the structure of the self to the idea of the dignity of 
human beings, and hence to the validity of morality. 
Korsgaard holds that it is necessary if one is to avoid nihilism that one 
accords oneself a dignity, and that according oneself a dignity rationally 
requires  one  to  accord  all  other  value-conferring  beings  one  as  well.81 
Charles Taylor holds that according all others a dignity is mandated by the 
unavoidable attempt to make the best sense of the lives we are trying to 
lead.82 
Where these accounts appeal to the transcendental conditions of agency, 
my account appeals to empirical psychology. It takes belief in the dignity 
81 See chapter four.
82 See chapter five.
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of all human beings to be strictly optional: rather than claiming that it is 
necessary to  believe  in  the  dignity  of  all  human  beings,  it  admits  the 
contingency of this belief. But, it argues, there are good reasons to live 
according to this belief nonetheless. 
Let us begin by examining Korsgaard’s arguments. 
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C h a p t e r  F o u r  
Korsgaard’s Argument for the Normativity of 
Morality
4.1 Introduction
In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard attempts to modernise 
the Kantian argument for the universal dignity of human beings we looked 
at in the previous chapter.83 In so doing to she attempts to use Kantian ideas 
to construct a sceptical justification for the dignity of human beings by 
showing that human selfhood implies valuing both one’s own humanity 
(capacity for rational choice) and the humanity of all other human beings. 
Here I analyse her approach: by showing up some of its limitations we will 
take a first step toward constructing a sound argument for morality. Thus, 
my  interest  is  in  the  possibility  of  the  sort  of  strategy  she  employs 
demonstrating  the  truth  of  morality.  So  in  our  discussion  we  are  less 
interested  in  the  particular  argument  that  Korsgaard  gives,  than  in  the 
question of whether any argument which starts from the reasons implied by 
self-consciousness  could  possibly  establish  an  affirmative  account  of 
morality. Thus, whenever her argument seems dubious, or to be missing 
some intermediate premisses that would be necessary to make it work, I 
attempt to supply them. If Korsgaard’s argument, read as sympathetically 
as possible, and as an exemplar of a whole strategy of argumentation, fails, 
then this whole approach is wrong, and we must try another. 
83 Korsgaard 1996b: in this chapter, page references are to this work unless otherwise stated.
I begin by laying out what I take the structure of the argument to be: this 
will serve both as a heuristic to the understanding of Korsgaard’s position 
and as a map of my discussion.
Korsgaard’s  argument  aims  to  show  how,  by  an  unbroken  chain  of 
implications,  our  self-consciousness  implies  that  we  must  value  our 
capacity  for rational  endorsement,  and thereby the capacity for rational 
endorsement of all human beings. 
To make the discussion more manageable, I have separated the argument 
into  several  overlapping  sub-arguments.  The  first  argument  aims  to 
demonstrate that our self-consciousness imports  a reflective structure to 
our consciousness, which implies that we must think of ourselves as acting 
for  reasons.84 The  second  argument  aims  to  show  that  the  reflective 
structure of our consciousness implies that we must decide how to act as if  
we were free. (Or, as Kant put it, that we ‘act under the idea of freedom’.) 
It further aims to show that acting under the idea of freedom implies that 
we act on universal principles. The third argument aims to buttress this 
conclusion: it argues that we must think of ourselves as aiming to act on 
universal principles, because the will is a cause; the concept of a cause 
brings with it the notion of lawlikeness; and hence the free will must will 
in accordance with lawlike universal principles. 
Between them, the first three arguments aim to establish the claim that the 
reflective structure of our consciousness implies that we act on universal 
principles. I argue that this claim is not established: all that is established is 
the weaker claim that the reflective structure of our consciousness implies  
that we act must in ways that we endorse, and so-acting need not imply 
acting in accordance with universal principles.
84 As Korsgaard presents it, it is difficult to tell how this argument is supposed to work. I attempt  
to elucidate it on the assumption that it attempts to show that being a person presupposes that one 
acts for reasons. 
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The next five arguments aim to add the content required for morality to the 
bare  idea  of  acting  on  universal  principles  (for  given  what  Korsgaard 
thinks  she  has  established  with  the  first  three  arguments,  a  consistent 
rational egoist would count as acting on universal principles). 
The fourth argument aims to show that a reflectively self-conscious agent 
must  have  a  self-conception,  which  she  chooses  from,  and  which  is  a 
description (or set of descriptions) under which the agent values herself. 
Korsgaard calls this set of descriptions a practical identity. 
The fifth argument aims to show that nothing is a genuine reason for an 
agent unless it is implied by a practical identity that the agent has, and that 
obligations spring from what is forbidden by a given practical identity.
The sixth argument is largely my own interpolation: it aims to make clear 
what would be involved in successfully reconstructing morality the basis of 
the idea of practical identity. If, following Korsgaard, all obligations spring 
from practical identities, then if there are to be universal obligations for 
human  beings  as  such,  these  obligations  must  follow from a  practical 
identity that each human being has. But there are two further constraints: 
given that the claims of morality are supposed to trump claims provided by 
all other practical identities (say as a football coach, or as a member of the 
Corleone family), then we must be able to demonstrate that the practical 
identity appealed to by morality can legitimately claim precedence over all 
other practical identities. Last, even if an obligation were universal and 
trumped all  others,  it  still  would not  be capable  of  giving  us  morality 
unless it necessitated us acting on reasons that are public and shareable.85 
The seventh argument is Korsgaard’s attempt to demonstrate that there is a 
practical identity that is implied by any other practical identity we have, 
which is a valuation of ourselves  as  reflective choosers, which she calls 
85 We could for example have an argument which showed that each person had a practical identity 
as a rational egoist, and that this practical identity should be put before all others: in this case, despite 
the fact that we had universal obligations that trumped all others, we would be no closer to the 
validity of moral obligation.
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(following Kant) our humanity. There is a weak and a strong reading of this 
argument: the strong reading would say that humanity is the source of all 
value (and of the value of all practical identities) and hence without it there 
would be no value; the weak reading would say that the value of humanity 
is implied by having any other practical identity. 
We can see from the sixth argument that the total structure of Korsgaard’s 
argument  requires  the strong reading, for the even if the weak reading is 
true, it gives us no reason why our practical identity as human should be 
able to claim precedence over any other practical identity. However, the 
claims about value implied by the strong reading are not true. Further, there 
are good reasons for thinking that even the weak reading is false. 
The chain of argument thus breaks down irreparably at this point. 
The eight argument aims to show that our deep social nature commits us to 
the necessity of conceiving reasons as essentially public (agent neutral), on 
the following grounds: we can think and reason together; therefore reasons 
cannot be inescapably private; so we must think of reasons as public. This 
argument is invalid, but this matters little given that the chain of reasoning 
has already broken down irreparably.  But it  has the great  virtue that  it 
points us in the right direction: towards our social nature in a way that is 
taken up both by Charles Taylor and by my pragmatist account in part 
three. 
4.2 From self-consciousness to reason governed action
The first argument is by far the most important. It aims to demonstrate that 
a human being is a being that acts for reasons. The remaining arguments 
(two to eight) are just a working out of what is implied by this idea of a 
being that acts for reasons. 
Korsgaard offers the following as her version of the first argument:
100
The human mind is self-conscious... in the sense that it is 
essentially reflective. ... A lower animal’s attention is fixed 
on the world. Its perceptions are its beliefs and its desires 
are its will. It is engaged in conscious activities, but it is not 
conscious  of  them.  That  is,  they  are  not  objects  of  its 
attention. But we human animals turn our attention on to 
our  perceptions  and  desires  themselves,  on  to  our  own 
mental activities, and we are conscious of them. That is why 
we can think about them.
And this sets us a problem no other animal has. It is the 
problem of  the  normative.  For  our  capacity  to  turn  our 
attention on to our own mental activities is also a capacity 
to  distance  ourselves  from  them,  and  to  call  them  into 
question.  ...  I  desire  and  I  find  myself  with  a  powerful 
impulse to act. But I back up and bring that impulse into 
view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse 
doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I act? 
Is this desire really a  reason  to act? The reflective mind 
cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as such. It 
needs a reason. Otherwise, at least as long as it reflects, it 
cannot commit itself or go forward. (pp. 92-3)
This passage purports to be offering an argument from a premiss (the claim 
that the human mind is reflectively self-conscious) to a conclusion (that 
this  forces  us  to  act  for  reasons),  via  a  middle  term  (the  reflective 
endorsement of a desire). 
However,  if  we  read  it  in  this  way  it  is  somewhat  unsatisfying,  for 
Korsgaard  does  not  appear  to  give  any sort  of  argument  to  get  to  the 
middle term: all we have is the claim that ‘our capacity to turn our attention 
on to our own mental activities is also a capacity to distance ourselves from 
them, and to call them into question’, which appears to be an assertion 
rather than an argument. Further, the move from the middle term to the 
conclusion seems to rest on a stipulation: for Korsgaard defines a reason in 
terms  of  reflective  endorsement.86 The  move  from  the  middle  term 
(reflective  endorsement)  to  the  conclusion  (reason  governed  action) 
therefore follows by definition.
86 ‘We need reasons because our impulses must be able to withstand reflective scrutiny. We have 
reasons if they do. The normative word ‘reason’ refers to a kind of reflective success.’ (p.93)
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We have an argument, then, in which two moves are made: one is a mere 
assertion,  the  other  a  stipulation.  It  is  hardly  surprising  that  it  seems 
unsatisfying. 
But Korsgaard gives a hint about where we should look to fill  out the 
argument.87 She claims there that her account of a person has an obvious 
affinity with that put forward by Harry Frankfurt,88 and she implies that 
human  consciousness  is  essentially  reflective  in  a  way  that  Frankfurt 
doesn’t quite realize. 
I  suggest  that  this  allows  us  to  reconstruct  the  presuppositions  of  her 
argumentative strategy in as follows: 
1) Morality is concerned with the obligations owed by persons.
2) It follows that the concept of a person plays the role of a fixed point in 
the argument. 
3) Therefore, if we can demonstrate that what it is to be a person involves a 
commitment to acting for reasons then we will have done enough.89
I begin by giving Frankfurt’s conception of the person: then I shall try to 
explain  why  Korsgaard  thinks  i)  it  is  in  fact  incorrect  as  to  what  is 
distinctive about persons, and ii) once we realize what is distinctive about 
persons, it  requires that we rethink personhood as essentially active and 
reflective,  in  a  way  that  is  ruled  out  by  the  framework  with  which 
Frankfurt  is  working.  We  will  then  show  that  acting  for  reasons  is 
presupposed by this revised conception of a person.
87 p. 99.
88 Frankfurt (1971)
89 There is an obvious risk with this strategy, analogous to the one we saw with attempted positive 
justifications  of  the  dignity  of  human  beings,  namely  that  our  definition  of  person  is  actually 
unhelpful for moral thinking because it draws the boundaries in the wrong place or makes firm 
distinctions where there are in fact none. Bernard Williams draws this worry out well: “The category 
of person, though a lot has been made of it in some moral philosophy is a poor foundation for ethical  
thought, in particular because it looks like a sortal or classificatory notion while it in fact signals  
characteristics  that  almost  all  come in  degrees  –  responsibility,  self-consciousness,  capacity  for 
reflection and so one. It thus makes it seem as if we were dealing with a certain class or type of  
creature, when in fact we are vaguely considering those human beings who pass some mark on a 
scale.” (Williams 1985, p.114)
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Frankfurt’s conception of a person relies on a distinction between first and 
second-order desires. First-order desires are ‘simply desires to do or not do 
one thing or another’, (1971, p.12) whilst second-order desires are desires 
about the sort of first-order desires we would like to have. Whilst animals 
can have first-order desires, they cannot have second-order desires: these 
are the sole preserve of human beings.90
Frankfurt then gives a definition of a will: 
To identify an agent's will is either to identify the desire (or 
desires)  by  which  he  is  motivated  in  some  action  he 
performs or to identify the desire (or desires) by which he 
will or would be motivated when he acts. An agent's will, 
then, is identical with one or more of his first-order desires. 
But  the notion of the  will,  as I  am employing it,  is not 
coextensive with the notion of first-order desires. It is not 
the notion of something that merely inclines an agent  in 
some degree to act in a certain way. Rather it is the notion 
of an  effective desire – one that moves (or will or would 
move) a person all the way to action. (1971, p. 14)
When we apply the distinction between first and second-order desires to 
this notion of will, we obtain the notion of first and second-order volitions. 
Thus, an entity has a second-order volition when ‘he wants a certain desire 
to be his will’ (1971, p.16). It is, according to Frankfurt, the capacity for 
second-order volition that is the mark of a person. 
This completes the necessary distinctions. Frankfurt then attempts to show 
why these definitions capture the concept of a person by applying them to a 
concrete example. He asks us to consider two agents, both of whom are 
drug addicts, the first  being a person and thus capable of second-order 
volition, the second a wanton (Frankfurt’s technical term for an agent who 
has desires but who is incapable of second order volition.)
90 ‘Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have 
(or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their 
preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I  
shall call ‘first-order desires’ or ‘desires of the first order,’ which are simply desires to do or not do  
one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective  
self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.’ (1971, p.12)
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The wanton can be no more than a space in which various desires play 
themselves  out:  while  ‘he’ can be rational  in  a  sense,  for  example,  by 
adopting the best means given the desires he has, we must remember that 
there is nothing to ‘him’ apart from these first-order desires:
He does not prefer that one of his conflicting desires should 
be paramount over the other; he does not prefer that one 
first-order desire rather than the other should constitute his 
will. It would be misleading to say that he is neutral as to 
the conflict between his desires, since this would suggest 
that he regards them as equally acceptable. Since he has no 
identity apart from his first-order desires, it is true neither 
that he prefers one to the other nor that he prefers not to 
take sides. (1971, p.18)
Certainly, it seems that we would not call such an entity a person. 
He contrasts this with the person, to whom it does make a difference which 
of his first-order desires wins out:
It  makes  a  difference  to  the  unwilling  addict,  who  is  a 
person, which of his conflicting first-order desires wins out. 
Both desires are his, to be sure; and whether he finally takes 
the drug or finally succeeds in refraining from taking it, he 
acts to satisfy what is in a literal sense his own desire. In 
either case he does something he himself wants to do, and 
he does it not because of some external influence whose 
aim happens to coincide with his own but because of his 
desire  to  do  it.  The  unwilling  addict  identifies  himself, 
however, through the formation of a second-order volition, 
with one rather than with the other of his conflicting first-
order desires. He makes one of them more truly his own 
and,  in  so  doing,  he  withdraws  himself  from  the  other. 
(1971, p.18)
It is notable that despite Frankfurt’s invocation of second-order desires and 
volitions, his view of persons is basically Humean: where a straightforward 
Humean view would view the person as a bundle of desires, Frankfurt 
complicates  the  picture  by arguing that  there  are  desires  about  desires. 
However,  according to  Korsgaard,  the same Kantian worry about  what 
unifies the Humean self applies. 
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While  Korsgaard  would  agree  with  Frankfurt  that  the  ability  to  form 
second-order  volitions  in  his  sense  is  a  necessary  condition  for 
personhood, she does not think that it is a sufficient condition. It leaves us 
with a conception of the person that is uninvitingly passive: what she feels 
this account leaves out is the element of activity. On her account, what 
makes a person a person is a conception of themselves as a unity (an ‘I’),  
through which they deliberate and act on the basis of reasons. 
Korsgaard suggests that if we look at what deliberation is like we will see 
that it  presupposes a unity, an ‘I’,  a standpoint  from which  deliberation 
takes place:
It  may be that  what  actually happens when you make a 
choice is that the strongest of your conflicting desires wins. 
But that is not the way you think of it when you deliberate.  
When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over 
and above all your desires, something that is you, and that 
chooses  which  one  to  act  on.  The  idea  that  you choose 
among your conflicting desires, rather than just waiting to 
see which one wins, suggests that you have reasons for or 
against acting on them. And it is these reasons, rather than 
the desires themselves, which are expressive of your will. 
(1989a, p.370)
Subjectivity  of  this  sort  (considering  oneself  as  an  ‘I’ who chooses)  is 
essential  to being a person.  Moreover,  it  enjoys an explanatory priority 
over Frankfurt’s favoured conception of second-order volitions. While we 
can explain the capacity for second-order volitions if we take the basic 
element  in  a  person  to  be  an  ‘I’ who chooses,  we  cannot  explain  the 
subjectivity – the ‘I’ in terms of a capacity for second-order volition. 
Given that a person is at least an ‘I’ who chooses, if we work out the 
conditions under which it is possible to have an ‘I’ who chooses, we know 
that we can presuppose this of ourselves given that we are persons. This 
will  take  a  form something like the  following.  Inevitably it  anticipates 
some of the points covered by arguments two to eight, as it does not try to 
show how we must act for reasons from non-normative  premisses,  but 
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instead attempts to make this thesis plausible by laying out a structure of 
how things seem to fit together. Parts of this structure are also involved in 
arguments two to eight.
From an I who chooses to reason governed action 
1. Personhood presupposes an ‘I’ or a ‘self’. 
2. This ‘I’ unifies the human being into a single entity. 
3. This unification is both reflexive and active. 
3a) It is reflexive because the unity consists in the conception that the self 
has of itself. (i.e. the unity isn’t grounded in anything further than the self’s 
conception of itself).
3b) It is active because the unity of the self depends on the self being able 
to actively maintain a conception of itself. (Thus it can be shattered if for 
any reason the self is no longer able to maintain a conception of itself as a 
unified being.)
4. A person chooses what to do.
5. When a person freely chooses what to do she does so in a way that is 
expressive of herself.
6. Therefore a person’s conception of herself  does double duty: it both 
holds her together as a unified agent and acts as a standard against which 
she judges what to do. 
7. This self-conception must be one that the agent reflectively endorses: 
otherwise it could not fulfil its role, which is to demarcate what the agent 
considers herself to be. 
8.  Given  that  i)  the  self’s  conception  of  itself  implies  reflective 
endorsement of itself, and ii) the capacity for choice is not external to the 
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self,  choosing in  accordance with the capacity for choice must involve 
choosing what one reflectively endorses. 
9.  Given  that  one  is  choosing  what  one  reflectively  endorses,  one  is 
choosing for reasons.
10. Persons act for reasons. 
This argument allows us to help ourselves to the conclusion that normative 
judgment is already implied in our conception of ourselves as persons, and 
that hence normativity is not something we need discover in the world, but 
something presupposed in what we are. This is an important result if we 
want to give (as Korsgaard does) an account of normativity that allows us 
to see it as continuous with the world of natural facts. But as this is not our 
focus here, I merely mention it and pass on.
4.3 From acting for reasons to universal principles 
Argument two starts from the assumption that persons act for reasons and 
attempts  to  demonstrate  that  reasons  will  have  the  form  of  universal 
principles. Argument two is taken straight from Kant: as it seems to me that 
he puts the arguments more clearly than Korsgaard, I shall for the most part 
analyse  the  relevant  passage  of  the  Grounding  of  the  Metaphysics  of  
Morals: 
Now we cannot possibly think of a reason that consciously 
lets itself be directed from outside as regards its judgments; 
for in that case the subject would ascribe the determination 
of  his  faculty  of  judgment  not  to  his  reason,  but  to  an 
impulse.  Reason  must  regard  itself  as  the  author  of  its 
principles independently of foreign influences. Therefore as 
practical  reason  or  as  the  will  of  a  rational  being  must 
reason regard itself as free. (G, p.448)
The reading I propose for argument two, on the basis of this passage, is as 
follows: 
1) We start with a blank conception of an agent who acts for reasons.
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2) By definition, we know that we can already impute to this agent the 
capacity for reflectively endorsing her desires.
3)  This  reflective  endorsement  cannot  come from a  source  outside  the 
agent’s capacity for choice, as then it would seem to the agent that she was 
merely being buffeted by her impulses.
4)  The reflective  endorsement  must  then come from  inside  the  agent’s 
capacity for choice.
5) The capacity for choice is capable of determining the agent’s actions.
6) (From 4) When the agent acts in accordance with what she endorses 
with her capacity for choice, she must see herself as having the final say on 
what she does.
7) When an agent acts in accordance with her capacity for choice she must 
consider herself as free. 
8)  In  a  formal  sense  a  free  will  is  a  will  which  makes  choices 
independently of all alien influences.91
9) When the will  wills  freely it  must  reflectively endorse the action it 
performs.
10) Hence (by definition)  when the will  wills freely it  must will  for a 
reason.
11)  Hence  there  must  be  some  standard92 in  virtue  of  which  the  will 
endorses the impulses that it does. 
12) Therefore, when the will wills freely it must will in accordance with a 
universal principle.93
91 Korsgaard, (1989b, p.162); G, p.446.
92 I intend ‘standard’ here to be taken in a purely formal sense: in the sense that normativity as  
such presupposes a standard in virtue of which what is endorse as normative is said to be correct. See 
my proposal for a rewriting of argument three (below) for this.
93 There is an alternative formulation for this argument, which we could call argument two′, 
which would go as follows:
1. Persons are capable of acting for reasons.
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The problem with this argument is the move from 11 to 12: while it is true 
that the idea of reflective endorsement presupposes some process in virtue 
of which certain impulses to act are anointed as reasons, it does not seem 
to follow immediately that this process must consist of deciding from a 
universal principle.94 Why couldn’t the appropriate model be perceptual, 
for instance? 
Argument three: from the will as a cause to the lawlikeness of reasons
Argument three aims to answer this criticism, and to explain why we must 
consider  ourselves  as  acting  on  universal  principles.  Argument  three 
depends on the following argument of Kant’s:
The will is a kind of causality belonging to living things 
insofar as they are rational; freedom would be the property 
of this causality that makes it effective independent of any 
determination by alien causes. ... The concept of causality 
involves that of laws according to which something that we 
call cause must entail something else – namely, the effect. 
Therefore freedom is certainly not lawless, even though it is 
not a property of the will in accordance with laws of nature. 
It must, rather, be a causality in accordance with immutable 
laws, which, to be sure, is of a special kind; otherwise a free 
will would be something absurd. ... What else can freedom 
of the will be but autonomy, i.e., the property that the will 
has of being a law unto itself? (G, pp. 446-7)
As it stands, there are two major problems with this argument. First, it 
seems to be premissed on an equivocation. When we call the will a ‘cause’, 
we are using this term in a different way from when we describe a physical 
2. The capacity to act for reasons presupposes a capacity for judgment (‘reason’), which does the 
reflective endorsing. 
3. Reason cannot consciously let itself be directed from outside as regards its judgments. It must 
be able to assent to the judgments it makes. 
4. Reason qua reason cannot judge at random (or, ‘for no reason’). 
5. (From 3,4) There must be some standard in virtue of which reason judges which it assents to.
6. This standard will be a principle that it lays down for itself.
The move from 5 to 6 is flawed for the same reasons as the move from 11 to 12 in argument two.
94 As G. A. Cohen puts it,  ‘The reflective structure of human consciousness may require,  as 
Korsgaard says… I endorse the first-order impulses on which I act. But it does not follow, and it is 
not true, that the structure of my consciousness requires that I identify myself with some law or 
principle. … What the reflective structure requires, if anything, is not that I be a law to myself, but 
that I be in command of myself. And sometimes the commands that I issue will be singular, not  
universal.’ (1996, p.176)
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cause: we call the will a cause because it appears to the person whose will 
it  is  that  their  willing is  the  first  cause of  the action that  then ensues. 
‘Cause’ here seems to denote a conviction we have that we are the authors 
of our actions – in Aristotle’s words, that ‘a human being originates and 
fathers his own actions as he fathers his children.’95 But it remains to be 
shown that the concept of an apparent first cause brings with it the idea of 
lawlikeness. 
Quite  apart  from this,  it  is  rather  difficult  to  see,  without  any  further 
argument, why freedom should require that an agent act according to laws. 
Nagel puts this doubt well in his reply to Korsgaard’s initial formulation of 
this argument:
A neo-Humean  regularity  theory  of  causation  seems  an 
inappropriate model for free self-determination. If the idea 
makes sense at all, the free choice of actions which conform 
to a law is no more nor less a form of causality than the free 
choice  of  actions  which  do  not...  So  far  as  I  can  see, 
choosing freely in a law-like pattern is merely a way of 
mimicking causality; if I always put on my left sock before 
my right, that does nothing to establish the causality of my 
will, so why does the categorical imperative do any better? 
(1996, p.202)
Korsgaard then produces a new argument in an attempt to fill  out why 
Kant’s claim is true. 
The structure of this argument is far from clear: I shall present the best 
reading that I can give of it. Korsgaard starts from a certain parallelism of 
structure that  she claims to  detect  between the concepts  of  reason  and 
cause:  both allegedly combine a sort of necessitation with a universality 
claim. Realising that this universality is the very thing that she is supposed 
to be arguing for she then puts forward the following argument:
1)  We start  from Hume’s  claim that  since we do not  directly  perceive 
power, we cannot perceive individual exercises of power.
95 Nichomachean Ethics 11113b18-19.
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2) Ergo, even if  there were such things as single, anomalous instances of 
one thing making another happen, we would have no way of distinguishing 
these from mere temporal sequences of events. 
3)  ‘To  regard  oneself  as  an  agent  is  to  regard  oneself  as  a  cause,  as 
productive of certain actions and their effects. And given the connection 
between causality and regularity, to do that must be to regard oneself as 
productive of these actions and effects in some regular way.’ (p. 227)
4) ‘If I am to constitute myself as the cause of an action, then I must be able 
to distinguish between my causing the action and some desire or impulse 
that is ‘in me’ causing my body to act. I must be able to see  myself  as 
something that is distinct from any of my particular, first-order, impulses 
and motives, as the reflective standpoint in any case requires.’ (pp. 227-8)
5) ‘[I]f all my decisions were particular and anomalous, there would be no 
identifiable difference between my acting and an assortment of first-order 
impulses being causally effective in or through my body.  And then there 
would be no self – no mind – no me – who is the one who does the act. ... 
Just as the special relation between cause and effect, the necessitation that  
makes  their  relation  different  from mere  temporal  sequence,  cannot  be 
established  in  the  absence  of  law or  regularity,  so  the  special  relation 
between  agent  and  action,  the  necessitation  that  makes  that  relation 
different from an event’s merely taking place in the agent’s body, cannot be 
established in the absence of at least a claim to law or universality. So I 
need to will universally in order to see my action as something which I do.  
Nagel  misses  the  point  when  he  says  that  regularity  does  nothing  to 
establish the causality of my will. What it does is establish my own ability 
to  see  myself  as  having  a  will,  as  having  the  kind  of  self-conscious  
causality that is a rational will.’ (pp. 228-9)
There are two arguments here: first, if we look at (3), then it is clear that 
there are some remnants of Kant’s original argument.  But there is also 
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another,  more  interesting  argument:  this  one  tries  to  tie  willing  in  a 
universal  manner  to  the  possibility  of  the  will  constituting  itself  as  a 
rational will. This is a better argument, but it founders at the same point 
that argument two did: we can agree about the key place of normativity in 
the unity of the self, but it follows that it is only qua normative that the 
universality is required, and it need not therefore extend as far as universal 
principles as such.96 
We need to stand back for a moment and take stock, to see why this should 
be so. The sort of self-consciousness we have commits us to normative 
judgment, and combining the idea of normative judgment with the unity of 
agency presupposed in the deliberative perspective gives us the result that 
we must will in accordance with some sort of standard which we endorse, 
if  we  are  to  be  free.  This  doesn’t  actually  say  that  much:  we  could 
summarize it as follows – given that we are normative beings, we must will 
in accordance with our conception of what we normatively endorse. Given 
that the concept of normativity already involves the notion of standard, it 
follows that willing freely involves willing in accordance with a standard 
that we endorse. We haven’t got as far as Korsgaard thinks we have, simply 
because  the  result  comes about  because of  what  is  presupposed in  the 
concept  of  normative  judgment,  and not  due  to  any external  argument 
about the will as a cause and causes having to operate in accordance with 
laws. 
The difference between the concept of normative judgment in general and 
the concept of a judgment which operates under laws is as follows: it is 
right  to  say that  a correct  normative  judgment (tautologically)  must be 
discursively redeemable as a universally valid claim. However it does not 
96 There is an additional problem with this argument, of which Korsgaard herself is aware: even if 
the argument worked, it could only establish that I must for the most part will universally. Even on 
the argument’s own terms, it is false to claim that isolated incidents of anomalous or arbitrary willing 
would destroy a person’s ability to see themselves as having a will. The most that the argument can  
establish is that one should not act anomalously or arbitrarily  so much than one undermines one’s 
sense of oneself as having a will. 
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follow  from  this  that  judgment  that  is  normatively  correct  must  be 
conceived  as  a  following  of  rules  that  are  already  given  prior  to  the 
exercise of judgment. For example, the particularity of a situation may be 
such that there is no rule in existence which adequately covers it, and even 
if there were a rule it would apply to such a small variety of cases that it 
could not be universalizable in any useful sense.97 
In other cases (possibly an apparent dilemma), moral thought will attempt 
to  construct  a law that would be appropriate in this and other relevantly 
similar cases.  Here it  does not follow that one should will in a lawlike 
manner; rather one should ask ‘what is to be done’ – it’s just that a correct  
answer  to  this  question  will  have  a  universal  applicability  across  all 
relevantly similar cases. Here, one should not will qua universal, but qua 
correct response to the problem in hand.
This brings us to the end of the first phase of the argument. In summing up 
where it has brought us to, Korsgaard admits that it leaves us quite some 
way from morality. She then makes a distinction that is quite unKantian in 
inspiration.  She  suggests  we  separate  i)  the  conclusion  she  has  just 
established, which is the requirement to act only on maxims you can will to 
be laws,98 which she will call ‘the categorical imperative’, from ii) what 
she calls the ‘moral law’ which is to be the ‘law of what Kant calls the 
Kingdom of Ends, the republic of all rational beings,’ which tells us to ‘act 
only on maxims that all rational beings could agree to act together in a 
workable cooperative system.’ (p.99) 
97 This is how Aristotle conceives the subject matter of ethics: cf  Nichomachean Ethics  1137b 
14ff. ‘All law is universal, but in some areas no universal rule can be correct…. This is also the  
reason why not everything is guided by law. For on some matters legislation is impossible, and so a 
decree is needed.’
98 As we have seen, this holds only in a negative sense, and not in a positive sense: that is, the  
categorical imperative is a  side effect  of the universality involved in normativity. While a correct 
result trivially can be willed as a universal law, it does not follow that one must get to the correct 
result by asking what can be willed universally. 
113
Understood this  way,  the categorical  imperative and the  moral  law are 
quite separate entities: the categorical imperative does not set any limits on 
what may be done except that the agent has to be consistent in it. Thus, the 
rational egoist, who makes it a law that he should always maximise his 
self-interest,  is  acting  in  accordance  with  the  categorical  imperative  so 
understood. The moral law, however, is much more substantive, and entails 
the validity of morality. 
4.4 From the categorical imperative to the moral law
Arguments  four  to  eight  try  to  make  the  move  from  the  categorical 
imperative so understood to the moral law.
Argument four: from self-consciousness to practical identity
Argument four takes place within the space of a paragraph: 
The reflective structure of the mind is  a  source of ‘self-
consciousness’ because it forces us to have a conception of 
ourselves. As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is like  
to  be  reflectively  conscious  and  it  does  not  prove  the 
existence of a metaphysical self... When you deliberate, it is 
as  if  there  were  something  over  and  above  all  of  your 
desires, something which is you, and which chooses which 
desire to act on. This means that the principle or law by 
which you determine your actions is one that you regard as 
being  expressive  of  yourself.  To  identify  with  such  a 
principle or way of choosing is to be, in St Paul’s famous 
phrase, a law to yourself. (p.100)
Korsgaard does not make it entirely clear how we are supposed to construe 
this  argument.  I  suggest we see it as the complement to argument two 
above. Argument two shows that the concept of judgment implies some 
sort of standard in virtue of which you are judging, which, as we saw, we 
could in a negative sense say is the form of universality. This argument 
must try to show that the standard(s) which are used in judgment must have 
some sort of content; that is, the standards must not only be universal in  
form, but also must have content. 
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We already know from argument two that an agent is committed to acting 
in a way that he endorses. This argument tries to elucidate the point that 
there must be something in virtue of which he endorses the things he does. 
It will do this by a consideration of two obvious facts about judgment: (1) 
judgment must be sufficient to determine what the agent is to do in normal 
situations; (2) the concept of judgment we employ must be able to support 
the idea that is closely tied to the concept of agency, that of the agent’s 
ownership of his actions. 
Both  considerations  show  that  it  is  incoherent  to  have  a  concept  of 
judgment  that  does not  presuppose some content  from which  the  agent 
judges.
1) The categorical imperative, as defined by Korsgaard, commits the agent 
only to acting in a way that they could will as a law. Now, in order for this 
to represent a normative standard in terms of which the agent is capable of 
judging  himself,  there  has  to  be  something  that  would  count  as 
transgressing  it.  That  is,  it  must  be  possible  for  the  agent  to  act 
inconsistently (or as Hegel might have put it, it must be possible for the 
agent  to  contradict  himself).  But  inconsistency  implies  that  there  is 
something fixed in the agent, that the agent can be inconsistent with. 
Further,  imagine that  (per impossible)  there were an agent  that  had no 
determinate  identity  or  prior  values,  which  he  was  capable  of  being 
consistent or inconsistent with. If  such an agent just had the maxim of 
willing consistently, then this would not rule out any actions. His faculty of 
judgment would radically underdetermine what the agent should do in any 
given situation,  and hence would  fail  in  its  own terms as  a  faculty  of 
judgment. 
2) Unless the agent did have a determinate identity to choose from it would 
be impossible for him to have the experience of ownership of his acts. This 
is because our feeling of ownership of our actions derives in great part 
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from  our  feeling  that  we  have  acted  in  a  way  that  is  expressive  of 
ourselves. For if it were the case that it were the form of universality per se 
that determined a particular action, then there would be nothing in that act 
that would allow the agent to see it as specifically his. 
It follows then, from both of these considerations, that we must impute to 
the agent some conception of himself which provides the content for actual 
judgment. The concept of a practical identity is then introduced to give us 
a better grip on this content that lies behind the mere universal form. A 
practical identity is to be understood as ‘a description under which you find 
your  life  to  be  worth  living  and  your  actions  to  be  worth 
undertaking.’(p.101)99
Argument five: from practical identity to the nature of obligation
Argument five goes as follows: 
Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average 
person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a 
human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain 
religion, a member of a certain ethnic group, a member of a 
certain profession,  someone’s  lover or friend, and so on. 
And  all  of  these  identities  give  rise  to  reasons  and 
obligations. Your reasons express your identity, your nature; 
your  obligations  spring  from  what  that  identity  forbids. 
(p.101)
This argument is no less compressed than the others that we have looked 
at: but it also harbours a further perplexity.  Prima facie,  it  appears that 
Korsgaard is now using ‘reason’ differently from the definition I quoted 
earlier.  For  Korsgaard  there  defined  a  reason  in  terms  of  reflective 
endorsement,  but  now it  appears  that  reasons  are  merely  given  by our 
practical identities. 
99 There is of course a more direct route to the conclusion that argument  four offers:  in our 
mapping of the concept of a person, we noticed that having an ‘I’ that chooses already presupposes 
that the I unifies itself through a conception of itself.
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Suppose an agent grows up in England: presumably it must be part of his 
practical identity to be an Englishman. But if the practical identity of an 
Englishman  just  gives  the  agent  reasons  (perhaps  to  enjoy cricket  and 
drink tea) then it appears that the agent will have reasons whether or not he 
reflectively endorses them; or, if we try to hang on to the conception of 
reflective endorsement, and put it alongside that of practical identity, then it 
will  seem that  the  practical  identity  seems insufficiently  reflective  – it 
seems to do no more than to rubberstamp desires.
Korsgaard’s answer to this is that practical identities themselves are within 
the  scope  of  reflective  endorsement,  and  that  it  is  only  insofar  as  we 
endorse  them  that  they  are  capable  of  providing  us  with  reasons.  A 
practical identity is  not to be treated as a mere given – something, for 
example,  that  the  agent  happens  to  be  born  into:  rather,  the  practical 
identity is itself subject to reflective endorsement.100 This is exactly what 
we would expect given our preliminary examination of the concept of a 
person, where we saw that a person must actively maintain the conception 
they have of themselves.
The  overall  picture  is  this:  particular  judgment,  and  thereby  reflective 
endorsement of desires, presupposes a background identity that is treated 
as more or less fixed for the purposes of this particular judgment. But this 
background identity can perform the role of being a standard for judgment 
only if it is itself reflectively endorsed by the agent. Normativity therefore 
permeates the structure of the self: both in its particular judgments and in 
the identity that makes those judgments possible. 
100 See p.123 for Korsgaard’s recognition of this: in her terms, this entails that we have a normative 
conception of our identity.
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Argument six: from obligation to the presuppositions of the moral law
Argument six is not one that Korsgaard explicitly formulates: rather, it is 
my attempt to elucidate what is required for Korsgaard’s arguments seven 
and eight to be successful.
We already  know from argument  five  that  all  obligations  spring  from 
practical identities. It remains to work out how obligations of the right sort 
to ground the moral law are possible.
First, the relevant obligations must be universal: that is, they must apply to 
each and every human being. Now, taking the premiss that all obligations 
spring from practical  identities,  this  leaves us with two possibilities:  a) 
there is a practical identity such that it is necessary for human beings and 
that is suitable for grounding the moral law; b) every human being is such 
that they have at least one practical identity from which it is possible to 
derive an obligation which is suitable to ground the moral law. In fact, as 
we shall see from argument seven, Korsgaard holds both a) and b).
Second,  the  relevant  practical  identity  must  also  enjoy  some  sort  of  a 
priority over any other competing practical identity: it will not be sufficient 
for morality if the argument provides only an identity that can be defeated 
by claims coming from one’s identity as a member of the Corleone family, 
or as a rational egoist.101 
Third, the relevant obligations must also be public. ‘Public’ is here defined 
in contradistinction to ‘private’.  Think of the rational egoist: he will be 
concerned to further his own happiness, but the happiness of others will not 
matter to him in the same way. If he follows his creed strictly, he will take 
the  happiness  of  others  into  account  only  as  far  as  it  enables  him  to 
101 It is worth remembering here that Kant defines the evil person as one who places his own 
happiness above the moral law:  he does not  deny his  practical  identity  as  a moral person,  but 
subordinates it to the claims of his own happiness. Thus, if Korsgaard’s argument were to establish 
the necessity of having a practical identity  as a moral being,  but not that this identity must claim 
precedence, she would have established no more than that we must be at least evil  (and not, for 
example, devilish) in Kant’s sense. 
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maximise his  own.  For the rational egoist,  all  reasons are private:  they 
relate  back  only  to  him  and  his  life.  But  private  reasons  would  be 
insufficient to ground the moral law:
If reasons  were  essentially private, consistency would not 
force me to take your reasons into account. And even if it 
did, it would do it in the wrong way. It would show that I 
have  an  obligation  to  myself  to  treat  you  in  ways  that 
respect the value which I place on you. It would show that I 
have  duties  with respect  to you, about  you, but  not  that 
there are things I owe to you. (p.134)
Thus the validity of the moral law requires that we show that reasons are 
public.
Argument seven attempts to establish the first and second conditions, and 
argument eight the third.
Argument seven: from possession of any practical identity to valuing your  
humanity
Argument seven is the most difficult to construe. Just before the following 
passage, Korsgaard has been talking of the possibility of revising one’s 
practical identities in the light of reflection; suggesting ‘most of the self-
conceptions which govern us are contingent’ (p.120):
What is  not contingent  is that  you must be governed by 
some conception of your practical identity. For unless you 
are  committed  to  some  conception  of  your  practical 
identity, you will lose your grip on yourself as having any 
reason to do one thing rather than another – and with it, 
your grip on yourself as having any reason to live and act at 
all.  But  this  reason  for  conforming  to  your  particular 
practical identities is not a reason that springs from one of 
those  particular  practical  identities.  It  is  a  reason  that 
springs  from  your  humanity  itself,  from  your  identity 
simply as  a human being,  a reflective animal who needs 
reasons to act and live. And so it is a reason you have only 
if you treat your humanity as a practical, normative, form of 
identity, that is, if you value yourself as a human being. (pp. 
120-1)
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We can agree that having a practical identity is non-optional for human 
beings: but our confidence in this claim, pace Korsgaard, derives from our 
psychological knowledge of what it is to be a normal human being, rather 
than from reflection on what it is to have a self-conscious being who acts 
for reasons.102 The next part of the passage is problematic, however: there 
is a jump between the idea of all human beings needing a practical identity, 
and the idea of each human being having a reason for conforming to the 
particular practical identities they in fact have. 
If this is supposed to represent an inference of some sort, then it is invalid: 
if the argument is supposed to go from the (unstated) premiss that an agent 
must have a reason to maintain those conditions that  make her  agency 
possible, then all that follows is that the agent has a reason that does not 
spring  from  any  of  her  current  practical  identities  to  maintain  some  
practical identity, not this particular one. 
Korsgaard then attempts to elucidate the argument as follows:
It is because we are human that we must act in the light of 
practical conceptions of our identity, and this  means that 
their importance is partly derived from the importance of 
being human. We must conform to them not merely for the 
reasons that caused us to adopt them in the first place, but 
because being human requires it. You may give up one of 
your contingent practical roles. But so long as you remain 
committed to a role, and yet fail to meet the obligations it 
generates, you fail yourself as a human being, as well as 
failing in that role. And if you fail in all of your roles – if 
you live at random, without integrity or principle, then you 
will lose your grip on yourself as one who has any reason to 
live and to act at all. (p.121)
102 As Gibbard puts it, ‘A connoisseur may act form pride in his connoisseurship, from his self-
image as a connoisseur, but children seek out pictures from straight liking, and an adult might visit 
the Art Institute in the same spirit. Not all motivations focus on maintaining a view of oneself as 
valuable, and a reflective agent might conceivably have no self-focused, esteem-driven motives at 
all.  Without  these motives,  he would,  perhaps,  be a  normal member of  our species  – but  with 
Korsgaard,  as  I  read her,  we’re examining the sheer  logic  of  agency’.  (1999,  p.152)  Note that  
Taylor’s transcendental argument, which we shall look at in the next chapter only aims to show that a 
particular  structure  is  presupposed  by  undamaged  human  personhood  and  thus  evades  this 
complaint. 
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I  would call  this  the argument  from integrity:  reconstructed,  it  goes as 
follows:
1. A reflective agent, by committing herself to autonomy (being a law to 
herself),  thereby  also  commits  herself  to  integrity  (being  true  to  the 
practical identities she has) in her action.
2.  Given that autonomy is  a  transcendental  presupposition of reflective 
agency, so must integrity be.
3. When I act in a way that lacks integrity I fail qua agent with that role, 
but also qua agent simpliciter.
4. That is, I have failed to live up to my own conception of what I should 
do.
5. We can only fail qua agent if we presuppose an identity qua agent which 
brings with it the obligation to integrity.
6. This identity, as with all others, must be a description under which we 
value ourselves.
7. Unlike all other identities it is non-optional since it is a transcendental 
condition for valuing anything at all.
8.  This  identity  involves  our  valuing  ourselves  qua  reflective  agents  
(Korsgaard’s claim that it is qua human is a little bit misleading here).103
9. Sincerely valuing anything brings with it a commitment to integrity – to 
act on the value when required. To fail to act on the values you endorse is 
to lack integrity: it matters to you when you lack integrity. This is because 
what lies behind your concern with integrity is a value that you place on 
yourself  qua  reflective  agent:  to  lack  integrity  is  to  fail  yourself  qua 
reflective agent. 
103 Cf the discussion in the earlier paper Korsgaard 1986.
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She  then  follows  up  with  another,  more  radical  argument,  which  is 
designed to show that our humanity is the source of all value:
Most of the time, our reasons for action spring from our 
more  contingent  and  local  identities.  But  part  of  the 
normative force of those reasons springs from the value we 
place  on  ourselves  as  human  beings  who  need  such 
identities.  In this  way all  value depends on the value of 
humanity; other forms of practical identity matter in part 
because  humanity  requires  them.  Moral  identity  and  the 
obligations it carries with it are therefore inescapable and 
pervasive. Not every form of practical identity is contingent 
or relative after all: moral identity is necessary. (pp.121-2)
This is just a fancy new model of an argument that first 
appeared in a much simpler form, Kant’s argument for his 
Formula of Humanity. The form of relativism with which 
Kant began was the most elementary one we encounter – 
the relativism of value to human desires and interests  ... 
Kant saw that we take things to be important because they 
are  important  to  us  –  and  he  concluded  that  we  must 
therefore take ourselves to be important.  In this way, the 
value of humanity itself is implicit in every human choice. 
If complete normative scepticism is to be avoided – if there 
is such a thing as a reason for action – then humanity, as the 
source of all reasons and values, must be valued for its own 
sake. (p.122) 
If this argument works, it  is supposed to establish that ‘our identity as 
moral beings – as people who value themselves as human beings – stands 
behind our more particular practical identities.’
The first thing we need to clarify is what exactly is meant by ‘humanity’ 
and what  it  is  to value  one’s humanity.  It  seems to me that  there  is  a 
slippage between the idea of ‘humanity’ that Korsgaard has argued for, 
namely  one’s  humanity  as  capacity  for  reflective  choice,  and what  she 
attempts  to  do  with  the  concept  of  humanity,  which  involves  a  rather 
thicker  notion  of  humanity.  It  is  unclear  that  any constraints  on action 
follow  from  valuing  one’s  humanity  in  this  thin  sense.104 But  yet  if 
104 As Gibbard puts it, ‘If valuing my humanity is taking pride in being a reflective chooser, how 
does that constrain what I do, what I reflectively choose?’ (1999, p.156)
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Korsgaard wants to give humanity a thicker sense, valuing one’s humanity 
will not follow from the very idea of a self-consciousness.
The second thing we need to clarify with these arguments is the status that 
Korsgaard  is  claiming  for  the  value  of  humanity:  there  seems  to  be  a 
degree of sliding about between the relatively weak claim that having any 
practical  identity  presupposes  attributing  a  value  to  our  humanity,  the 
slightly stronger claim that in addition our humanity is a partial source of 
other values, and the very strong claim that our humanity is the source of 
all value. 
I suspect that this uncertainty may in part be because Korsgaard realises 
she requires the very strong claim, but does not have an adequate argument 
to  back  it  up.  She  requires  this  strong claim because  if  our  humanity 
provides us with just one practical identity amongst others, then there will  
be no reason to believe that the reasons it provides need be taken to be any 
more authoritative than those provided by any other practical identity. 
However, the strong claim seems to me to be deeply flawed because it 
ignores two major ways in which value is created in human life without 
depending  directly  on  the  agent’s  capacity  for  reflective  endorsement: 
through activity and through recognition. 
First, people often form practical identities in response to their finding the 
activities  implied  by  those identities  valuable  and enjoyable.  Thus,  for 
example,  most  professional  chess  players  do  not  start  by  reflectively 
endorsing the practical identity of a chess player: rather they begin to play 
chess, find they are good at it, that they enjoy it, that it begins to interest 
them more than anything else,  and only then  do they begin to think of 
themselves as chess players, and to endorse this practical identity. In such 
cases, it is false to claim that the resultant identity is valuable to that person 
because they endorse it. This gets things the wrong way round: it would be 
better to say that they endorse the identity because they find the activity 
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valuable. Their reflective endorsement is not the source of the value, but a 
recognition of the value that they had already been attracted by.
Second, it neglects the way in which people can find their lives valuable 
through being found valuable by others. The way that most of us, if we are 
lucky, come to have a sense of self-worth if through the internalisation of 
the love our parents show us. One takes the way one is treated by the other 
and  takes  it  as  an  indication  of  one’s  worth.  The  sense  of  oneself  as 
valuable is  constructed by love and it is not dependent on one’s capacity 
for rational endorsement.105
It thus seems implausible to hold that reflective endorsement is the source 
of all value. But there are reasons for doubting the weak claim, that having 
any  practical  identity  presupposes  valuing  one’s  capacity  for  reflective 
choice, as well. For it is quite conceivable that one could have a particular 
practical  identity  without  thereby endorsing  one’s  value  as  a  reflective 
chooser.  Let’s  say  I’ve  always  considered  myself  stupid,  useless  at 
everything  that  involves  thinking;  but  I  discover  that  I  am  a  brilliant 
footballer. I find both immense satisfaction in playing football, and receive 
extensive validation from others as a result of my footballing excellence. 
Why should I agree that the value of my identity as a footballer depends on 
my  endorsement  of  this  practical  identity  and  hence  on  valuing  my 
capacity for rational endorsement in general? 
I could doubt that the value of my identity depends on my endorsement as 
follows: as in the case of the chess player, I might have just stumbled into 
playing football. What makes it valuable to me is the fact that I’m good at 
it; that I love doing it; and that (for once) it makes people admire me. In 
this  case the value of the identity comes from the two other sources I 
mentioned  –  activity  and  recognition,  and  can  bypass  reflective 
endorsement altogether. 
105 I discuss such relationships of recognition at far greater length in chapter six.
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Further,  as  I  suggested  I  might  even  have  reasons  for  distrusting  and 
disliking those elements of life  that have to do with thinking and with 
rational weighing of alternatives, and actually wish to be free from all this 
standing back from life and asking myself if I really endorse the identity I 
find  myself  with.  Such  moves  may  merely  lead  me  into  doubt  and 
uncertainty; make me feel stupid and inadequate; worthless compared to 
those who are much cleverer than I am. Mightn’t I wish that I could be free 
from this extra layer of consciousness, living for glory and the activity that 
I love?106 
To sum up: Korsgaard wants to argue that valuing anything in the world 
implies that we value ourselves; and that this involves valuing our capacity 
for rational endorsement. But this argument does not work, as we can value 
our own lives without thinking that the source of this value is our capacity 
for reflective choice: we could conceivably value our own lives without 
valuing our capacity for reflective choice at all. 
The chain of Korsgaard’s argument therefore breaks down at this point. 
Argument eight: From our deep social nature to the necessity of conceiving  
reasons as essentially public (agent neutral)
Where argument seven was supposed to establish the universality of the 
practical identity of humanity, argument eight is supposed to show that the 
value we place on our own humanity must be construed in an agent-neutral 
way. 
Korsgaard says that there are only two ways in which we could establish 
the publicity  of reasons: either by asserting the truth of what  she calls 
substantive moral realism (i.e. the view that there are some moral facts or 
values that  are a part  of the furniture of the universe,  which make our 
106 Interestingly, Buddhism too would see something problematic in Korsgaard’s idea of reflective 
consciousness, though for different reasons: it sees it as something that has to be left behind on the 
road to enlightenment. For a good, philosophically astute introduction to Zen Buddhism, see Sekida 
1976.
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moral  claims  justified),  or  an alternative,  which  starts  from anti-realist 
premisses:
The other way retains one element of the picture I began 
with. The public character of reasons is indeed created by 
the  reciprocal  exchange,  the  sharing,  of  the  reasons  of 
individuals.  But  it  acknowledges  the  point  made  by  the 
criticisms  made  above.  If  these  reasons  really  were 
essentially private, it would be impossible to exchange or to 
share  them.  So  their  privacy  must  be  incidental  or 
ephemeral;  they must  be  inherently  shareable.  We might 
call this view ‘publicity as shareability’. I take this to be 
equivalent to another thesis, namely, that what both enables 
us and forces us to share our reasons is, in a deep sense, our 
social nature. (p.135)
[I]f our social nature is deep, in the sense that it is the nature 
of  our  reasons  that  they  are  public  and  shareable,  then 
justifications of morality can and should appeal to it. So the 
kind of argument we need here is not one that shows us that 
our private reasons somehow commit us to public ones, but 
one that acknowledges that our reasons were never more 
than  incidentally  private  in  the  first  place.  To  act  on  a 
reason  is  already,  essentially,  to  act  on  a  consideration 
whose normative force may be shared with others.  Once 
that is in place, it will be easy to show how we can get 
someone who acknowledges the value of his own humanity 
to see that he has moral obligations. (p.136)
One of these comments contains the germ of what I take the truth to be, 
namely ‘To act on a reason is already, essentially, to act on a consideration 
whose normative force may be shared with others.’ But we need to be more 
careful than she is in how to interpret this claim: there is an ambiguity in 
the  notion  of  ‘sharing’  here.  Think  for  a  moment  of  instrumental 
rationality: let us say that John wants to become a millionaire. This gives 
him a reason to will the means to his end (for example, to work hard, or to 
marry an heiress). Now the normative force of the reasons that are means 
to his end must be shareable (it must be the case that, given his end, we can 
intersubjectively agree that this constitutes the best means to it), but it does 
not follow that the reasons in question are agent-neutral. 
126
It is in the attempt to make this leap that Korsgaard introduces the idea of 
our ‘deep social nature’. But the problem is that this seems to be in danger 
of going from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’: the argument that Korsgaard constructs 
tries to go from something that doesn’t have any normative significance 
(our social nature) to the publicity of reasons.107 
4.5 Conclusion
After the collapse of Korsgaard’s attempt to show how self-consciousness 
implies the validity of morality, we should attempt to salvage what is of 
value from it. 
Charles Taylor presents one important way in which we might attempt to 
do this: he too invokes a transcendental account of human selfhood, but 
one which is closer to empirical psychological theories and generally less 
ambitious. He argues that for a life to have the sort of depth and value that 
is constitutive of a human life, an agent has to be hooked into a source of 
good outside himself,  which is capable of providing the public reasons 
required.
I shall take up again, from my own perspective, the theme of our deep 
social nature in the discussion of recognition in chapter six and the theme 
of the  public  nature  of  moral  reasons in  the account  of moral  rules  in 
chapter eight.
 
107 In fact the figure whom she refers to, Wittgenstein, suggests that it is nothing to do with the fact 
that we are social animals that reasons are shareable: rather it has to do with the conditions under 
which normativity is possible. The key idea here is that private normativity is incoherent: if you take 
something to have normative force for you then this ipso facto commits you to the shareability of this 
normative force, on pain of your falling into mere wilful self assertion.
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C h a p t e r  F i v e
Charles Taylor’s Ethics of the Good
5.1 Introduction
At the close of the previous chapter, I argued that Korsgaard’s attempt to 
reconstruct morality fails both because it fails to demonstrate that we must  
value our humanity, and because you cannot get from private to public 
reasons in the way she thinks we can. We can see Charles Taylor’s moral 
philosophy as a way of remedying these deficiencies and thus giving a 
more convincing response to the Nietzschean critique of morality. 
Charles Taylor’s moral philosophy is immediately addressed to what he 
sees as the greatest challenge raised by Nietzsche: he agrees with Nietzsche 
that the question of the affirmation of life is of fundamental importance, 
and that, insofar as we cannot articulate why the life of a moral goodness is 
more worthwhile than any other life, morality is in trouble. 
In arguing in this way, Taylor attempts to undermine methods of thinking 
about morality that focus, for example on autonomy, by insisting that the 
basis of moral thinking must be the good: that is, an image of a worthwhile 
life. On the basis of this understanding of the task of moral philosophy, he 
attempts to construct an argument that takes the following steps: i) we have 
a basic need to find our lives meaningful; ii) this need must be expressed in 
finding  some  things  good; iii)  where  this  sense  of  the  good  does  not 
include the affirmation of the dignity of human beings, it is a result of a 
form of  self-deception  or  unwillingness  to  see  on  the  agent’s  part;  iv) 
therefore if an agent sees things rightly, she will perceive the dignity of 
human beings and act accordingly. 
I argue that his attempts to reorient moral philosophy, whilst convincing in 
part, go too far when they attempt to banish all other forms of normativity 
than  that  of  the  good:  in  attempting  to  remedy  the  one-sidedness  of 
traditional moral philosophy, they go too far and we end up with a position 
that is just as lop-sided. 
On the argument for morality, I show that we have no way of convincingly 
showing that the affirmation of the dignity of all human beings is in any 
way required: as we shall see, Taylor himself sees this to some extent, and 
suggests that a turn towards theism may be in order. I do not follow him in 
this, though I do pick up some of the themes that he wishes to push with 
his theism in the final chapter, though they are transplanted into a secular 
context.  
The argument of this chapter takes the form of a reconstruction of and 
extrapolation  from  the  whole  range  of  Taylor’s  work.  This  is  in  part 
because Taylor philosophizes in a different vein from Korsgaard; he does 
not attempt to provide arguments that are knock-down in the sense that 
analytic philosophy (at least professes to) aspire to. Rather, his aim is to 
provide  an  account  of  human  experience  which  we  ourselves  find 
compelling: Taylor favours this method over the more traditional knock-
down approach, because believes that the attempt to provide foundational 
knock-down arguments is a symptom of the account of human beings that 
we need to go beyond if we are to explain how morality is possible. 
5.2 Situating Taylor
For our purposes here we can vastly simplify Taylor’s account as follows: 
up until the scientific revolution in the sixteenth century, the idea that there 
was an underlying order of things in the universe (in Taylor’s phrase, an 
‘ontic logos’) played a constitutive role in human life: it fixed the guiding 
principles of science and of ethics and of the nature of man. Moreover, it 
gave a unity to the overall outlook: there was, for example, no fact-value 
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dichotomy. Science and axiology were closely intertwined, for the same 
underlying logos served both to explain how things were and how they 
ought to be. Knowledge too was understood in terms of this world view: 
rather than as a representation of how things really were, it was understood 
participationally, ‘being informed by the same eidos, the mind participated 
in the being of the known object, rather than simply depicting it.’ (1987, 
p.467)
The coming of the scientific revolution destroyed Aristotelian science, and 
with it, swept away the idea of an ontic logos, which was replaced by the 
conception of the world as inert, evaluatively neutral. Given that the ontic 
logos had played at constitutive role in the notions of science, ethics and of 
man, these all had to undergo extensive reformulation. 
The key switch here, Taylor suggests, is in the underlying conception of 
reason: ‘[R]ationality is no longer defined substantively, in terms of orders 
of being, but rather procedurally, in terms of the standards by which we 
construct orders in science and life.’ (1989, p.156) The flip side of this new 
idea of procedural reason is what I would call an ethic of disengagement, 
which holds that we ought, so far as is possible, abstract from our human 
situatedness in the world, so that we can discover the truth. I speculate that 
the ethic of disengagement comes out of the idea of procedural reason by 
something like the following chain of thought:
The only thing that is trustworthy is reason. But reason is 
formal, in that it depends on following  procedures  which 
are constitutive of it. Hence the things over which reason 
ranges,  and  which  it  can  pronounce  rational  are  not 
intrinsically trustworthy: we must be suspicious of them. So 
it  is  best  to  disengage  ourselves  from  them  as  far  as 
possible. [My reconstruction]
For  Taylor,  the  two  most  important  ramifications  of  the  switch  from 
substantive to procedural conceptions of reason relate to its conceptions of 
knowledge and of ethics. 
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Knowledge comes to seem both philosophically more important, and much 
harder to attain than it had previously. The general model that procedural 
reason uses for its account of knowledge is that of an inner representation 
of an outer reality: what makes a particular representation  knowledge  as 
opposed to a belief that just happens to coincide with the truth is that the 
belief has been derived by the application of a reliable method. Now, this 
new world view ushers in a threat that was not present before: once we 
consider what is in our minds to be merely a representation of reality, then 
the problem arises of how we can be sure that our representations match up 
with the way things really are. Scepticism becomes a constant threat – not, 
of  course,  because  anybody  actually  believes  it  –  but  because  this 
representationalist construal of knowledge makes it difficult to see how our 
‘knowledge’ could be adequately grounded. 
In the ethical sphere, the switch to procedural reason creates an inversion: 
where the focus in ethics had been the good (what is most worth aiming at 
in action and in human life), it becomes the right (the standards that are 
appropriate  to the regulation of human action).  There are  two different 
specifications  of  ethics  compatible  with  this  conception  of  procedural 
reason, depending on the degree of power which we accord to reason. If 
the power of reason is thought to be slight, then we have something like the 
rational  economic man; if  it  is thought  to be great,  we have a Kantian 
model. 
5.3 Taylor’s critique of the disengaged worldview
Much of Taylor’s philosophical effort goes into trying to undermine this 
‘disengaged’ way of looking at things; his clear assumption being that it is 
this ethic of disengagement that has created most of the problems and that 
overcoming it will  ipso facto put us a good distance towards finding a 
solution. 
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Taylor takes it that the conception of knowledge is the key element that 
must be overturned in a critique of this worldview. The obvious reason for 
this is that, according to Taylor’s philosophical history, it is its conception 
of  knowledge  that  gives  this  worldview  its  particular  structure.  More 
subtly,  Taylor’s  philosophical  history  has  an  ambiguous  relationship  to 
Hegel, which is perhaps shining through here.108 Hegel argues that what is 
counted as knowledge always plays this structural role in formations of 
consciousness  and  that  it  is  through  perceived  inadequacies  in  the 
structures which had, up till  then,  counted as knowledge that cognitive 
improvement occurs.109 Certainly, Taylor intends his account knowledge to 
play a constitutive role in his ethical thinking. 
5.3.1 The argument from agent’s knowledge
The  ideal  of  disengaged knowledge is  to  be  undermined by an appeal 
‘agent’s knowledge’.  ‘Agent's knowledge’ is here to be understood as a 
grasp that we have, in virtue of being agents, of our own agency: ‘As those 
effectively engaged in the activities of getting to perceive and know the 
world, we are capable of identifying certain conditions without which our 
activity would fall apart into incoherence.’ (Taylor 1987, p.475)
The disengaged world view, of course, sees the idea of a representation as 
basic in knowledge. Whether linguistically, pictorially, or in some other 
way, there is a representation that things are thus-and-so, (for example, that  
the cat is on the mat) which may or may not match up with the way things 
really are.
What Taylor’s critique aims to show here is that the idea of a representation 
is not basic, in that it rests on a hitherto unacknowledged engagement with 
the world; showing this through reflection on the transcendental conditions 
of our having the sort of agent's knowledge that we do in fact have. In 
108 When Taylor grapples with the question about his methodology in chapter 12 of Sources of the 
self he (in my opinion) fails to recognize how Hegelian it is.
109 Phenomenology of Spirit, Introduction.
132
Taylor's words, that ‘What you get underlying our representations of the 
world  –  the  kind  of  things  we  formulate,  for  instance,  in  declarative 
sentences – is not further sentences – is not further representations but a 
certain grasp of the world that we have as agents in it.’ (1987, p 477)
Taylor takes the adequate exposition of this thesis to be the key advance in 
twentieth century philosophy: in this he thinks that Heidegger, Merleau-
Ponty and Wittgenstein110 have done the key work, and it remains for us 
only to defend their insights against misunderstandings engendered by the 
ideal of disengagement. Where the ‘epistemological construal’ takes the 
idea of a representation as basic and takes the fundamental question to be 
how we  can  know that  our  inner  representations  match  up  with  outer 
reality,  Heidegger  shows that  ‘the condition of our forming disengaged 
representations of reality is that we be already engaged in coping with our 
world, dealing with things in it, at grips with them.’ (1987, p.476)
This realisation is supposed to undermine the whole world view and its 
accompanying ethic of disengagement. It turns out that being at grips with 
the world is the precondition for even being able to have representations 
that we are capable of disengaging from, so the totally disengaged agent 
does not make sense even as an ideal. Rather we must accept ourselves as 
situated, social beings, and realise that it is in virtue of the situatedness that 
we  are  able  to  think  at  all,  as  Taylor  puts  it,  ‘We  cannot  turn  the 
background from which we think into an object for us. The task of reason 
has  to  be  conceived  quite  differently:  as  that  of  articulating  this 
background,  “disclosing”  what  it  involves.  This  may  open  the  way  to 
detaching ourselves from or altering part of what has constituted it – may, 
indeed,  make  such  alteration  irresistible;  but  only  through  our 
unquestioning reliance on the rest.’ (1987, pp. 477-8)
Remarks on this argument
110 See  Being and Time, The Phenomenology of  Perception  and  Philosophical  Investigations 
respectively. 
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1: Is the argument question begging?
The difficulty with this argument is that it attempts to, so to speak, pull 
itself up by its own bootstraps. It runs a transcendental argument from a 
certain conception of what is open to us via our agent’s knowledge, and 
hence installs these things as basic. But in doing so, it is not clear that it has 
refuted the representationalist picture. Rather, it might just be arguing from 
different  premisses.  What  assurances  can  it  give  us  that  it  is  not  just 
begging the question against the representationalist construal?
Taylor has the beginnings of an answer to this question, but it seems to me 
inadequate:  this  answer  is  expressed  in  embryo  in  the  following 
explanation 
By “transcendental arguments” I mean arguments that start 
from some putatively undeniable facet of our experience in 
order  to  conclude  that  this  experience  must  have  certain 
features  or  be  of  a  certain  type,  for  otherwise  this 
undeniable facet could not be. (1972, p.151) 
The reason, then that the argument from agent’s knowledge is not question-
begging, according to Taylor, then, is that it starts from facets of experience 
that are undeniable. 
The important question is how we are supposed to know these undeniable 
elements of experience: is this knowledge supposed to be immediate, or is 
it supposed to be mediated through philosophical theories? If it is supposed 
to be known immediately,  then we need some argument as to how the 
structure  of  experience  can  be  known  in  an  unmediated  way:  if  its 
mediated, then it becomes dubious how  basic  such knowledge could be 
said to be. 
2: The Heideggerean conclusion about reason seems to rely on a confusion 
between  the  nature  of  the  knowing  agent  and  the  methods/procedures  
appropriate to reason.
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We might  agree  that  each  and every  human being is  situated within  a 
community, and that it is only in virtue of being so situated that he or she is 
able  to  reflect.  But  it  does  not  follow  from  this  that  the  standards 
appropriate to reason are constituted by our engagement with the world. I 
shall  argue below that for reason to be possible  at  all,  it  cannot be so 
constituted by our engagement with the world. But for the time being we 
should  rest  content  with  pointing  out  that  there  is  nothing to  stop  the 
representationalist  re-appropriating  what  Taylor  has  said;  admitting  our 
situatedness, but still arguing there are compelling reasons for us to strive 
for knowledge that is as far as possible absolute.
If  the  account  of  knowledge was to  provide  a  foundation for  what  he 
wanted to say in ethics, then it has been unsuccessful; it should at least 
have served the lesser function of filling out the background necessary for 
an understanding of Taylor’s work. 
5.3.2 The argument against a purely procedural ethics
Taylor also has another argument, wholly his own, which we can think of 
as parallel to the critique of the disengaged subject of knowledge. This one 
attempts  to  attack  the idea of a disengaged subject  of practical  reason. 
Taylor equates the attempt to construct an ethics out of the picture of a 
disengaged subject  of  practical  reason with purely procedural  ethics. A 
purely procedural ethics would be so constituted that: 
1) Morality is exhausted by the notion of right action
2) Right action is exhausted by following procedures that are in themselves 
rational.
Taylor’s aim is to show that such an ethics would be incoherent, and to the 
extent that real ethical positions (e.g. utilitarianism, Kant’s ethics) actually 
resemble it, they are either incoherent, or trade on values that they cannot, 
by their own lights admit to. 
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The crushing problem which is supposed to beset any purely procedural 
ethics is that, within its own terms, it cannot give an account of the value of 
rationality, of the superiority of living as the rational person does. 
To  make  this  point  fully  clear,  we  must  make  a  distinction:  a  purely 
procedural ethics answers questions about individual actions, by referring 
us  to  the  concept  of  rationality  (for  example,  “Why must  I  study?”  – 
“Because, given that you will the end [passing the exam], it is rationally 
required that you pursue the means [studying]”). But no such answer is 
available if we ask the question about rationality itself – for in this case to 
refer us back to the requirements of rationality is question begging and 
circular (for example, “Why should I do what is rational” – “Because that’s 
what rationality requires”)
The ethics of autonomy threatens to force an inarticulacy on us about the 
ultimate source of the reasons for our actions: we seem to be left with no 
reason to think that being rational matters – that is, we seem to leave the 
door open for someone to merely reply ‘so what’ when we admonish them 
that they are being irrational. What is worse, we would be left  with no 
account  to  give  ourselves  of  why  rationality  mattered.  In  essence,  the 
problem is this: a disengaged, purely procedural ethics only gives us an 
abstract  structure  of  rules  and  requirements  and  cannot  in  itself 
demonstrate the appropriateness of these rules and requirements for the 
regulation of the actions of embedded human beings like ourselves. 
Taylor takes it that these reflections show that an account of the  good is 
required at the base of ethics.  Taylor uses ‘the good’ as a term of art, to 
describe a vision of a worthwhile, higher form of life that the agent takes to 
be normative and which is motivationally efficacious for him.111
The reason why only the good could be suitable basis for ethics is that it is 
only with the good that we reach a justification that a human being living 
111 I discuss Taylor’s account of our psychological economy and its relation to the good later in the 
section on Taylor’s philosophical anthropology.
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in the world will find satisfying. Hence, we should conclude that all ethical 
discussion must be ultimately answerable to an account of the good: as 
Taylor puts it, ‘The chain of explanations must be anchored somewhere in 
our intuitive grasp of what is at stake.’ (1985b, p.62)
Taylor suggests that this sound point has overlooked, because ethics that 
have  presented  themselves  as  procedural  have  in  fact  relied  on  a 
conception  of  the  good,  namely  the  conception  of  human  beings  as 
possessing a  dignity  in virtue of their rational nature. The good was not 
banished by procedural ethics, but  displaced inwards  into the idea of the 
dignity of human beings: 
If  rational  control  is  a  matter  of  mind  dominating  a 
disenchanted  world  of  matter,  then  the  sense  of  the 
superiority of the good life, and the aspiration to attain it, 
must come from the agent’s sense of his own dignity as a 
rational being. (1989, p.152)
However, procedural ethics have either not admitted to this conception of 
the good (as in utilitarianism), or have admitted it, but urged that it is the 
subjective effect of the moral law (Kant).
Any proposed purely procedural ethics is left  with a dilemma: either it 
comes clean, and admits that it  is powered by an account of the good, 
namely that human beings owe their dignity and importance to their power 
of reason. But this would involve it in a contradiction: it posits autonomy 
and disengaged reason as its first principles, but if the status of these  as 
first principles is contingent on the subscribing to a particular vision of the 
good, then it turns out that autonomy is grounded in heteronomy, and the 
ideal of disengaged reason in an engagement with the world. 
Or, if it attempts to eschew its account of the good, then, as we have seen, 
its requirements remain a mere abstract structure without any necessary 
applicability to human life.112 
112 For this argument to go through against Kant’s position, Taylor would require some way of 
demonstrating that the feeling of respect is not just the subjective effect of the moral law on a finite 
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Remarks on this argument
I think that this argument tells us something useful and important, about 
what  is left  out  by some forms of utilitarianism and by Kant’s official 
account of his own views. And I think that we should agree that when it 
comes to morality, we must take the good to be in a certain sense prior to 
the right. 
However, Taylor overreaches in his estimation of what is achieved by this 
argument: he takes it to imply that ethical theorizing should concern itself 
with the good rather than the right. If this is followed through, then right is 
robbed  of  the  intrinsic  normativity  that  it  purports  to  have;  rather, 
moonlike, it borrows its light from the sun of the good.
However, this stronger conclusion does not follow. For it does not seem to 
be generally true that all standards of practical rationality must be anchored 
in  a  conception  of  the  good.  Take  means-end  reasoning,  for  example. 
Dreier (1997, p. 93) considers the following case:
We tell [Ann] that she ought to take a prep course for the 
Law School Admissions Test. She asks why. We point out 
that  she  wants  to  raise  her  chances  of  getting  into  a 
competitive law school, and she can raise her chances by 
taking the prep course. She admits as much, but still isn’t 
motivated to take the prep course. So we cite a rule, the 
means/end rule:
    M/E:  If you desire to ψ, and you believe that by φ-ing 
you will ψ, then you ought to φ.
Now suppose that  Ann agrees  that  this  rule  does indeed 
instruct her to take the prep course, given what she believes 
and desires, but she shrugs at the rule. She doesn’t accept it.
Taylor’s position would commit him to arguing that what lies behind the 
validity of the means-end rule is a vision of the good, namely of a strong-
will, but is in fact a vision of the good that plays a foundational role in Kant’s theory. If he wished to  
make  this  argument,  he  could  avail  himself  of  the  arguments  we  put  forward  in  chapter  two 
concerning the relationship between universal law and the humanity formulations of the categorical 
imperative. 
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willed, effective person who takes the necessary steps to secure what she 
desires. But there seems to be no good reason to follow him in this: the 
means-end  rule  is  more  naturally  understood  as  having  a  constitutive 
status: on this reading, the attempt to ask why we should follow the means-
end principle just shows a basic lack of understanding of practical reason, 
for without it, one has no grip on the idea of a reason for action at all.113 
In the case of moral rules, we can agree with Taylor that they must be put 
forward within a wider context of an account of the good: but it does not 
follow that the normativity of moral rules is reducible to that of the good. 
For it is quite possible to have a position (such as the one I shall be arguing 
for in the final chapter), in which the good provides the context in which 
the attempt to construct moral rules that all can agree to makes sense, but 
where  the  validity  of  moral  rules  is  to  be decided by a  dedicated  and 
separate procedure. 
Taylor’s  error  here  is  parallel  to  that  in  the  case  of  the  account  of 
knowledge: just as engagement need not exhaust theoretical reason, so it 
need not  exhaust practical  reason. Indeed,  there are reasons that spring 
from within the nature of reason itself that should lead us to be wary of 
attempting to tie the correct exercise of reason too closely to the boundaries 
of  our  all-too human engagement.  While  reasoners  are  engaged agents 
operating within social horizons, reason qua reason seeks a validity beyond 
all such horizons. As Putnam explains it, ‘Reason is, in this sense, both 
immanent  (not  to  be  found  outside  of  concrete  language  games  and 
113 Dreier puts the point as follows: ‘What would count as a reason, by her lights? As long as she 
accepts M/E, we know what would count as a reason: some belief that by following the rule to be  
justified she would achieve some end she desires. ... If you can’t draw the practical inference, not 
even the fundamental M/E kind, then nothing counts as a reason for you. This is why M/E has a kind 
of ground-level normative status. I think it counts as a categorical imperative, too. Of course, the 
particular reasons that M/E generates are all hypothetical reasons. But M/E is not hypothetical. Its 
demands must be met by you, insofar as you are rational, no matter what desires you happen to  
have.’ (Dreier  1997,  pp.  95-6).  For  other  useful  recent  writing  on  instrumental  reasoning,  see 
Korsgaard (1997), Hampton (1998). For further thoughts on constitutive arguments about practical 
reasoning, see Velleman  (1992), (1996), (1997) and Railton (1997). 
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institutions) and transcendent (a regulative idea that we use to criticise the 
conduct of all activities and institutions)’. (Putnam 1982, p. 228)
In so far as an ethical norm or a methodology for thinking purports to be 
rational, it must be able to survive critique by reason. But reason itself is 
also subject to critique by reason. In so far as anything fails such a test, it 
only approximated to rationality; or perhaps was a downright mistake. We 
cannot state in advance that the results of such testing will be the exclusive 
upholding  of  the  picture  derived  from our  basic  engagement  with  the 
world, ‘for it is indeed absurd to look to reason for enlightenment, and yet 
prescribe beforehand which side she must necessarily favour’. (Kant  C1,  
A747/B775) 
5.3.3 The argument from the phenomenology of experience
We have  so far  seen  no  reason  to  follow Taylor  in  believing  that  the 
normativity of the right is borrowed from that of the good. But he also has 
another  argument  to  this  conclusion,  based  on  the  phenomenology  of 
experience.
The argument turns on making us look and see the way in which concepts 
like ‘shame’ operate. We are supposed to appreciate i) that such concepts 
presuppose an engagement with the world; ii) the feelings correlative to 
such  concepts  are  expressions  of  some  underlying  sense  of  what  is 
important114 (i.e. a notion of the good); iii) (generalizing this conclusion) it 
is only through feeling that we can gain access to what is important (to the 
good); and iv) morality too must be explained in these terms. 
i) Taylor argues that engagedness is necessary for shame in the following 
way:
114 Taylor  uses  ‘what  I  feel  as  important’ in  preference to  discussion of  ‘the good’ in  ‘Self-
interpreting Animals’ (1985b), from which I draw this argument. This does not represent a difference 
in position, but only in focus. In ‘Self-interpreting Animals’, he is considering solely what having a 
notion of the good looks like from the inside, and finds the notion of importance helpful.
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Shame is an emotion that a subject experiences in relation 
to a dimension of his existence as a subject. What we can be 
ashamed of are properties which are essentially properties 
of a subject. This may not be immediately evident, because 
I  may be ashamed of  my shrill  voice,  or  my effeminate 
hands. But of course it only makes sense to see these as 
objects  of  shame  if  they  have  for  me  or  my culture  an 
expressive  dimension:  a  shrill  voice  is  (to  me,  to  my 
culture)  something  unmanly,  betokens  hysteria,  not 
something solid, strong, macho, self-contained. It does not 
radiate a sense of strength, capacity, superiority. Effeminate 
hands are – effeminate. Both voice and hands clash with 
what I aspire to be, feel that my dignity demands that I be, 
as a person, a presence among others. (1985b, p.53)
Shame involves us in engagement with the world in two ways: first, it is an 
emotion that can only be had by an engaged agent, as it is experienced 
relative to the agent’s own understanding of himself as an agent (or, in 
Taylor’s terms, it is ‘subject-referring’). Second, if we are to understand or 
justify the actions that shame motivates, this too can only be done from the 
perspective of an engaged agent: this is true both on a conceptual level i.e., 
that if we wish either to explain actions done from shame or to explicate 
them we have to refer to things like ‘our sense of dignity, of worth, of how 
we are seen by others – which are essentially bound up with the life of a 
subject  of  experience.’  (1985b,  p.54)  It  is  also  true  on  the  level  of 
producing actual interpretations: to fully understand an action done from 
shame we must have a sense of the form of life which that feeling of shame 
articulates. 
ii)  the  feelings  correlative  to  such  concepts  are  expressions  of  some 
underlying sense of what is important (i.e. a notion of the good). 
I  abstract  this  premiss  from what  Taylor  says  about  ‘subject-referring’ 
properties.
iii) (generalizing this conclusion) it is only through feeling that we can gain 
access to what is important (to the good)
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Taylor formulates his argument for this claim in response to an imagined 
criticism that ‘[W]e also see our selves as being aware of what is important 
to us as humans in other ways... We should distinguish what we feel as 
important  or  valuable,  we  are  often  led  to  say,  from  what  we  know 
rationally  to  be’ (1985b,  p.60)  Taylor’s response is  that this  rests  on a 
misleading characterization; for what I ‘know rationally’ to be valuable is 
also based in feeling:
If  I  want  to  say  that  I  know  certain  things  to  be  truly 
important: one should be generous even to blackguards; or 
that the only thing one should really be ashamed of is being 
untrue to oneself; or that acting out of spite is always bad – 
even though my gorge rises at the thought of helping that 
cad, I feel ashamed at not making the football team, and I 
cannot resist lashing out at my successful rival – I am not 
just opposing feeling to reason. For I would not ‘know’ that 
one should be generous, and so on, unless I was moved in 
some way: perhaps I feel remorse when I have delivered 
myself of a spiteful attack; or feel self-contempt at my lack 
of  autonomy when  I  allow myself  to  feel  shame at  not 
making the football team; or feel morally inspired by the 
ideal of universal generosity. If I were quite impervious to 
any such feelings, these norms and ideals would carry no 
weight with me; I would not even be tempted to subscribe 
to them, and would not describe myself as ‘knowing’ that 
they were true/valid. (1985b, pp. 60-1)
The key idea here is that valuing x has an internal relation to being moved 
by it; hence to talk of ‘knowing’ that something is valuable or important is 
misleading, if it is taken to imply that this knowledge is unrelated to being 
moved. ‘[W]e can have no dispassionate awareness of the human good.’ 
(1985b, p.62)
There are two problems with this stage of the argument: the first is that the 
proposed  necessary  link  between  motivation  and  the  human  good  is 
suspect. Taylor allays this difficulty somewhat in the later  Sources of the  
Self, where he spells out this relationship in a more nuanced way:
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Our acceptance of any [good] is connected in a complex 
way  with  our  being  moved  by  it.  ...  We  may  accept 
something as a good although we are relatively unmoved by 
it, because at the lowest, we think very little about it and 
glide along in conformity with our milieu; or because we 
revere and look up to established authority; or perhaps best, 
because we choose certain figures as authoritative for us, 
sensing in them that they are moved by something authentic 
and great, even though we don’t fully understand it or feel it 
ourselves.  But  through  all  these  complex  chains  of 
intermediation, the connection between seeing the good and 
being moved by it cannot be broken. (1989, pp. 73-4)
Second, it remains unclear how ‘the human good’, defined in terms of the 
individual’s  feeling  that  something  is  important,  is  related  to  what 
philosophers would usually describe as the good for a human being. ‘The 
good for a human being’ would include, no doubt, some notion of what is 
important, but it would also involve more mundane elements, such as the 
basic needs of food, shelter, warmth, association and so on, which while 
we have them, seem relatively unimportant. To take ‘the human good’ in 
Taylor’s  sense  to  be  everything  in  ethical  inquiry  seems  to  risk 
romanticising our predicament in such a way that ethical inquiry is cut off 
from the needs deriving from the sort of biological beings we are. 
In fact, we can quite easily think of cases in which a form of life associated 
with  the  reverence  of  a  particular  good  is  actually  harmful  from  a 
biological point of view (primitive initiation ceremonies spring to mind). It 
is  ludicrous  to  treat  our  feelings  of  what  is  important  as  enjoying  a 
complete autonomy from the actual conditions of human life: I do not see 
how anyone could fail to see how the fact that holding certain values is 
physically bad for us constitutes an objection to them.
This objection is sufficiently obvious that one would have thought that 
Taylor would have some answer to it; however, I have been unable to find 
a very clear one in the corpus of his writings. What I suspect he would say, 
if pushed, is that the ‘no dispassionate awareness of the human good’ thesis 
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does not commit us to merely contemplating our own feelings; other sorts 
of knowledge and expertise can of course be brought to bear on the subject 
of the good. He would stress, however, that it is in our feelings of what is 
important that the ultimate court of appeal lies. 
iv) We have already criticised Taylor’s conclusion that because the right 
presupposes an account of the good, it  therefore derives its normativity 
from  the  good.  Taylor  attempts  to  give  another  argument  for  his 
conclusion,  based  on  the  reading  of  the  phenomenology  of  moral 
obligation. 
Taylor  bases  his  claim  on  an  explanation  of  the  experience  of  moral 
obligation. He suggests that we take, as a paradigm case, an experience 
something like the one that the good Samaritan had, that of ‘coming across 
someone in trouble and feeling called upon to help’. (1985b, p. 57) His 
reading is that this experience involves a feeling of what is of importance, 
which is related to our conception of ourselves:
For I do not just feel desire to help this man. Indeed, I might 
feel no such desire in the usual sense of the term. But I feel 
called upon to help him. And I feel called upon qua rational 
being,  or  moral  being,  or  creature  made  by  God  in  his 
image,  in other  words capable of responding to this  like 
God, that is, out of agape. The obligation does not lie on an 
animal  nor,  in  another  way,  on  an  idiot,  nor  an  infant. 
(1985b, p. 58)
Here we might agree with Taylor’s reading of what it is like to feel a moral 
demand, but without the argument which claims that the normativity of the 
right is derived from that of the good, nothing follows about validity of 
moral demands – certainly it does not follow that the validity of a moral 
demand is to be judged by its ability to move us. 
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5.3.4 Principle of the best account
Last of all, Taylor attempts to ground his ethical philosophy with what he 
calls the ‘principle of the best account’. Taylor lays out his argument in the 
form of rhetorical questions:
What better measure of reality do we have in human affairs 
than  those  terms  which  on  critical  reflection  and  after 
correction of the errors we can detect make the best sense of 
our  lives?  ‘Making  best  sense’ here  includes  not  only 
offering the best, most realistic orientation about the good 
but also allowing us best to understand and make sense of 
the  actions  and  feelings  of  ourselves  and  others.  (1989, 
p.57)
What we need to  explain  is people living their lives;  the 
terms in which they cannot  avoid living them cannot be 
removed  from the  explanandum,  unless  we can  propose 
other  terms  in  which  they  could  live  them  more 
clairvoyantly.  We cannot just leap outside of these terms 
altogether, on the grounds that their logic doesn’t fit some 
model of “science” and that we know a priori that human 
beings must be explicable in this “science”. This begs the 
question.  How  can  we  ever  know  that  humans  can  be 
explained by any scientific theory until we actually explain 
how they live their lives in its terms?
... The terms we select have to make sense across the whole 
range  of  both  explanatory  and  life  uses.  The  terms 
indispensable for the latter are part of the story that makes 
best sense of us, unless and until we can replace them with 
more clairvoyant substitutes. The result of this search for 
clairvoyance  yields  the  best account  we can  give  at  any 
given  time,  and  no  epistemological  or  metaphysical 
considerations  of  a  more  general  kind  about  science  or 
nature can justify setting this aside. The best account in the 
above sense is trumps. (1989, p.58)
More rigorously, we could rewrite the argument as follows: 
We take as a premiss the claim that the function of our evaluative terms 
and practices is to help us to live wisely and insightfully as human beings. 
Anything that is designed to fulfil a function F enjoys a certain autonomy, 
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in the following sense:  qua designed to F,  it  is  criticizable only on the 
grounds that it does not F well. Thus, a rain water butt qua rain water butt 
is criticizable only on the basis of its failure to catch and store rain water. If 
we extend the same principle to our evaluative terms and practices, they 
are criticizable as such, in part or in whole, only on the basis that they fail 
to help us to choose wisely and insightfully as human beings. For example, 
we  would  have  lost,  ethically  speaking,  if  in  attempting  to  make  our 
evaluative  practices  more  ‘rigorous’ or  ‘scientifically  acceptable’,  we 
thereby reduced our ability to judge wisely and insightfully. 
It  follows  that  something  could  only  count  as  an  improvement  of  our 
evaluative  practices  if  it  enables  us  to  do  better  what  our  evaluative 
practices attempt to do. Our evaluative practices are therefore autonomous, 
in the sense that no change can be imposed on them from the outside; 
rather it must meet with the approval of these practices themselves. 
This should give us important additional reasons for being suspicious of 
any attempt to reduce our discussion of ethical matters to facts that can be 
known independent of specifically human sensibilities. A scientific theory’s 
excellence  as science  does not give any intrinsic  reason why it  should 
increase ethical insight; rather before we rectified our evaluative practices 
on  the  basis  of  a  scientific  theory,  we  would  have  to  check  that  the 
scientific  theory  did  in  fact  better  fulfil  the  function  of  our  evaluative 
practices. In fact, as we have seen above nothing which is put in absolute 
terms can tell us anything about the human good; what we are seeing here 
is that it  is dubious to imagine that science could even put background 
constraints on acceptability in ethical thinking. Hence the commonly held 
background assumption that science is a higher or more rigorous form of 
knowledge than ‘mere’ common sense must be abandoned in the case of 
ethical thinking. 
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The corollary that we should draw is that in discussing the human good, to 
be truly philosophical – that is, to adopt the methodology appropriate to the 
task in hand – is to attempt to make sense of our lives as we live them 
rather than to adopt a model of rigour borrowed from outside discourse 
concerning the human good.
Criticism of this argument
What Taylor is gunning against with the principle of the best account is 
reductive  movements  like  behaviourism,  which,  on  the  basis  of 
methodological  assumptions  attempt  to  bypass  the  inner  logic  of  our 
deliberative practices.115 But he oversteps the mark: the principle of the 
best account amounts to an attempt to hive off our deliberative practices as 
something quite separate from what can be discovered by science. This I 
would  submit,  is  both  an  over-reaction,  and  a  severe  methodological 
mistake. It is an over-reaction because behaviourism was  bad science:  it 
was quite  incapable of explaining human behaviour  because the theory 
contained insufficient resources to explain how an animal can act so as to 
mould its environment in the absence of a stimulus. 
It is a severe methodological mistake because in its attempt to carve out a 
specific niche for ethical thinking, it forgets a far more fundamental duty of 
philosophy, namely to mediate between different systems of thought which 
claim a genuine cognitive grasp on the way things are, but which produce 
results that are either incommensurable with one another, or are at odds 
with one another.
If we consider the law of non-contradiction, then it should be apparent why 
philosophy should have to fulfil  this  task:  the law of non-contradiction 
states that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong to the same 
subject in the same respect.116 Now, presumably in claiming knowledge of 
something, we are claiming to cognize it as it really is. Now, it is clear that 
115 See Taylor’s first book (1964), which is a critique of behaviourism.
116 Aristotle, Metaphysics IV.3; 1005b19
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what one system claims as knowledge cannot simultaneously be claimed 
by a different system to be not knowledge in the same respect, but yet both 
be  correct.  Hence,  in  all  our  dealings  with  science  and  with  ethical 
theorizing, we should remember that all the truths there are must cohere 
with one another. Even though our knowledge may be highly fragmented, 
we should never lose sight of the fact that it is incoherent to suppose that 
the pieces in front of us are not all part of one jigsaw. 
This is, of course, not to say that it is a requirement of reason that all truths 
can be reduced to some sort of common currency; instead it is to affirm 
that  reason  requires  us  to  give  some  account  of  logical  space  which 
explains  how  everything  that  we  take  to  be  true  can  indeed  be  true 
simultaneously – which will, for example, allow us to distinguish different 
explanatory levels. In so far as the principle of the best account fails to take 
this into account it is founded on bad philosophy.
We have seen that the grounds of which Taylor attempts to put forward his 
approach  to  ethical  theorizing  as  the  only  possible  one  are  flawed.  It 
remains to see how Taylor applies this conception of ethical theorizing.
5.4 Taylor’s philosophical anthropology
Taylor’s  philosophical  anthropology attempts  to  lay the  foundations  for 
morality, by arguing that our best account of human beings will show us 
that the centre of each person’s identity is an account of the good which 
commits them to public reasons.  It  attempts to tighten up all  the loose 
formulations we have made so far in terms of the good, and ‘importance’ 
into a unified theory. 
Taylor starts from what he takes to be the common sense idea that there are 
certain things that it is good to be or good to love. Thus, we might say it is 
good  to  be  generous  or  trusting,  and  good  to  love  the  truth.  Actions 
obviously  will  follow  from  such  an  adherence;  but  when  we  admire 
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someone,  for  example,  who  is  generous  even  to  his  enemies,  we  are 
evaluating the person or the quality of will, that lies behind these actions. 
Taylor  first  attempts  to  give  a  more  perspicuous  explanation  of  these 
‘things  that  are  good  to  be  or  to  love’,  and  second  to  show,  via  a 
transcendental argument, that having things you believe it to be good to be 
or to love is a necessary condition for undamaged human personhood.
5.4.1 The descriptive part
Taylor invents the term ‘strong evaluation’ to attempt to explicate what lies 
behind the claim that there are certain things that it is good to be or to love. 
He  has  made  several  attempts  to  elucidate  his  conception  of  strong 
evaluation, and it has been argued that these attempts are not all mutually 
consistent.117 Here  I  quote  the  attempt  which  seems to  me  to  be  most 
helpful:
[An] end is strongly valued when its being an end for us is 
not just contingent on our happening to desire it or need it, 
when in other  words, we allow that  we would be lesser 
beings if we should cease to want or need it. The ice-cream 
cone I now desire is weakly valued, because should I lose 
my interest in it, it would no longer have any claim on me. 
But  I  do  not  think  of  my  commitment  to  Amnesty 
International  in  these  terms.  Someone  who  refused  to 
contribute to this cause because they were not ‘into’ torture 
victims this week would be thought unbearably frivolous. 
Their  change  of  interest  does  not  reduce  the  claim,  but 
rather shows them in a poor light. (Taylor 1995, p. 134)
This is a little vague and impressionistic, but we can tighten it up into the 
following four theses: An end is strongly valued when it has the following 
properties: 
117 See Taylor (1977), (1985b), (1985c), (1989) and (1995). This complaint of inconsistency is 
made by Owen Flanagan (1990). Flanagan does not refer to the account I shall examine, (Taylor 
1995), which was published after his article.
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i) The end is a standard against which one can be judged regardless of the 
desires I now have. 
ii) The end is such that it draws people towards it because they see it to be 
good. 
iii) Being motivated by this end is being motivated by the good, and is 
‘higher’ or praiseworthy. 
iv) Correlatively, failing to be moved by what is strongly valued can be an 
adequate reason for contempt. 
As is implicit in the above formulation, Taylor believes strong evaluation 
to be intrinsically contrastive in nature. He does not explain fully why this 
is so; however, Nicholas Smith, in his perceptive and sympathetic account 
of Taylor, gives a good explanation:
Mattering,  Taylor  informs  us,  is  only  intelligible  as  a 
background  of  qualitative  distinction;  if  everything 
mattered  the  same,  if  anything mattered,  nothing would. 
What  matters  makes  a difference,  [hence]  its  articulation 
requires qualitative distinctions between the worthwhile and 
the worthless, the significant and the trivial, the fulfilling 
and the vacuous. (Smith 1997, p. 37: my italics).
Once we switch to the terminology of ‘mattering’, rather than ‘what it is 
good to be’, then everything becomes clearer: we are able to see that the 
notion of mattering already entails that of a ‘higher’ that which matters as 
opposed to a ‘lower’ – that which does not matter. 
Mattering  must  be  considered  holistically  because  mattering  is  a 
comparative concept (for example, like tall) rather than an absolute one 
(for example, having a height of six feet). (The distinction being that the 
height of other men makes a difference to whether this man is tall or not, 
but it makes no difference to whether he is six feet tall). Just as we can only 
say that a man is tall against some background understanding of the normal 
height for a man, so we can only say that something matters against a 
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background  understanding  of  what  is  important.  It  is  this  general 
understanding of what is important that is a ‘notion of the good’. 
That a person is a strong evaluator ties her into a community of valuers, 
Taylor argues. His reasons for this are threefold: first, that one can only 
grow into an adult human being in the context of a community – by taking 
up the values of that community and internalizing them. Second, once you 
are  a  fully  functional  adult,  you can  only  progress  by  working on the 
framework you find yourself in; repairing the ship whilst it is at sea. Third, 
you  can  only  make  progress  on  improving  this  framework  through 
dialogue; whether with others who are physically present; positions one 
encounters in books or through hearsay or through inner dialogue in which 
you yourself play the parts of the people you are arguing with. Each way, 
the progress you are making is within a community of valuers; you are 
presenting your notion of the good to a community for its approval (even if 
it is only the notional one of an inner dialogue).
Note that what we have said about strong evaluation so far is compatible 
with two distinct readings of the ontology it calls into play. We could call 
these  the  subjectivist  and  the  objectivist  readings.  Obviously  the 
epistemology of strong evaluation is subjectivist, as we can only be strong 
evaluators  if  we  have  the  correct  specifically  human  sensibilities  and 
grown up in a community. But this leaves open the question of whether 
there is something that lies behind the strong evaluations we make. There 
are two possibilities here: the subjectivist one would state that nothing lies 
behind our strong evaluations. Our strong evaluations articulate the form of 
life of a community; they are part of a way of living in the world, and that  
is  all  they  are.  The  objectivist  reading  would  agree  that  our  strong 
evaluations articulate the form of life of a community, and that they are 
part of a way of living in the world, but it would say that there is also 
something that lies  behind  any set of strong evaluations – an objective 
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good – that any particular set of strong evaluations is an inadequate attempt 
to articulate.
Reading between the lines, it is quite easy to see that Taylor believes in the 
objectivist reading. But, judging from his way of proceeding, he is also 
aware that it would not be a valid philosophical move to merely assert that 
there is an objective good resting behind our strong evaluations. Rather he 
must provide an argument. 
This  leaves him,  it  seems, with two possible  strategies:  i)  to argue for 
morality  whilst  only  presupposing  a  subjectivist  account  of  strong 
evaluation,  or ii)  to give grounds, from within the nature of the strong 
evaluations people actually have, for thinking that the objectivist account 
of strong evaluation better characterizes the way things are.
I’m not sure that Taylor has clearly distinguished strategy i) from strategy 
ii)  in  his  mind.  Anyway,  I  shall  show  below  that  i)  is  fraught  with 
problems, and that, given Taylor’s conception of normativity, strategy ii) 
requires the success of strategy i), and hence is unworkable.
5.4.2 Strong evaluation and human life
Before this, Taylor must show that strong evaluation can be taken to be 
universal for human beings. Both strategy i) and strategy ii) require this: i) 
presupposes that each person has some strong evaluations that we work 
from to get to morality; ii) requires it because it needs an inseverable link 
between objective value and motivation. 
Taylor’s  approach  is  to  try  to  show  that  strong  evaluation  is  a 
transcendental condition of human agency; as he puts it, 
Living within ... strongly qualified horizons is constitutive 
of human agency, that stepping outside these limits would 
be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognize 
as integral, that is, undamaged human personhood. (1989, 
p. 27)
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Smith provides a reconstruction of this argument that is more perspicuous 
than Taylor’s original, which I will for the most part follow. Smith suggests 
that we can best understand the argument with reference to a distinction 
that Paul Ricoeur makes between two different senses of identity: 
On the one hand, one’s identity is that which makes one the 
same, it signifies permanence in time, and it has that which 
differs, the changing and the variable,  as contraries. This 
sense of identity corresponds to the Latin term idem. On the 
other hand, there is the sense of identity that corresponds to 
the Latin  ipse,  one that is preserved in the English word 
‘ipseity’. Synonyms for ipse-identity include individuality 
and  selfhood.  Ipseity  signifies  myself,  my  selfhood  in 
contrast to sameness. (Smith 1997, p. 50: the distinction is 
made in Ricoeur 1992)
Now,  Smith  suggests,  we  should  take  Taylor’s  argument  to  be  a 
transcendental one, about the possibility of ipse identity.118 This illuminates 
Taylor’s argument considerably. Taylor defines identity as follows
My  identity  is  defined  by  the  commitments  and 
identifications which provide the frame or horizon within 
which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, 
or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or 
oppose.  In  other  words  the  horizon  within  which  I  am 
capable of taking a stand. (1989, p. 27)
This  is  the role  that  an ipse identity  must  fulfil:  but  this  is  already to 
presuppose  strong  evaluation,  for  our  identity  ‘only  plays  the  role  of 
orienting us, of providing the frame within which things have meaning for 
us, by virtue of the qualitative distinctions it incorporates.’ (1989, p. 30) 
If this were supposed to be an argument in the traditional sense then it 
would  be  quite  obviously  question  begging;  but  we  should  be  more 
charitable to Taylor and interpret it in the light of his attempt to provide the 
best account of human life.  When we think of it in this way, there are 
118 Hence in terms of Taylor’s definition of a transcendental argument that I quoted earlier, this 
transcendental argument takes our ipseity to be a ‘putatively undeniable facet of our experience’.
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additional  reasons  that  can  be  adduced  in  support  of  the  connection 
between ipseity and strong evaluation. 
First, Taylor urges, is difficult to imagine how we could make any sense of 
the idea of an ipseity which did not involve strong evaluation. The problem 
here  would  be  that  ‘our  identity  is  what  allows  us  to  define  what  is 
important  to  us  and  what  is  not.  It  is  what  makes  possible  these 
discriminations, including strong evaluations. It hence couldn’t be entirely 
without such evaluations.’ (Taylor 1989, p. 30)
Second, the phenomenon of an identity crisis can be used to give us insight 
into the conditions of ipseity. If we take it that ‘To suffer an identity crisis 
is to be incapable of telling why a life should be led one way rather than 
another,’  (Smith  1997,  p.  39)  then  identity  crises  will  prove  to  be 
enlightening  for  our  purposes,  because this  sense  of  not  being  able  to 
discriminate  between  what  is  more  and  what  less  worthwhile  is 
experienced by the agent as ‘an acute form of disorientation’. (Taylor 1989, 
p. 27) But it is only possible for the agent to experience the identity crisis 
as an extreme form of disorientation on the assumption that ‘the question 
of  what  is  really  of  more  or  less  importance,  worthwhile  or  fulfilling 
demands  an answer even if we are not in a position to give one.’ (Smith 
1997, p. 39)
So, either a human being has an orientation to the good which gives them a 
place to stand on what they find important; or they lack one, and so suffer a 
feeling of disorientation. Hence we are entitled to conclude that human 
identity involves an orientation to the good and hence strong evaluation. 
Remarks on this argument
I  like  the  conception  of  the  self  that  comes  out  of  this  transcendental 
argument, as defined by that which it takes to be good. I would be happy to 
take it a moral or rational ideal. But I am sceptical of the claim that human 
selves must be so constructed. Taylor’s account implies that one leads an 
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authentic life through following the strong evaluations that one adheres to. 
I would agree that this is the ideal, but I do not agree that everyone has the 
necessary self-clarity or articulacy to do so. It seems far more plausible to 
suggest that most of us have only made small steps towards this goal. 
While we are still  distant from this goal, there can be a massive chasm 
between the values that one would need to assert to live at anywhere near 
one’s  optimal  capacity,  and  the  ones  that  one  currently  takes  to  be 
authoritative for oneself. Think, for example, of someone who is gay but 
has grown up in an environment in which homosexuality is seen as evil 
and  unnatural.  Now,  suppose  he  has  internalized  these  values  (that  is, 
imported  them  into  his  self  as  a  structural  element).  He  now  has  a 
problem: he is drawn to what he would simultaneously revile as evil. There 
are various ways the situation could develop from here. I will very briefly 
consider some of them.
1. Authenticity.  By articulating for himself what he believes to be truly 
valuable, the agent overturns the bigoted views he has been socialized into, 
and  hence  brings  his  motivations  in  line  with  what  he  takes  to  be 
authoritative.
2. Containment. The agent through thinking comes to realize that he does 
have desires of this sort and that they are ineradicable, and still thinks that  
the evaluative framework he has been socialized into is sound. He then 
proposes to treat himself as a recovering alcoholic might; trying to keep his 
recalcitrant desires under control through reason and making every attempt 
not to expose himself to temptation. 
3. Hypocrisy. By an artful act of self-separation, the agent is able to have 
his cake and eat it. So long as the left hand does not know what the right 
hand is doing (or hides from itself the fact that it does), he can contrive a 
modus  vivendi,  though,  of  course  he  will  be  at  a  constant  risk  of  the 
disparity between his two sides being brought to light. 
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4. Repression. The agent is aware in some sense that he is attracted to men. 
But he is unable to countenance he might be such an evil person. So he 
goes into overdrive, trying to prove to himself and to everyone else – he is 
terrified that they might guess his guilty secret – that he is definitely not 
gay.
Scenarios  1  and  2  are  straightforwardly  compatible  with  Taylor’s 
understanding of the self. But 3 and 4 are more problematic. 
The  lesson  to  be  learnt  from  scenario  3  (hypocrisy)  is  that  the 
commitments  which  Taylor  thinks  define  one’s  ipseity  need  not  be 
operative in the context of action; they can be bracketed by the agent and 
ignored.
We could make things more difficult for Taylor’s account of the self by 
proposing  a  more  radical  example:  one  in  which  a  person,  by  living 
hypocritically and being recognized by others in a community for acting in 
this way, undermines the status of this way of living as hypocritical  for  
them because they loosen the hold of the ‘higher’ set of values on them.
Consider a case where someone becomes a tyrant. Let us suppose that the 
initial act of violence by which they ascend the throne is done against their 
‘higher’ self. Once they ascend the throne they continue to act against this 
higher  self,  and  are  buoyed  up  in  the  immorality  of  so  doing  by  the 
flattering of their resident toadies. Before long, anyone who dares to speak 
out – to suggest that the actions coming from the tyrant's lower self are 
anything but fine – is swiftly despatched. It seems to me possible that such 
a process could continue until the higher self is completely destroyed (or, at 
the very least of no importance in defining where they stand) and we will 
be left only with the arbitrary exercise of power, validated as ‘good’ by a 
resident  claque.  It  seems  far  from  clear  that  such  a  person  would 
necessarily suffer an identity crisis.
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The lesson to be learnt from scenario 4 is that the self need not be held 
together positively, by a vision of a good, but can also be held together 
negatively – defining itself by what it is against, what it hates or resents. 
This target of resentment may even be another part of itself that it hides 
from itself. The verbalizations, the posturings through which people try to  
convey to the world and to themselves can just as well  serve to mask 
desires and values that the person cannot admit to.
None of this speaks against Taylor model as an ideal: much of my criticism 
here turns on what one would consider to be included in the concept of 
‘undamaged human personhood’. Taylor could merely bite the bullet and 
exclude the tyrant or the extremely repressed from this; alternatively he 
could avail himself of a very general non-moral model of psychic health 
(as I have implicitly done above) in order to ground his ethics. In this case, 
the emphasis would not be on the universality of strong evaluation, but on 
articulacy about one’s value as a condition of psychic health. 
Smith reminds us, the transcendental argument (if successful) 
rules out contingency only at a very general level. It claims 
to show that there is a non-contingent relationship between 
self-interpretation and an orientation to the good, but it does 
not say anything about the content of the good. That a self-
interpreting animal is non-contingently oriented against a 
background framework of strong evaluation does nothing to 
contradict the contingency of  how a person is so oriented. 
(1997, p. 40)
5.5 The argument for moral universalism
I noted above that there are two apparent strategies for arguing from strong 
evaluation  to  moral  universalism.  Taylor  does  not  explicitly  commit 
himself directly to either at this point; rather he prefers instead to start from 
the  pragmatics  of  ethical  argumentation.  Taylor  here  suggests  that  all 
ethical argumentation must be ad hominem – that is, addressed to people 
with particular conceptions of the good and work through conceptions of 
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the good to get to the correct answer. This follows quite directly from his 
position on the priority of the good to the right; if the right is always an 
attempt to articulate the good in rules, then clearly in ethical discussion we 
must start from what our opponent takes to be good.
More revealingly,  Taylor suggests that we must take a certain frame of 
mind into practical argumentation: 
[P]ractical  argument  starts  off  on  the  basis  that  my 
opponent already shares at least some of the fundamental 
dispositions towards good and right which guide me. The 
error comes from confusion, unclarity, or an unwillingness 
to  face  some  of  what  he  cannot  lucidly  repudiate;  and 
reasoning aims to show up this error. Changing someone’s 
moral view by reasoning is at the same time increasing his 
self-clarity and self-understanding. (1993, p. 210)
What is the basis of this assumption? Is it just a regulative ideal; a certain 
attitude  that  makes  argument  possible  in  the  first  place?  Or  is  it  a 
substantive thesis,  that, my opponent deep down really shares the same 
values as me? The first reading would turn on a transcendental argument 
about  the  conditions  under  which  practical  argument  is  possible;  the 
second would turn on a substantive theory of human nature, namely that 
there  is  a  core  of  good at  the  centre  of  each  person that  represents  a 
bridgehead to be advanced from.
The  following  passage  suggests  that  Taylor  is  committed  to  the  more 
substantive thesis; he is prepared to take for granted a certain vision of 
human life as important: 
Do we really face people who quite lucidly reject the very 
principle  of  the inviolability  of  human life? In fact,  this 
does  not  seem to  be  the  case.  Intellectual  positions  put 
forward to justify behaviour like that of the Nazis – to the 
extent that any of their ravings justify this appellation at all 
– never attack the ban on murder of conspecifics frontally. 
They are always full of special pleadings: for example that 
their targets are not really of the same species, or that they 
have  committed  truly  terrible  crimes  which  call  for 
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retaliation  ...  The  fact  that  these  terrible  negations  of 
civilised morality depend so much on special pleading, and 
of a particularly mad and irrational sort, rather suggests that 
there  are  limits  beyond  which  rational challenges  to 
morality have a great trouble going. (1993, p.209) 
Taylor concludes from this that ‘The task [required] of reasoning, then, is 
not to disprove some radically opposed first premiss (e.g. killing people is 
no  problem),  but  rather  to  show how the  policy  is  unconscionable  on 
premisses which both sides accept, and cannot but accept. In this case, its 
job is to show up the special pleas’. (1993, p. 209)
This is true as far as it goes, but when we recall Taylor’s conception of 
normativity, we can quickly see that there is a severe problem here: Taylor 
argued i) that the right derives its normativity from the good, and ii) that 
good is inseparable from its ability to move us by intimations of what is 
higher or more worthy. 
Taylor is here imagining that the dispute with the Nazi must take place here 
at the level of the  right: the assumption is that the Nazi shares the same 
underlying sense of the good, but interposes some special pleadings, so that 
he can come out with his favoured account of the right. But this seems to 
discount the possibility of the difference occurring at the level of the good: 
that is, that a Nazi account of the right might be a perspicuous articulation  
of a totalitarian account of the good. Indeed, I think we can discern in the 
best fascist rhetoric a distinctive account of the good that could ground a 
Nazi account of the right in a way wholly consistent with Taylor’s account 
of the relationship between the right and the good. Such a rhetoric,  pace 
Taylor, does not attempt to justify rules or exclusions through special pleas, 
but to present us with a vision of life that inspires us and leaves us aching 
to realize it.
Ernst Jünger, in a book that proved to be one of the major spiritual sources 
of Nazism, tries to turn us on to the supreme worth of the Fatherland. The 
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following  thoughts  (he  says)  came to  him as  he  was  lying  injured  in 
hospital, wounded after his many heroics, as the war came to an end.
And almost without any thought of mine, the idea of the 
Fatherland had been distilled from all these afflictions in a 
clearer and brighter essence. That was the final winnings in 
a game on which so often all had been staked: the nation 
was no longer for me an empty thought veiled in symbols; 
and how could it have been otherwise when I had seen so 
many die for its sake, and been schooled myself to stake my 
life for its credit  every minute,  day and night,  without a 
thought? And so, strange as it may sound, I learned from 
this  very  four  years’ schooling  in  force  and  in  all  the 
extravagance of material warfare that life has no depth of 
meaning except when it is pledged for an ideal, and that 
there are  ideals in comparison with which the life  of an 
individual and even of a people have no weight...
To-day  we  cannot  understand  the  martyrs  who  threw 
themselves  into  the  arena  in  a  transport  that  lifted  them 
even before their  deaths beyond humanity,  beyond every 
phase of pain and fear.  Their  faith  no longer exercises a 
compelling force.  When once it  is  no longer possible  to 
understand how a man gives his life for his country – and 
the time will come – then all is over with that faith also, and 
the idea of the Fatherland is dead; and then, perhaps, we 
shall  be  envied,  as  we  envy  the  saints  their  inward  and 
irresistible  strength.  For all  these great and solemn ideas 
bloom from a  feeling  that  dwells  in  the  blood  and  that 
cannot  be  forced.  In  the  cold  light  of  reason everything 
alike is a matter of expedience and sinks to the paltry and 
mean.  It  was  our  luck  to  live  in  the  invisible  rays  of  a 
feeling that filled the heart, and of this inestimable treasure 
we can never be deprived. (Jünger 1929, pp. 316-7)
The problem for Taylor is this: Jünger will agree on the importance of all 
human  life119 but  will  argue,  on  the  level  of  the  good, that  the  value 
represented by the Fatherland is immeasurably more compelling. While 
others might be able to try to argue against  such a position by putting 
forward an account of the right against which to judge such an account of 
119 For example, his preface to the English edition expresses ‘sincere admiration’ (p.xiii) of the 
British forces.
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the good as wrong, deluded and dangerous, Taylor can do nothing of this 
sort.
Instead he must hope that  it  can be shown that  there exists  a  ‘way of 
experience’ through which someone like Jünger could be brought from his 
position to ours. I frankly doubt that this could be done. What if this cannot 
be done? If there is no such way of experience for each and every person, 
then  it  seems  that  we  cannot  establish  morality  on  the  basis  of  the 
subjectivist account of strong evaluation. 
This would mean that Taylor would have to adopt the second strategy; that 
of arguing for an objectivist ontology for strong evaluation. The problem 
is,  I  do not  see how this  strategy could work:  Taylor  ties  the  good to 
motivation constitutively, so it is hard to see (given his assumptions about 
normativity) how an objective good could be normative for me if I proved 
motivationally immune to it. Hence the objectivist account must collapse 
into the subjectivist one. 
Taylor  is  aware  of  this  problem, but  believes  that  its  import  runs  in  a 
different  direction  –  not  to  the  inadequacy  of  his  account  of  ethical 
thinking, but to a deep problem with our whole conception of morality. In 
Sources of the self,  he suggests that the crisis for moral universalism lies 
not in the fact that we find ideas such as universal human rights incorrect, 
but that we have lost touch with the motivational sources that originally 
powered the ideals of universal morality. The problem is not so much in 
our inability to convince individual people of the merits of morality, but 
that  we  ourselves  have  lost  touch  with  the  goods  that  underlie  our 
commitments to morality,  so that  our account  of the right  is no longer 
anchored in the good: 
High standards need strong sources. This is because there is 
something  morally  corrupting,  even  dangerous,  in 
sustaining  the  demand  simply  on  the  feeling  of 
undischarged  obligation,  on  guilt,  or  its  obverse,  self-
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satisfaction.  Hypocrisy  is  not  the  only  negative 
consequence. Morality as benevolence on demand breeds 
self-condemnation  for  those  who  fall  short  and  a 
depreciation of the impulses to self-fulfilment, seen as so 
many obstacles raised by egoism to meeting our standard...
The question which arises from all this is whether we are 
not living beyond our moral means in continuing allegiance 
to our standards of justice and benevolence. Do we have 
ways of seeing-good which are still credible to us, which 
are powerful enough to sustain these standards? If not, it 
would be both more honest and more prudent to moderate 
them. (1989, pp. 516-7)
In counterpoint to this sharply stated choice, Taylor suggests that it may 
only be by a turn to theism that we can find a moral source sufficient to 
power the ideas of moral universalism. I must at this point be honest: I 
cannot follow Taylor in this proposed return to theism. If morality can be 
shown to require God, then (from my perspective) the most honest thing 
would be to give up on universalistic morality. 
5.6 Conclusion
We spent the first half of this chapter demonstrating that the considerations 
that Taylor invokes (his critiques of the representationalist conception of 
knowledge,  the  idea  of  a  purely  procedural  ethics,  his  descriptive 
phenomenology, and his principle of the best account) do not necessitate 
his  conclusion  that  ethical  thinking  must  consist  in  articulating  the 
substantive horizon of strong evaluations that we already committed to. 
The second half worked within Taylor’s conception of ethical thinking to 
demonstrate the difficulties that would be involved in defending morality 
on this basis. I raised some difficulties with the transcendental argument he 
gives for taking strong evaluation to be a necessary condition for human 
agency, which amounted to pointing out that psychological economies can 
be much more complex than is implied by Taylor’s model; that a person’s 
self need not be solely held together by strong evaluations.
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But  there  are  deeper,  structural  reasons  for  finding  Taylor’s  account 
inadequate: he elucidates the good in terms of a certain sort of motivation, 
but then must be committed to the existence of a ‘way of experience’ from 
any set of strong evaluations to those involved in moral virtue. It seems 
unlikely that we will be able to do this. What is more Taylor’s account of 
moral normativity entails that we must reinflate our account of moral right 
with the breath of the good; it seems highly unlikely that we will be able to 
do this without God.
The account of morality I shall give in part three is strongly influenced by 
what we have learnt from this study of Taylor’s moral philosophy, but it 
takes a path that Taylor himself does not take. Like Taylor’s, it is an ethics 
which takes seriously the relationship between selfhood, moral identity and 
narrative. It differs fundamentally, however, in that where Taylor’s account 
takes  the  vertical  relationship  between  the  self  and  something  that  is 
experienced as incomparably higher as foundational to his ethical thinking, 
I  take  the  horizontal relationship  of  reciprocal  recognition  to  be 
foundational to mine. 
In addition, we make use of the fact that the normativity of morality need 
not  be  reducible  to  that  of  the  good:  in  this  case,  morality  can 
unproblematically go beyond our ability to be deeply moved by it without 
thereby undermining its own normativity. In the final chapter I try to set 
out  an  account  of  moral  normativity,  that  is  grounded  (as  Taylor’s 
arguments  require)  in  the  human  good,  but  which  is  not  directly 
answerable to this human good. This way we will be able to defend moral 
normativity within a secular framework.
In so doing, I hope that we will be able to construct an account of morality 
that is both satisfying to ourselves and resistant to the sorts of criticism that 
Nietzsche would want to make of it. 
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PART THREE:
A PRAGMATIST 
REINTERPRETATION OF 
MORALITY
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 MAP OF PART THREE
In  part  three,  I  fashion  a  pragmatist  reply  to  Nietzsche’s  claims.  The 
account of morality is split over three chapters. 
Chapter  six,  Recognition  and  Human  Life, is  meant  as  a  riposte  to 
Nietzsche’s underlying theory of human nature with its glorification of the 
will to dominate. It argues that  mutual recognition  has a central place in 
human life, and that the will to dominate only arises out of a failure in the 
process of recognition. It is quite unnecessary for human relationships to 
resolve themselves into the pattern of dominator and submissive: there is 
another alternative, mutual recognition, and it is only this alternative that 
can solve the problem that domination attempts to solve. 
Chapter seven, Dignity and Vulnerability, is concerned with the dignity of 
human beings. Here I argue that Nietzsche in fact has much in common 
with the tradition of morality: both laud hardness and self-sufficiency as 
the appropriate response to life, and equate the dignity of human beings 
with  this  hardness.  For  both,  vulnerability  is  a  form of  weakness  that 
should be extirpated. Against this, I return to an alternative tradition of 
thinking that dovetails well with the account of recognition, which places a 
positive  value  on  human  vulnerability  and  understands  the  dignity  of 
human beings in terms of their courage  in the face of  the riskiness and 
arbitrariness of life. 
Chapter eight, Reconstructing Universality, completes the reconstruction of 
morality  by  giving  an  account  of  moral  rules,  and  by  extending  and 
clarifying what I have so far said about dignity. 
The account of moral rules does three things. First, it explains what the 
regulation of life through moral rules is supposed to accomplish, namely 
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the continuing viability of morality as a project, and the equal respect of 
each person under rules that all can agree to. Second, it articulates why one 
might find this  goal worth striving towards. Third,  it  gives a theory of 
argumentation which we can use to determine which norms to take to be 
morally valid. 
The account of dignity makes a distinction between a bloodless and a full-
blooded conception of the dignity of human beings. The bloodless version 
is all that is presupposed by the project of constructing moral rules, and 
amounts to no more than considering a person to be a part of the moral 
community. The full-blooded version takes its cue from the conception of 
the hero’s  dignity,  but transforms this  so that  we can universalise it.  It 
requires far more of us, but it promises a more effective affirmation of 
human life. 
Last,  I  give a  vision of moral  life,  in  which moral  rules  and this  full-
blooded conception of human beings are combined. 
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C h a p t e r  S i x
Recognition and Human Life
6.1 Introduction
This  chapter  argues  that  Nietzsche  is  mistaken in  his  basic  account  of 
human nature in the place he gives to the will to dominate, because what he 
isolates and lauds is in fact just a failure in the search for recognition. It is 
quite unnecessary for human relationships to resolve themselves into the 
pattern of dominator and submissive: there is another alternative, mutual 
recognition, and it is only this alternative that can solve the problem that 
both domination and submission attempt to solve. 
For Nietzsche, life is essentially will to power, that is the will to  dominate, 
to be master:
[L]ife is  essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of 
the strange and weaker, suppression, severity, imposition of 
one’s  own  forms,  incorporation  and,  at  the  least  and 
mildest, exploitation – but why should one always have to 
employ precisely those words which have from of old been 
stamped with a slanderous intention? … ‘Exploitation’ does 
not pertain to a corrupt or imperfect or primitive society: it 
pertains to the essence of the living thing as a fundamental 
organic function, it is a consequence of the intrinsic will to 
power which is precisely the will of life. (1886, §259)
The will to power can be turned inward as well as outward (or it can be 
turned  in  both  ways  simultaneously):  when  turned  inward,  the  will  to 
mastery is applied to the self, and we end up with a form of asceticism. 
When turned outwards we have the will to dominate others. We shall not 
be concerned with the will to power as turned inwards in this  chapter: 
insofar as the will to power is focused inwards as asceticism a good case 
can be made for its usefulness.120 
120 See for example, Nehamas (1985). The account of how it is possible to believe in the dignity of 
all human beings that I shall give in chapter eight makes use of some ascetic practices of self-
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In line with Nietzsche’s technique, I shall not attempt to argue against this  
interpretation so much as to offer another interpretation which subsumes it, 
and  which  makes  Nietzsche’s  interpretation  look  biased  and  partial  by 
comparison.
Compared  to  Nietzsche’s  account  this  interpretation  has  the  following 
advantages:  i)  it  incorporates  a  lot  more  empirical  observation  of  the 
behaviour  of  human  beings  and  integrates  the  insights  of  many  more 
perspectives: philosophy, child psychology and psychoanalysis. ii) It tells a 
developmental story of how human beings come to be what they are; iii) it 
casts light on the instances of exploitation and the will to dominate that 
Nietzsche wishes to illuminate but also sheds light on other things that 
Nietzsche’s theory fails to explain. 
This theory places not the will to dominate, but the struggle for recognition 
at the centre of human life, and reinterprets the will to dominate as a result 
of the failure of the process of recognition. Recognition is helpfully defined 
by  Jessica  Benjamin  as  ‘that  response  from  the  other  which  makes 
meaningful the feelings, intentions and actions of the self. It allows the self 
to realize its agency and authorship in a tangible way… Recognition is so 
central to human existence as to often escape notice; or rather, it appears to 
us in so many guises that it is seldom grasped as one overarching concept. 
There are any number of near-synonyms for it: to recognize is to affirm, 
validate,  acknowledge,  know,  accept,  understand,  empathize,  take  in, 
tolerate, appreciate, see, identify with, find familiar, … love’  (1988, pp. 
12, 15-16)
I  shall  argue  that  recognition  is  a  vital  human need because it  is  only 
through recognition that an individual can come to feel real to herself – that 
is  to  feel  validated  as  a  person  and  to  find  her  own actions  and  life 
meaningful.
modification, though the asceticism is unNietzschean in tone, aiming as it does at the expansion of 
curiosity and love for others, rather than a reshaping of the self in the direction of hardness through a 
self-directed cruelty. 
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The theory that I shall present takes its cue from Hegel’s early writing on 
recognition,  up  to  and including  the  Phenomenology of  Spirit.  Hegel’s 
thought is at this point working in two directions at once. 
First, he argues that an analysis of the romantic love relationship gives us 
an insight into the basic core of ethical life. Each person can only fully 
come to be themselves indirectly through the other’s validation of them:
Each one is identical to the other precisely owing to that in 
virtue of which each is opposed to the other; the other, that 
through which the other exists for one, is oneself.121
Habermas helpfully glosses this as follows:
In a symmetrical relation the point of mutual recognition is 
that  the  two  persons  involved  seem  to  sacrifice  their 
independence;  but  in  fact  each  gains  a  new  kind  of 
independence by coming to recognise, in the mirror of the 
eyes of the other person, who he or she is. Both become for 
themselves the kind of characters they mutually attribute to 
each other. Both gain awareness of their individuality by 
seeing their own images reflected in the dense and deep 
exchange of an interpersonal relation. (1999, p.140)
The other aspect, which we see in the Phenomenology of Spirit §178-196 is 
the argument that there is something inherently unstable in the attempt to 
get this recognition through force,  because we can only be recognised by 
an other whom we recognise as a person in his or her own right. One 
comes to find one’s life unreal and hollowed out to the extent that is unable 
to recognise others as persons in their own right. 
Hegel dramatizes this through the famous ‘master-slave’ dialectic. Hegel 
begins  by  supposing  two  self-consciousnesses,  both  of  whom  want 
recognition from the other. If they fight and one is killed, then even the 
victor is no nearer to receiving the recognition he craves: for you cannot 
receive recognition from a dead man. Suppose then instead the conflict 
121 Hegel (1983, p.107). See also Phenomenology of Spirit §184: “Each is for the other the middle 
term, through which each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself, and  
for the other, and immediate being on its own account, which at the same time is such only through 
this mediation. The recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.”
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falls short of death, and we are left with a situation in which the stronger 
becomes the master and the weaker his slave. But this situation is little 
better, for by enslaving the other, and treating him as a thing, he fails to 
confirm his  reality  in  the way he wanted  to.122 Interestingly,  the  slave, 
meanwhile is better off at least to the extent that the master for him is real  
and is able to form expressive relations with the things he makes through 
his work. 
The overall thesis is ably summarised by Honneth:
[A]n  individual  that  does  not  recognize  its  partner  to 
interaction to be a certain type of person is also unable to 
experience itself completely or without restriction as that 
type of person. The implication of this for the relationship 
of recognition can only be that an obligation to reciprocity 
is, to a certain extent, built into such relations, an obligation 
that requires but does not force subjects to recognize one 
another in a certain way: if I do not recognize my partner to 
interaction as a certain type of person, his reactions cannot 
give me the sense that I am recognized as the same type of 
person,  since  I  thereby  deny  him  precisely  the 
characteristics and capacities with regard to which I want to 
feel myself affirmed by him. (Honneth, 1995, pp. 37-8)
6.2 Winnicott’s theory of child development
But considered in themselves, Hegel’s arguments seem just as unsupported 
as Nietzsche’s arguments for the will to power: we need an empirically 
grounded theory that will buttress these claims. 
Donald Winnicott’s work provides the basis of such a theory. However, 
Winnicott’s theory comes out of a very different framework from the one 
in which we have hitherto been working: Winnicott was a paediatrician and 
122 Phenomenology of Spirit §192. “In this recognition the unessential consciousness is for the lord 
the object, which constitutes the truth of his certainty of himself. But it is clear that this object does 
not correspond to its Notion, but rather that the object in which the lord has achieved his lordship has  
in reality turned out to be something quite different from an independent consciousness. What now 
really confronts him is not an independent consciousness, but a dependent one. He is, therefore, not  
certain of being-for-self as the truth of himself. On the contrary, his truth is in reality the unessential 
consciousness of its unessential action.”
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child  psychotherapist,  who positioned his  work  relative  to  the  body of 
work in psychoanalysis, and especially the work of Melanie Klein.
What is required therefore is a translation of the core of Winnicott’s theory 
into a medium that is usable by us. Luckily, much of the hard work has 
already been done by Jessica Benjamin and Axel Honneth, and I shall use 
their analyses where appropriate.123 
Winnicott’s theory aims to explain how a new born infant, unable as yet to 
distinguish between inner and outer, what belongs to self and what to the 
world, becomes a subject capable living in an objective world and relating 
to other subjects as subjects, and the reasons why this process sometimes 
fails or gets stalled. His answer, is that what makes the difference is the 
quality of the relationship between the infant and the primary care giver124 
and the progress in styles of recognition. 
Where this care fails (in Winnicott’s terminology, when the mother is not 
good enough) various forms of psychopathology predictably result.  The 
nature  of  these  psychopathologies  will  depend  both  on  the  stage  in 
development at which the mother fails to be good enough and the way in 
which this inadequacy is manifested.125 
Winnicott’s theory envisages three basic stages: first absolute dependency, 
next  relating  to  subjective  objects  and  finally  use  of  objects.126 
123 I have also found Hundert  (1989) helpful.
124 Or, in Winnicott’s now slightly dated and sexist sounding terminology, the ‘mother’. ‘Primary 
care giver’ is however a cumbersome phrase, and I shall continue to use the word mother, with the 
proviso that we should be clear that it is the role of the primary care giver in infancy that Winnicott is 
theorizing, and, of course this role need not in fact be played by the baby’s actual mother.
125 Note, however that the ‘good enough mother’ must be the norm and the not good enough 
mother less frequent: it is difficult to see that the human race could have progressed this far had good 
enough mothering been rare. As Winnicott puts it, “it is important that the function of the mother 
should be understood. This function is by no means a recent development, belonging to civilisation 
or to sophistication or to intellectual understanding. No theory is acceptable that does not allow for 
the fact that mothers have always performed this function well enough.” (1960a, pp.147-8)
126 A warning: as will  become apparent Winnicott’s terminology is quite counter-intuitive. As 
Benjamin explains: ‘“using” here does not mean instrumentalizing or demeaning, but being able to 
creatively benefit from another person; it refers to the experience of “shared reality” in which “the 
object’s  independent  existence”  is  vital.  “Relating”  refers  to  the  experience  of  “the  subject  as 
isolate,” in which the object is merely a “phenomenon of the subject.”’ Benjamin (1988, p. 37)
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Corresponding to these three stages is a gradually increased capacity of the 
infant to be independent and a decreased fragility in the infant’s self. At 
first dependence is total; the self is easily ruptured and so the mother needs 
to be totally attuned to the infant’s needs if development is to occur: the 
infant needs an environment that allows it to just be, without having to 
react to the outside world.127
Luckily,  correlative  to  this  basic  need of  the  baby is  the  good enough 
mother’s  Primary  Maternal  Preoccupation:  that  is,  a  high  degree  of 
identification with the infant that develops through the pregnancy, which 
enables her to ‘know what the infant feels like, and so … provide almost 
exactly what the infant needs at the beginning, which is a live adaptation 
to the infant’s needs.’ (1960b, p.54) It also makes the mother vulnerable 
and dependent on the infant, because she experiences its cries as a failure, 
as a lack of sensitivity on her part.128 
What  happens next  depends on whether  the mother is  good enough or 
not.129 The good-enough mother will first help the infant’s self to grow by 
implementing his desires, and do this so well that the infant will have a 
brief  experience  of  omnipotence:  that  is,  the  infant  will  experience  its 
desires in such a way that it  seems they automatically bring about their 
127 As Winnicott  puts it  in an important early paper,  ‘health in the early development of the  
individual  entails  continuity  of  being.  The  early  psyche-soma proceeds  along  a  certain  line  of 
development  provided  its  continuity  of  being  is  not  disturbed;  in  other  words  for  the  healthy 
development of the early psyche-soma there is a need for a perfect environment. At first the need is 
absolute. The perfect environment is one which actively adapts to the need of the newly formed 
psyche-soma, that which we as observers know to be the infant from the start. An environment is bad 
because by failure to adapt it becomes an impingement to which the psyche-soma (i.e. the infant) 
must react. This reacting disturbs the continuity of the going on being of the infant.’ (1949, p.245)
128 Benjamin 1988, p.28: “Just as the baby’s positive response can make the mother feel affirmed 
in her being, the baby’s unresponsiveness can amount to a terrible destruction of her self-confidence 
as a mother. The mother who jiggles, pokes, looms, and shouts ‘look at me’ to her unresponsive baby 
creates a negative cycle of recognition out of her own despair at not being recognized. Here in the 
earliest social interaction we see how the search for recognition can become a power struggle: how 
assertion becomes aggression.”
129 “So much difference exists between the beginning of a baby whose mother can perform this 
function well enough and that of a baby whose mother cannot do this well enough that there is no  
value  whatever  in  describing  babies  in  the  earliest  stages  except  in  relation  to  the  mother’s 
functioning.” (1962, p.57)
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fulfilment.130 She then gradually de-adapts to the child (with the fading of 
Primary Maternal Preoccupation) in such a way that he or she gradually 
comes face to face with elements of reality. 
The mother who is not good enough, however, is  ‘not able to implement 
the infant’s omnipotence,  and so she repeatedly fails to meet the infant 
gesture; instead she substitutes her own gesture which is to be given sense 
by the compliance of the infant. This compliance on the part of the infant is 
the earliest stage of the False Self, and belongs to the mother’s inability to 
sense her infant’s needs.’ (1960a, p. 145)131
As the good-enough mother gradually de-adapts to the infant, the infant 
comes face to face for the first time with the fact that the mother is not just 
a subjective object, under the control of his fantasying (this is the illusion 
given by the good-enough mother’s responsiveness to the infant’s needs). 
This situation creates a challenge: in Winnicott’s terms, the infant must go 
from  object relating  to the  use of an object.  Winnicott argues that what 
must occur is  that  the subject places the object  outside the area of his 
omnipotent control, that is sees the object as independent from him. 
On Winnicott’s account, the infant’s destructiveness is of prime importance 
here: it is only by the infant repeatedly attempting to destroy the object, 
and the object surviving this attack that the quality of externality, of the 
reality of the external world is created.132 
This is Winnicott’s theoretical innovation, and it is important to stress it. 
Whereas in Freudian theory, (and in any theory such as Nietzsche’s which 
130 “The good-enough mother meets the omnipotence of the infant and to some extent makes sense 
of it. She does this repeatedly. A True Self begins to have life, through the strength given to the 
infant’s weak ego by the mother’s implementation of the infant’s omnipotent expressions.” (1960a, 
p.145); see also (1962, p.57).
131 The  development  of  an  extensive  false  self  system  of  this  sort  is  an  important  factor 
predisposing the infant to schizophrenia in later life. See R D Laing (1960, chapter six) on this.
132 As Winnicott puts it: “This thing that there is in between relating and use is the subject’s placing 
of the object outside the area of the subject’s omnipotent control; that is, the subject’s perception of  
the object as an external phenomenon, not as a projective entity, in fact recognition of it as an entity  
in its own right.” (1969, p.89)
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gives pride of place to the will to dominate) the incursion of the hardness 
of reality is seen as an incursion and a source frustration, on Winnicott’s 
account, the survival of destructiveness is a source of joy and reality for the 
individual.133 As Benjamin puts it, ‘Beyond the sensible ego’s bowing to 
reality  is  the  joy  in  the  other’s  survival  and the  recognition  of  shared 
reality.’ (1988, pp. 40-1)
Destruction can fail in one of two ways: either the object does not survive 
or the object retaliates. Where the object does not survive, we have the 
proto-type of  what will  reappear  in  the  adult  as  sadism, or the will  to 
dominate: where the object retaliates, we have the proto-type of what will 
reappear in the adult as masochism, or the will to be dominated.
The mother must pursue a delicate balancing act: setting limits for the child 
allowing the space for his true self to develop:
So  if  the  mother  sets  no  limits  for  the  child,  if  she 
obliterates herself and her own interests and allows herself 
to be wholly controlled, then she ceases to be a viable other 
for him.  She is  destroyed and not  just in  fantasy.  If  she 
retaliates, attempting to break his will, believing that any 
compromise will  “spoil”  him, she will  also inculcate  the 
idea that there is room for only one ego in any relationship 
– he must obliterate his for now, and hope to get it back, 
with a vengeance later. Only through the other’s survival 
can the subject move beyond the realm of submission and 
retaliation to a realm of mutual respect. (Benjamin, 1988, 
p.39)
When the object does not survive, the child continues to attack, seeking a 
boundary for his anger and destructiveness. But for him, unfortunately ‘the 
real object, the one who cannot be destroyed, never comes into view. For 
him, assertion and agency are not integrated in the context of mutuality and 
respect  for  the  other  but  in  the  context  of  control  and retaliation.  The 
sadist-child is  cognitively aware of the difference between self and other, 
133 “The assumption is always there, in orthodox theory, that aggression is reactive to the encounter 
with  the  reality  principle,  whereas  here  it  is  the  destructive  drive  that  creates  the  quality  of 
externality. This is central in the structure of my argument.” (1969, p.93)
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but emotionally this awareness is hollow and does not counteract the desire 
to control the other.’ (Benjamin 1988, p.20)
This success of domination has results  far  from desirable,  even for the 
dominator: for the child experiences the parent’s caving in as ‘flying off 
into space – he finds no limits, no otherness… When the other crumbles 
under my act, then my act seems to drop off the edge of the world into 
emptiness, and I feel that I will soon follow. In this void begins the loss of 
tension or boundaries, a by-product of losing the other.’ (1988, pp. 70-1)
When the mother retaliates, the situation is scarcely more enviable:  the 
child does not have the chance to discover his own sense of agency and his 
own true self; ‘he has not experienced his own impulses and acts as his 
own, arising without direction from outside.’ (Benjamin 1988, p.72) He 
‘despairs of ever holding the attention or winning the recognition of the 
other, of being securely held in the other’s mind.’ (Benjamin 1988, p.72)
6.3 Recognition and domination in adult relationships
It is time to step away from Winnicott’s theory as such and to apply what 
we have learnt to the understanding of adult relationships. 
The  theory  we  are  pushing  takes  it  that  the  most  valuable  forms  of 
intersubjectivity  such as  true  friendship  and erotic  love  result  from an 
experience of temporary merging between those who have developed what 
Winnicott calls the  capacity to be alone.134 The capacity to be alone is a 
feeling of security and confidence that allows a person to  relax  when in 
their own company. In such relationships, each  recognises the other as a 
separate capable subject, and this recognition opens up a communal space 
in which both experience being with the other. As Benjamin puts it,
134 Winnicott 1958b.
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One of the most important insights of intersubjective theory 
is  that  sameness  and  difference  exist  simultaneously  in 
mutual  recognition.  …  Experiences  of  ‘being  with’ are 
predicated on a continually evolving awareness, on a sense 
of intimacy felt as occurring between ‘the  two of us.’ The 
fact that  self and other are not merged is precisely what 
makes experiences of merging have such high emotional 
impact. The externality of the other makes one feel one is 
truly  being  ‘fed,’ getting  nourishment  from  the  outside, 
rather than supplying everything for oneself. (1988, p.47)135
Friendship and love are thus shown to be quite fragile affairs requiring a 
continual play between the participants, both of whom must be comfortable 
both to be alone and to be merged with the other. When these exacting 
conditions  are  not  met  we  have  a  relationship  of  domination  and 
submission  rather  than  a  ‘communicative  arc  suspended  between  the 
experience of being able to be alone and the experience of being merged’ 
(Honneth, 1995, p.105)
It  is  easy to  see that  such experiences  open up each  individual  to  the 
possibility of harm: they are entrusting what is most precious to them to a 
common space created with another: such a move is risky. It runs the risks 
both  of  bad  luck  –  for  example  of  the  other  dying  or  becoming 
incapacitated: or worse still of betrayal. But there is no way of evading 
these risks without sacrificing the experiences that recognition opens up. 
Jessica Benjamin argues that the sado-masochistic relationship is key to 
understanding how the failure of destruction manifests itself in later life. 
Erotic domination attempts to compensate for the failure of the process of 
destruction. But it does so in an ultimately futile manner:
135 In Honneth’s more jargon ridden formulation, “We can then proceed from the hypothesis that 
all love relationships are driven by the unconscious recollection of the original experience of merging 
that characterised the first months of life for ‘mother’ and child. … Of course, this desire for merging 
can only become a feeling of love once, in the unavoidable experience of separation, it has been 
disappointed in such a way that it henceforth includes the recognition of the other as an independent 
person. Only a refracted symbiosis enables the emergence of a productive interpersonal balance 
between the boundary-establishment and boundary-dissolution that, for Winnicott, belongs to the 
structure of a relationship that has matured through mutual disillusionment.” (1995, p.105)
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Domination  presumes  a  subject  already  caught  in 
omnipotence,  unable  to  make ‘live’ contact  with  outside 
reality,  to  experience  the  other  person’s  subjectivity.  But 
this  apparent  first  cause  is  itself  the  result  of  an  earlier 
breakdown  between  self  and  other  –  which  though 
pervasive,  is  not  inevitable.  Insofar  as  domination  is  an 
alienated  form  of  differentiation,  an  effort  to  recreate 
tension through distance, idealization, and objectification, it 
is destined to repeat the original breakdown unless and until 
the other makes a difference. (1988, p.68)
The  problem  is  exactly  the  one  that  we  saw  with  the  master-slave 
relationship  in  Hegel.136 Both  sadism and  masochism have  to  keep  on 
raising the stakes in an attempt to find the elusive recognition that they 
have unfortunately ruled themselves out from at the beginning. Such a 
spiral can only end in disaster, if neither finds a way out: 
Eventually the other’s unreality becomes too powerful; the 
sadist  is  in  danger  of  becoming  the  will-less  thing  he 
consumes unless he separates himself completely. And the 
masochist increasingly feels that she does not exist, that she 
is without will or desire, that she has no life apart from the 
other. (1988, p.65)
What  I  hope  to  have  established  in  this  account  is  that  the  universal 
dynamics of human life, far from favouring the will to dominate, in fact 
ensure that the will to dominate will regularly and reliably fail to provide 
the sort of satisfaction that the dominator is looking for. The dominator 
seeks a sense of reality, of someone else there who can make a difference,  
but  his  attempt  to  dominate  in  fact  undermines  the  possibility  of  this 
occurring.  Furthermore,  this  same  account  also  suggests  that  the  most 
fulfilling  human  experiences  will  be  those  of  reciprocal  exposedness, 
where one person feels he is getting fed from the outside: we experience 
136 “We might call this the dialectic of control: If I completely control the other, then the other  
ceases to exist, and if the other completely controls me, then I cease to exist. A condition of our own 
independent existence is recognizing the other. True independence means sustaining the essential 
tension of these contradictory impulses; that is, both asserting the self and recognizing the other. 
Domination is the consequence of refusing this condition.” (1988, p.53)
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our lives as valuable to the extent that we can open up and enjoy mutual 
experiences with others. 
The next chapter pushes these insights further, and rethinks the dignity of 
human beings.
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C h a p t e r  S e v e n
Dignity and Vulnerability
7.1 Introduction
This chapter argues against  both  Nietzsche  and  the tradition of morality: 
both laud hardness and self-sufficiency as the appropriate response to life, 
and  equate  the  dignity  of  human  beings  with  this  hardness.  For  both, 
vulnerability is a form of weakness that should be extirpated. Against this, 
I return to an alternative tradition of thinking that dovetails well with the 
account  of  recognition  we  put  forward  in  the  previous  chapter,  which 
places a positive value on human vulnerability and understands the dignity 
of human beings in terms of their courage in the face of the riskiness and 
arbitrariness of life. On this account, the hard, self-sufficient person has cut 
themselves  off  from some  of  the  deepest  sources  of  value:  their  self-
sufficiency comes to seem less heroic and more like a strange combination 
of wishful thinking and self protection. 
The mainstream of the tradition of morality concentrates on the  agent to 
the exclusion of the patient of action: it is far less interested in the effects 
of various forms of immorality (violence or betrayal for instance) on the 
unfortunate recipient of these violations than it is in the promulgation of 
universal  rules  and  the  accompanying  condemnation  of  the  agent  who 
transgresses them.137 
This lack of balance ought to be a little surprising, given the centrality of 
the  concept  of  reciprocity  to  morality:  in  chapter  one we saw that  the 
golden rule by its very nature focuses attention on the passive recipient of 
the action and hence, one would assume, should make the agent aware of 
137 The consequentialist  tradition of ethical  thinking has of course been more sensitive to the 
suffering of the vulnerable.
the possibility of the misuse of his power and its potentially devastating 
effects on the other.138 
I believe that this state of affairs is best explained by the fact that there is 
another  tradition  of  ethical  thinking  that  has  become  entwined  into 
morality, and has done so through morality’s understanding of the dignity 
of human beings.
This  other  tradition  of  ethical  thinking  (which,  following  Martha 
Nussbaum, I shall call the anti-pity tradition) is concerned to claim that 
human goodness  is  self-sufficient  and hence  to  claim that  each person 
always has within his139 power sufficient resources to lead a flourishing 
life. According to this tradition, human beings are not basically needy and 
vulnerable creatures: such weaknesses are a result of a lack of self-mastery 
which is ultimately to be traced back to a lack of virtue. 
This  anti-pity  tradition  is  relatively  uninterested  in  the  effects  of  the 
violation of a human subject because it sees such violations as  as such 
unable to break up the goodness (flourishing) of the virtuous person’s life. 
Insofar as the goodness (flourishing) of a person’s life is capable of being 
broken up from the outside by violation that person lacks a necessary part 
of virtue. Violation, and in general serious suffering is thus, according to 
this tradition, uninteresting for ethical theory because it only really affects  
people who lack virtue: that is it only affects people who we already know 
should be other than they currently are. 
When this tradition is entwined into morality, this tendency to play down 
or  efface  the  effects  of  violation  is,  unfortunately,  exacerbated.  This  is 
perhaps a little surprising: one might imagine that morality’s insistence on 
138 Especially in Rabbi Hillel’s formulation: “What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbour.” 
Ricoeur  (1992,  p.219)  underscores  this  point  ‘The  most  remarkable  thing,  however,  in  the 
formulation of this rule is that the reciprocity demanded stands out against the background of the 
presupposition of an initial dissymmetry between the protagonists of the action – a dissymmetry that 
places one in the position of agent and the other in that of patient. ... it is upon this dissymmetry that  
all the maleficent offshoots of interaction, beginning with influence and culminating in murder, will  
be grafted.’.
139 ‘His’ is used deliberately here to hint at the latent sexism of such theories.
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the dignity of human beings would lead to an increased awareness of the 
results of violating, insulting or otherwise failing to respect that dignity. 
But this is not so. The mainstream of morality (following the Stoics, and 
especially Kant) has understood the dignity of a human being to  be  that 
person’s capacity for virtue.140 This entails that should some violation break 
up a person’s capacity for virtue, it would ipso facto break up their dignity 
and thus their claim to respect from their fellow human beings. 
This possibility is deeply problematic from the perspective of morality: for 
it would undermine the claim that  all human beings have a dignity that  
renders them worthy of respect, and turn dignity into a contingent quality 
of a human being. What is more, it would imply that a person’s claim to 
respect might be destroyed by another’s unjust violation, whilst the one 
who had done the wrong would  retain  his claims to the respect of his 
fellow men. 
The problem in short is this: the way the anti-pity tradition is entwined 
with  morality,  it  becomes  impossible  to  admit  that  someone  could  be 
broken by circumstances – say, by the murder of their child or the suicide 
of a lover – because their claim to respect (which morality knows they 
cannot lose) requires them to remain in control.
The tradition of morality attempts to avoid this unpalatable possibility by 
stipulating that no violation could break up a person’s capacity for virtue. 
But this has the effect of skewing moral thinking: because no one can be 
rendered incapable by violation, thinking proceeds from the perspective of 
the capable agent and his duties. 
140 This capacity for virtue is understood in terms of  practical reason, where practical reason is 
taken to be the ability to order one’s life in accordance with the dictates of morality.
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7.2 The Pro-Pity tradition
Just  as  we  traced  the  tradition  of  morality  back  to  its  beginnings  in 
Stoicism in chapter one, so we must trace the pro and anti pity traditions 
back to their beginnings. These too are in the thought of the Greeks. 
Greek ethical thought before Socrates takes it for granted that human life is 
a chancy affair, and that if one is to live a flourishing life one needs luck as 
well as virtue. Happy lives can be torn apart by fate or by the malice or 
incompetence  of  others.  This  possibility  is  not  something  that  can  be 
avoided or warded off; rather it calls for humility, a creation, if you will of 
a community of sufferers, ready to respond with pity to others in respect of 
those things they fear for themselves. 
Book 24 of the Iliad provides the best example of the heights to which this 
approach to ethical thinking may rise. Frail Priam, the King of Troy, aided 
by the god Hermes, arrives at the tent of Achilles. He has come to ransom 
the body of his  favourite  son Hector, whom Achilles has slain. He has 
driven through the night at great danger to himself. He enters unseen, takes 
Achilles in his arms and kisses his hands, ‘those terrible, murderous hands, 
which had killed many of his sons,’ and says 
“Think of your father, godlike Achilles, an old man like I 
am, at the cruel edge of old age. And it may be that he too is 
pressed by those who live around his home, and there is no-
one to protect him from harm and destruction. But he can at 
least hear that you are alive, and feel joy in his heart, and 
look forward every day to seeing his dear son return from 
Troy. But my fate is utter misery – I fathered sons who were 
heroes in the broad land of Troy, and I tell you not one of 
them is left. ... Respect the gods, then Achilles, and have 
pity on me, remembering your own father.  But I am yet 
more pitiable than he. I have endured to do what no other 
mortal man on earth has done – I have brought to my lips 
the hands of the man who killed my child.”
So he spoke, and he roused in Achilles the desire to weep 
for his father. He took the old man by the hand and gently 
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pushed him away. And the two of them began to weep in 
remembrance.  Priam  cried  loud  for  murderous  Hector, 
huddled at the feet of Achilles, and Achilles cried for his 
own father, and then again for Patroclus:141 and the house 
was  filled  with  the  sound  of  their  weeping.  (Book  24, 
482ff.)
It is important to note that it is through the emotion of pity that the mutual 
recognition of Priam and Achilles takes place. Through pity they come to 
see  each  other  as  equally  human,  both  with  symmetrical  fears:  Priam 
fearing for his sons and the destruction of his line; Achilles fearing for his 
father, growing old without a son to take care of him. 
Aristotle’s discussion of pity in the Rhetoric is the most helpful place to go 
if  we  wish  to  get  a  philosophical  handle  on  this  tradition  of  ethical 
thinking:  he  defines  pity  as  a  ‘feeling  of  pain  at  an  apparent  evil, 
destructive  or  painful,  which befalls  one  who does  not  deserve it,  and 
which we might expect to befall  ourselves or some friend of ours, and 
moreover to befall us soon.’ (1385b12-14) 
There are three elements to this definition of pity: first, the evil has to be 
serious – (‘we do not go around pitying someone who has lost a toothbrush 
or a paperclip’ (Nussbaum 1994, p.141); second, the evil cannot be the 
person’s fault, or if it is their own fault, the evil must be far greater than 
would  be appropriate  given the fault;142 and  third that  the  pain of  pity 
requires  one  to  see  befalling  a  similar  evil  as  a  real  possibility  for 
oneself.143
Martha Nussbaum argues that were this tradition to rise to the level of 
philosophical  theorizing,  it  would posit  three distinct  advantages for its 
pity-oriented  outlook:  first,  pity  expresses  the  truth  about  the  human 
141 Achilles’ best friend, whom Hector had slain.
142 As a side issue, Aristotle’s theory of tragedy demands that the protagonist does not suffer for no 
reason at  all,  but  rather that the suffering must  be caused by a mistake (hamartia)  though the 
punishment must be so extreme as to excite pity. 
143 ‘What we fear for ourselves excites our pity when it happens to others.’ (1386a27-8)
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situation:  we are needy incomplete creatures who are reliant on external 
circumstances for our flourishing. 
Second, this truth holds regardless of how rich or powerful a person may 
be:  everyone  should  bear  this  in  mind,  because  ‘one  will  act  more 
appropriately if one remains aware at all times of the sort of being one is.’ 
(1994, p.143) Third, because pity acknowledges the importance of external 
goods, and because pity requires one to admit that one may one day be in 
need  oneself,  pity  ‘works  to  ensure  a  more  equitable  distribution  of 
goods.’(1994, p.143)
7.3 The Anti-Pity tradition
But  Socrates,  as  we  see  him  in  the  Apology,  the  Crito  and  Phaedo 
represents a very different model of life from Priam and Achilles. Faced 
with the prospect of being put to death unjustly, Socrates does not cry, get 
angry or violent: rather he remains preternaturally calm, insisting that he 
has not really been harmed: for to be really harmed he would have to have 
become unjust. For according to Socrates, the most flourishing life for a 
human being is one of virtue: everything else is of minor importance.
From Socrates’ perspective, the whole pro-pity tradition is deeply flawed: 
its most basic error is that it assumes that externals such as money, power 
friends and children are important, when they are not. Pity is insulting to 
the  pitied  because  it  implies  that  the  pitied  person  really  needs  these 
externals, when any virtuous person does not. Moreover it is demeaning to 
the one who pities, because it implies that she too needs externals, when it 
is clear that all that is required is virtue. Rather, no serious harm can befall 
the just person qua just person, for the only injury that would count as 
serious would be one that interfered with their virtue. 
This tradition of anti-pity thinking that starts  with Socrates is entwined 
with  morality  right  from  the  beginning  through  the  conception  of  the 
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dignity  of  human  being  that  is  present  in  Stoicism.  Human  dignity  is 
thought to consist in reason, and reason to be the identical to the capacity 
for virtue. 
If you understand human dignity as being grounded in reason, and reason 
to involve mastery over the emotions, then it is easy to get to the thought 
that responding appropriately to one’s dignity as a human being is all about 
mastering  the  emotions,  and hence  that  someone  who is  overcome by 
emotion (say at the ending of a love affair) thereby either diminishes their 
dignity or (if that is not possible) fails to act in a way that is respectful of  
that dignity. George Harris summarizes the essence of this tradition well:
According to this tradition, when character either weakens 
or succumbs to life’s trouble, it fails because it lacks the 
kind of strength ideal characters should have. To be sure, 
good  people  are  almost  always  less  than  ideal.  For  this 
reason we understand that certain failures of strength are 
compatible with being a good person.  Still  we would be 
better  were  we  to  realize  fully  that  which  gives  us  our 
dignity, and if we did fully recognize our dignity we would 
have  unlimited  strength  to  cope  with  life’s  troubles 
whatever they might be. Were we good Kantians and more 
rational, were we good Christians and more faithful to God, 
and  were  we  good  Stoics  and  less  attached  to  things 
external  to our character,  we would not be vulnerable to 
failures  of  strength.  Being more  dignified,  we  would  be 
stronger. (Harris 1997, pp. 1-2)
Set  against  the  background  of  this  personality  ideal,  the  travails  and 
possible breakdown of the person who suffers the effects of immorality 
look like they occur because of a failure of those very qualities – hardness 
towards oneself  and strength of character – that  make the good person 
good. The unavoidable conclusion is that it is due to a failure on the part of 
the person who suffers that they are overcome by suffering. The natural 
conclusion to draw is that drawing attention to such suffering is much less 
important  than  telling  people  how  to  overcome  it  through  their  own 
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hardness.  People  are  only  incapacitated  to  the  extent  that  they  allow 
themselves to be: what is morally important is to focus on capability. 
The combined effect of these decisions is that the vulnerability of human 
beings  has  tended  to  become  hidden  by  a  zealous  affirmation  of  the 
inalienable capability of human beings to meet their moral demands. The 
person who thinks of him or herself as having been broken on the wheel of 
life is just being weak: it is in their power to stop being weak in this sense, 
and  ‘pull  themselves  together’,  and  so  their  weakness  is,  ultimately, 
morally culpable.
I  think  that  this  position  is  flawed  both  empirically  and  normatively. 
Empirically, it is just false to claim that whatever happens a human being 
can keep their composure: there are some degrees of suffering that break 
up  the  soul  from the  inside,  and  make  the  idea  of  maintaining  one’s 
hardness seem ridiculous.144 Nor can the capacity  for anything like this 
degree of self-command be developed except under reasonably propitious 
circumstances. 
Normatively, it is at best highly unclear whether the ideal of hardness and 
self-command is worth pursuing. Nussbaum asks the following:
What should we think about a human being who insists on 
caring deeply for nothing that he himself does not control; 
who refuses to love others in ways that open him to serious 
risks of pain and loss; who cultivates the hardness of self-
command as a bulwark against all the reversals that life can 
bring? We could say, with Nietzsche, that this is a strong 
person. But there is clearly another way to see things. There 
is a strength in the willingness to form attachments that can 
go wrong and cause deep pain, in the willingness to invest 
oneself in the world in a way that opens one’s whole life up 
to changes of the world, for good and for bad. There is, in 
short, a strength in the willingness to be porous rather than 
totally hard, in the willingness to be a mortal animal living 
in the world.  The Stoic, by contrast,  looks like a fearful 
144 Simone Weil makes a distinction between mere suffering and affliction (malheur) that captures 
this point well. 
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person, a person who is determined to seal himself off from 
risk, even at the cost of loss of love and value. (Nussbaum 
1994, p.160)
This criticism obviously applies to Nietzsche as well.145 
7.4 Dignity in the Pro-Pity tradition
But if I am not mistaken, there is another conception of dignity that takes 
its cue from the pro-pity tradition: let us look at Achilles’ reply to the great 
speech of Priam I quoted above: 
Poor man, you have surely endured many sorrows in your 
heart. How could you bear to come alone to the ships of the 
Achaians, into the eyes of a man who has killed many of 
your brave sons? Your heart must be made of iron. (Book 
24, 525 ff.)
Here  Achilles  responds  not  just  with  pity,  but  with  a  sort  of  awe  – a 
recognition of  dignity – at what Priam has done in coming to him.
This feeling is related to pity, but is so to speak its flip side: where pity is a 
feeling of pain for another like ourselves broken on the wheel of life, the 
experience of human dignity is a feeling of awe at one like ourselves who 
has been through adversity, had the vulnerabilities probed, but has survived 
without betraying himself. If pity teaches of the evils that can strike down 
any human being, dignity uplifts by teaching of the uncanny fortitude that 
allows  people  to  keep  striving  for  what  is  worthwhile  in  the  face  of 
destructive  blows dealt  by life  that  could have  shattered  them.  We are 
immensely impressed by such fortitude and think that the human race is 
ennobled by it.
145 “For a central theme in his work is that Christianity has taught us bad habits of self-insulation 
and self-protection, alienating us from our love of the world and all of its chanciness, all of its 
becoming. On this account we have become small in virtue, and will remain small, unless we learn  
once again to value our own actions as ends, and our own worldly existence as their natural home. I 
think that in the end Nietzsche fails to go far enough with this critique. He fails, that is, to see what  
the Stoicism he endorses has in common with the Christianity he criticizes, what “hardness” has in 
common with otherworldliness: both are forms of self-protection, both express a fear of this world 
and its  contingencies,  both are incompatible  with the deepest sort  of love,  whether personal  or 
political.” (Nussbaum 1994, p.160)
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What Achilles sees in Priam and salutes is very different from what the 
tradition stemming from the Stoics means by dignity. He is not denying 
human vulnerability in order to praise strength: rather the sort of strength 
Priam shows presupposes  his  own vulnerability  and the  importance  of 
‘externals’ such as securing a decent burial for his son. 
On this tradition, it is above all the hero who has dignity, and what makes 
him a hero is precisely his willingness to risk his own destruction for the 
sake of what is fine.146 On this way of looking at dignity, it is only to those 
whom we might feel pity for that we can ascribe a dignity: those who 
cannot  be  harmed  cannot  be  dignified  in  this  sense,  because  for  them 
nothing is at stake. Hence neither Homer’s gods (who cannot die or really 
be  harmed)  nor  the  virtuous  man  of  the  Stoics  (who  ensures  his 
invulnerability  by  curtailing  what  he  finds  important)147 can  have  real 
dignity on this conception. 
Dignity, on this tradition derives, I suspect, from a reflection on the human 
condition: our vulnerability, our mortality, our weakness in the face of a 
world that we cannot control. What impresses us, and makes us think that 
human life is worth affirming after all, is the effort – and the successes – 
that we see human beings making  in spite  of the adverse and sometimes 
absurd conditions we find ourselves in. On this way of thinking, the person 
who has a dignity is above all the hero: and it is in his or her willingness to 
risk everything for the sake of his or her ideal that this dignity resides. 
William James encapsulates this tradition well when he writes:
In heroism, we feel, life’s supreme mystery is hidden. We 
tolerate no one who has no capacity whatever for it in any 
direction.  On  the  other  hand,  no  matter  what  a  man’s 
frailties otherwise may be, if he be willing to risk death, and 
still  more if  he suffer it  heroically, in the service he has 
chosen, the fact consecrates him forever. (1902, p.364)
146 Aristotle’s analysis of courage in Nichomachean Ethics III.6-9 is important here.
147 Epictetus,  Encheiridion 19: “You can be invincible if you do not enter any contest in which 
victory is not up to you.”
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However,  as James points out  in his discussion,  the two main ways in 
which this will to heroism has been manifested – in war and in religious 
asceticism – must be non-starters for an account of morality for us now. 
War is a non-starter because its essential purpose is destruction, and hence 
whilst it may be a training ground for heroism, its net effect must be for the 
bad.148
Christian asceticism, which James understands as an attempt to cleanse the 
world  through  self-mortification,149 while  less  destructive  than  war,  is 
hardly appealing (as James puts it,  ‘We can no longer sympathize with 
cruel deities, and the notion that God can take delight in the spectacle of 
sufferings self-inflicted in his honor is abhorrent.’ (1902, p.362)). 
James suggests that what we need is a new sort  of asceticism that will 
refocus energies in a healthier way:
What we now need to discover in the social realm is the 
moral equivalent of war: something heroic that will speak 
to  men  as  universally  as  war  does,  and  yet  will  be  as 
compatible  with  their  spiritual  selves  as  war  has  proved 
itself to be incompatible. (p.367)
His suggestion is that we adopt an ethic of poverty as this moral equivalent 
of war.150 Much as I admire William James, I cannot help finding this a bit 
148 He quotes an unnamed ‘clear-headed’ Austrian officer: “Live and let live is no device for an 
army. Contempt for one’s own comrades, for the troops of the enemy, and, above all, fierce contempt 
for one’s own person, are what war demands of everyone.  Far better is it for an army to be too 
savage, too cruel, too barbarous, than to possess too much sentimentality and human reasonableness. 
If the soldier is to be good for anything as a soldier, he must be exactly the opposite of a reasoning 
and thinking man. … The recruit brings with him common moral notions, of which he must seek 
immediately to get rid. For him victory, success, must be everything. The most barbaric tendencies in 
men come to life in war, and for war’s uses they are incommensurably good.” (1902, pp.366-7) 
149 “It symbolizes, lamely enough, no doubt, but sincerely, the belief that there is an element of real 
wrongness in this world, which is neither to be ignored nor evaded, but which must be squarely met 
and overcome by an appeal to the soul’s heroic resources, and neutralized and cleansed away by 
suffering.” (1902, p.362)
150 I cannot resist quoting his claims, which now seem a bit quaint: “We have lost the power even  
of imagining what the ancient idealization of poverty could have meant: the liberation from material 
attachments, the unbribed soul, the manlier indifference, the paying our way by what we are or do  
and not by what we have, the right to fling away our life at any moment irresponsibly, - the more 
athletic trim, the moral fighting shape. When we of the so-called better classes are scared as men 
were never scared in history at material ugliness and hardship; when we put off marriage until our  
houses can be artistic,  and quake at  the thought of having a child without a bank-account and  
doomed to manual labour, it is time for thinking me to protest against so unmanly and irresponsible a 
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silly, for several reasons. First, if we needed a moral equivalent of war, 
wouldn’t the fight against injustice be a better substitute? Second, the view 
of poverty he is recommending is somewhat romanticised. Third, there is 
something gratuitous about it: one deliberately puts oneself in a situation 
where one needs to exercise heroism, whereas heroism properly considered 
is already called for by the situation one finds oneself in.
On a more general level, it seems to me that James in addition makes two 
much more significant mistakes: first, he forgets that the importance of the 
hero lies not in his ability to justify his own life, but in his ability to inspire 
awe in others: it is not the hero who experiences his own dignity through 
his struggle, but others who experience the hero’s dignity. 
Second,  it  is  quite  incorrect  to  think  that  heroism  requires  special, 
contrived  circumstances  such  as  voluntarily  taken  on  poverty  for  its 
application:  everyday  life  provides  sufficient  challenges.151 Ibsen’s  Dr 
Stockmann in Enemy of the People perhaps provides the literary prototype 
for the sort of heroism that any honest person may be called upon to pursue 
in the course of their job.152 Think of artists and journalists, and of how 
much  courage  it  can  take  to  portray  the  truth  as  they  have  seen  or 
experienced it unadorned. Or again, think of the often less visible heroism 
often displayed by people caring for sick or dying relatives. It is true that 
we ‘tolerate no one who has no capacity whatever for [heroism] in any 
direction’, but heroism is always closer to us than we think.
state of opinion.” (1902, p.368) To be fair to James he later came to the more sensible suggestion of 
national service as the necessary ‘moral equivalent of war’.
151 I find it a little odd that someone who is usually so finely attuned to the minutiae of normal  
people’s experience should wish to transplant heroism to a completely different realm of life.
152 More modern cases would include those who risk losing their jobs, or even going to jail, to 
make public what various branches of the government having been doing in the public’s name.  
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 C h a p t e r  E i g h t
Reconstructing Universality
8.1 Introduction
This chapter completes the reconstruction of morality by clarifying and 
extending what we have so far said about dignity and by giving an account 
of moral rules. 
The account of dignity is extended in such a way that we can believe in the 
dignity of all human beings. This takes some work: for the hero is by his or 
her very nature exceptional, so it is immediately problematic to attempt to 
argue for the dignity of all human beings on the basis of the dignity of the 
hero. We can, as I suggested, extend the category of hero by looking for 
heroism in more mundane places, but there is a limit as to how far we can 
do this. For it is implausible to suggest that every human being is heroic in 
some respect: it seems far more realistic to agree, with James that there are 
some people who have no capacity for heroism in any direction, and some 
people whose slight heroism in some direction is vastly outweighed by 
their utter lack of it in all other directions. 
My reply to this problem is to make a distinction between two different 
ways of thinking of the dignity of human beings: a bloodless and a full-
blooded, and suggesting that we only need the bloodless version in order to 
have a viable account of moral rules.
The bloodless conception of the dignity of all human beings amounts to no 
more than seeing all human beings as worthy of a basic respect: that is 
considering  them  to  be  a  member  of  the  cosmopolitan  community  of 
morality. Considering them in this way implies three things: i) we consider 
ourselves to be bound by moral rules in our dealings with them; ii) we 
consider them to be bound by moral rules in their dealings with us; iii) we 
consider them to have a voice in the ongoing discussion as to what moral 
rules we should adopt for the general regulation of society. 
I assume that we can unproblematically hold that everyone has a dignity in 
this bloodless sense.153 
The account of moral rules presupposes this bloodless conception of the 
dignity of human beings. It does three things. First, it explains what the 
regulation of life through moral rules is supposed to accomplish, namely 
the continuing viability of morality as a project, and the equal respect of 
each under rules that all can agree to. Second, it articulates why one might 
find  this  goal  worth  striving  towards.  Third,  it  gives  a  theory  of 
argumentation which we can use to determine which norms to take to be 
morally valid. 
The ease with which we can gain acceptance for this bloodless conception 
of the dignity of all human beings cuts both ways however. Whilst it allows 
us to give a meaning to the fundamental moral claims that every human 
being has a dignity, and that moral rules exist to ensure that this dignity is 
respected, it fails to do justice to the other motivation we had for insisting 
on the dignity of all human beings. This was that the dignity of human 
beings provides the positive affirmation at the heart of morality; the thing 
that makes it false to claim that morality is basically reactive in its system 
of  valuation.  Whilst  affirming  each  person  as  a  member  of  the  moral 
community may go a little way towards fulfilling this goal, I doubt that it is 
sufficient to perform the affirmation required. 
Therefore, I develop a full-blooded conception of the dignity of all human 
beings alongside this bloodless one. If one were less sensitive than I am to 
the worry that Nietzsche raises, perhaps one might see it as an optional 
153 Note that this account does not rest on any alleged special traits that human beings have; nor do 
I argue that we must hold it. All that it rests on is the legitimacy of adopting this attitude towards 
them in our dealings with them
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extra to the account of morality, and think that the account of moral rules 
gives us everything we need. But for those who think that morality requires 
a more ringing endorsement of human beings, it forms an integral part of 
the reconstruction of morality.
This full-blooded conception of the dignity of all human beings takes its 
cue from the way we experience the dignity of the hero, but it makes a 
further  suggestion:  namely  that  what  is  special  about  the  hero  –  what 
makes us accord her a dignity – is, more fundamentally than her feats of 
derring-do, her ability to arrest our usual emotional self-protection in such 
a way that we cannot help finding her valuable. It follows that if we want 
to experience the dignity of all human beings in a full-blooded sense, we 
do better to attempt to dismantle these usual emotional defences than to 
attempt to make good on the rather implausible claim that everyone is a 
hero in some respect. I suggest that the most effective way we have of 
doing  this  is  to  first,  cultivate  a  greater  openness  towards  others,  and 
second to adopt an approach to life that places a unilateral love for others at 
its centre.
The basic structure of the reconstruction of morality, in which moral rules 
and  the  affirmation  of  human life  are  conceived  of  as  springing from 
separate sources, and must  be combined in creatively in the process of 
living,  is  borrowed  from  Paul  Ricoeur.  Ricoeur  uses  this  structure  to 
explain what Christianity  has to offer ethics.  His suggestion is that the 
Christian  ideal  of  unilateral  love  should  enter  into  the  conception  of 
reciprocity we find in the golden rule and in the universal law formulation 
of the categorical imperative and transform it by infusing it with a greater 
generosity: not to  replace  the rule of reciprocity but to  reinterpret  it in a 
more giving way.154 
154 “In fact, what penal law and in general what rules of justice could apply directly, without the 
detour of the golden rule, the bare commandment to love one’s enemies? What distribution of tasks, 
roles, advantages, obligations and duties – following the Rawlsian schema of the “idea of justice” –  
could result from a commandment from which reciprocity appears to have been excluded? What 
equity, on the economic plane, could be drawn from the commandment to “lend, expecting nothing  
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What I shall present differs from Ricoeur in two important ways. In terms 
of Charles Taylor’s terminology, Ricoeur’s account will place the Christian 
affirmation of life on the side of the good and the account of moral rules on 
the  side  of  the  right.155 My  account  places  both  the  idea  of  a  moral 
regulation of society and the dignity of human beings on the side of the 
good, leaving only the actual moral rules to be enforced on the side of the 
right. 
This means that there is far less distance between the two elements on my 
account.156 Rather than the gulf we have on Ricoeur’s account (which is in 
addition widened by a further distinction between sacred and profane), we 
have a distinction between trying to come to a mutual understanding about  
which norms can be shared as a basis for cooperation  and  approaching 
human beings in such a way that one experiences them as having a dignity.  
Although the first is a bilateral (or better, multilateral) and the second a 
unilateral operation, they both come out of a common vision of human life: 
that of human beings as attempting to create structures wherein they can 
flourish in a world that is indifferent to their fate.
The second disagreement is already implicit in the first: Ricoeur’s account 
incorporates a much more serious, more ‘heavyweight’ view of the world 
in return”? Detached from the golden rule, the commandment to love one’s enemies is not ethical but 
supraethical, as is the whole economy of the gift to which it belongs. If it is not to swerve over to the 
nonmoral, or even to the immoral, the commandment to love must reinterpret the golden rule and, in 
so doing, be itself reinterpreted by this rule.” (Ricoeur 1991, p.301)
155 This reading is, I think, true of Ricoeur’s  religious contributions to ethics, but in his secular 
contributions we have a more subtle three-stage process through which the good and the right are  
interrelated and reinterpret  one another.  See Ricoeur  (1992,  p.170):  “According to  the working 
hypothesis I am proposing, morality is held to constitute only a limited, although legitimate and even 
indispensable,  actualisation  of  the  ethical  aim,  and  ethics  in  this  sense  would  then  encompass 
morality.” He states his aim is to establish “(1) the primacy of ethics over morality, (2) the necessity 
for the ethical aim to pass through the sieve of the norm, and (3) the legitimacy of recourse by the 
norm to the aim whenever the norm leads to impasses in practice.”
156 It is noticeable that Ricoeur’s general philosophical methodology is to approach a problem by 
setting up two polar opposites and finding a way of mediating between the two of them through the  
act of creative interpretation. His account of the relationship between Christian ethics and moral rules 
is no exception. Whilst this strategy is often very revealing and enables him to reconcile seemingly 
conflicting claims, in this case, he seems to me overplay the conflict, just so he can use his preferred 
methodology. I prefer to fill out the answer to the question about the affirmation of human life and 
the answer to the question about the need for universal moral rules in a way that creates much less 
initial difference between them and so creates less need for creative mediation.
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than mine does. His account is anchored in absolutes in both its ‘love’ and 
its ‘justice’ directions: in the love direction, with his reading of Christian 
teaching,157 and in the justice direction, with his reading of Alan Donagan’s 
absolutist theory of morality.158 
Mine  is  free  floating  and pragmatist  in  tone,  expressing  a  faith  in  the 
possibility of universal moral rules and in a full-blooded conception of 
dignity, but well aware that these remain optional for us. On my account it 
is necessary neither to believe in universal moral rules nor in the dignity of 
all  human beings.  The  underlying  value  system of  morality  is,  just  as 
Nietzsche said, just one among many other possible systems. But it does 
not follow either that it is illegitimate to take morality as a guiding light in 
one’s life, or that there is nothing that can be said in favour of so doing. 
What speaks in favour of morality is the structure it imposes on human life. 
I shall suggest that there are three broad things that can be said in favour of 
morality: i) general adherence to moral rules protects both each individual 
and the web of interrelations through which they live; ii) belief in universal 
moral rules allows each person to recognise each person as autonomous 
and accountable,  and thereby creates  a domination-free  space in  which 
valuable human endeavours are possible. iii) Believing in the dignity of all 
human beings in a full-blooded sense makes one’s encounters with other 
human beings much richer and more satisfying than they would otherwise 
be, and hence one finds life more interesting.
Some  may  find  the  fact  that  my  account  makes  morality  ultimately 
optional  –  that,  in  Kantian  terms  it  never  rises  above  the  level  of 
157 Ricoeur bases his account of love on the Christian idea of human beings as creatures of God: 
created by God and utterly dependent on God. For Ricoeur it is from this sense of radical dependence 
that we find ourselves summoned by God and placed in a situation of gratitude and wonder: ‘“And 
God saw everything that he had made and behold it was very good.” (Genesis 1:31) The hyper 
ethical dimension of this predicate extended to all creatures is what we must emphasize, for the result  
is that it is as a creature that we find ourselves summoned. The sense of radical dependence that is at 
stake here, insofar as it is attached to the symbolism of creation, does not leave us face-to-face with 
God; rather it situates us within nature considered not as something to exploit but as an object of 
solicitude, of respect and admiration.’ (1991, p. 325).
158 See Donagan (1977).
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hypothetical imperatives – unsatisfactory, perhaps even vertigo inducing. 
There are two worries: first, whether the account will allow us to deal with 
those who don’t want to be moral; and second whether it is satisfactory for 
people who do believe in morality. 
I shall take the second worry first. This worry is about the contingency of 
the account I shall be giving: how can we continue in our commitment to 
morality after we admit that there is nothing to rationally coerce us into 
being moral? Can we continue to take morality seriously enough to want to 
guide our lives according to it? 
My reply is twofold: first that it is a sign of moral immaturity to want to be 
coerced –  whether by reason or by something else – into being good.159 
Second, there are good reasons why admitting the contingency of morality 
will make one both  more committed  to fighting the good fight and more 
effective at so doing than one otherwise would have been. 
If one believes that the moral law is inbuilt into every human being, it is 
easy to become complacent about such matters as moral education: for, try 
as we might,  however evil  we attempt  to become,  we cannot  extirpate 
morality from ourselves. The moral law will still be there to guide each and 
every human being for as long as the human race survives. But if morality 
is  contingent,  then  there  is  much  more  at  stake:  there  is  a  very  real 
possibility that the quality of our relations with our fellow human beings 
could deteriorate to the point where ideas like the dignity of all human 
beings, or universal rules against murder come to seem like laughable and 
superstitious naivety. 
There is every reason to think that a keen awareness of the contingency of 
moral goodness will lead one to be more willing to celebrate it and protect 
it where one finds it, just as a growing awareness of the contingency of 
159 In any case, we retain an element of coercion in our account of moral rules – though this  
coercion comes through  accountability to others  rather than through something more akin to the 
moral law.
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human life has led to a greater desire to protect the ecosystems that make 
this life possible.160 
Now, the worry about the amoralist. What are we to say to the person who 
refuses to act morally? My answer is that we do not need an  argument 
from  neutral  premisses  that  will  force  them  to  accept  the  validity  of 
morality. If we do not require such an argument to see the point of being 
moral, why do we need one for their benefit?161 
It is sufficient to be able to educate such people, so that they can see the 
point  of  morality  for  themselves.  If  they  are  ineducable  (where,  for 
example, their early experience has damaged them to the point where they 
have  become  incurably  psychopathic)  we may  need  to  find  a  way  of 
controlling  them  through  schemes  of  reward  and  punishment  that  are 
effective for them.
8.2 Moral rules
I shall now proceed to give a pragmatist account of moral rules. On this 
account,  moral  rules  are  social  norms  which  aim  to  ensure  both  the 
viability of the project of morality and equal respect for each under rules 
that everyone can agree to. Moral rules are held up by no more than a 
common willingness to believe in interpersonal justice and solidarity: their 
more precise content is forged by those who are committed to this project, 
through their attempts to convince one another of what would constitute 
the set of rules that is best suited to achieve the aims of morality. 
Everyone who has any interest in the aims of morality is free to contribute 
to  this  debate,  by  suggesting  why  individual  norms  are  problematic; 
160 As a side issue, I would also argue that recognising the contingency of morality allows us to 
better understand moral badness, both by allowing us to view it as normal rather than pathological, 
and by a keener awareness of how one too could have been or could yet become a bad person.
161 There is the additional pragmatist point that arguments for the validity of morality are, in fact, 
pretty ineffective at actually changing the minds of bad people: even if one were in possession of a  
valid argument which showed that someone really ought to be moral, the fact is it is unlikely to be 
effective in changing his behaviour. You will in other words, have to fall back on education or control 
to get the job done, just as you do on my pragmatist model. 
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suggesting better ways of formulating them; finding ways of reconciling 
norms that both seem plausible but which conflict in the behaviour they 
demand; and in many other ways. 
Moral rules presuppose the worthwhileness of a particular ethos, that of 
living together in harmony with others on the basis of rules that all can 
agree to, in a community that can eventually be extended to encompass all 
human beings. Arguments about moral norms presuppose this ethos and 
only  make  full  sense  to  those  for  whom  this  ethos  encapsulates  a 
worthwhile way of living. It is no part of my pragmatist account of moral 
rules to argue that moral norms can be convincingly justified to anyone for 
whom this ethos is unimportant. 
The account is split into three parts: 
1)  Explaining  what  it  is  that  the  moral  regulation  of  life  attempts  to 
achieve.
2) Attempting to articulate the conception of the good implicit in this ethos.
3) Explaining how, given this ethos, we are to argue about what regulation 
of life best expresses this ethos.
8.2.1 What the moral regulation of life aims to achieve
On  any  account  such  as  ours,  which  sees  morality  as  a  contingent 
phenomenon within the history of ethical thinking, the most important task 
that  moral  rules  must  perform is  to  ensure  the  continuing  viability  of 
morality. The moral rules and the general behavioural expectations that we 
build  into  morality  must  be  self-sustaining:  moral  rules  must  generate 
confidence in themselves through people acting on them, and must be such 
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as to draw increasing numbers of people to hold themselves accountable to 
them.162
There are several reasons why morality might fail to be self-sustaining. The 
most pressing such reason is that morality might collapse from within. We 
might find ourselves unable to take morality seriously any more: when, for 
example, morality tries to get strict with us about our obligations to our 
fellow human beings,  or  the importance of truthfulness,  we might  find 
ourselves involuntarily smirking at the idiocy of such an idea, much as we 
would do if someone told us in all seriousness that we should be preparing 
for  the  coming  of  the  Last  Judgment.163 I  hope  to  have  obviated  this 
potential problem by reconstructing morality in a way that is deliberately 
post-Nietzschean,  and  is  both  modest  and  sensitive  to  the  structure  of 
human life. 
The other threats  to morality are external. Put simply,  it  is  much more 
difficult to act according to moral principles when those around you do not: 
if you are lucky enough to live in a morally well-ordered community where 
people generally act according to moral rules and expect others to do the 
same, then it is relatively easy to act according to moral principles, and 
vice versa. 
We  could  think  of  something  like  a  principle  of  inertia:  the  general 
community in which one lives sets a certain tone; and it  takes a much 
greater degree of effort to act against the grain created by this general tone 
than it does to act in accordance with it. 
Moral goodness becomes more difficult  to the extent that the tone in a 
community downgrades moral goodness and expects different responses: 
in extreme cases, such as under a tyranny of the sort we saw for example in 
162 I am in agreement with Annette Baier’s claim that ‘a decent morality will  not depend for its 
stability on forces to which it  gives no moral recognition.  Its account  books should be open to 
scrutiny, and there should be no unpaid debts, no loans with no prospect of repayment.’ (Baier 1985, 
p.8)
163 The underlying theme of chapter two was that this has already occurred for much of Kant’s 
account of morality.
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Stalin’s  Russia  or  in  Nazi  Germany,  the  exercise  of  moral  goodness 
becomes  positively  dangerous  to  the  good  person.  Although  in  such 
circumstances we still find the odd individual capable of standing up with 
unbowed courage for the rules of morality,  what  is notable about  such 
individuals is their very exceptionalness. Morality lives on only on tiny 
islands in a sea of immorality: in such societies, the  project of morality has 
been shattered. 
The first aim of moral rules must therefore be to ensure that such a case 
does  not  occur;  and,  more  generally  that  it  is  easier,  rather  than  more 
difficult to exercise moral goodness. 
Above  and  beyond  this  basic  goal  of  seeking  the  survival  of  moral 
goodness as a way of life, we can think of the purpose of moral rules in a 
way that is in line with the tradition of morality: namely to ensure that 
everyone is  treated with the respect that is  due to them and to impose 
sanctions on those who violate these requirements of mutual respect. 
Where our account differs, however, is that it stipulates that it is up to us to 
decide what we should take to constitute the best way of working out the 
respect due to each person and how we should ensure that this is met. In 
8.2.3 I provide a theory of argumentation which attempts to elucidate what 
a debate about moral norms should be like if moral norms are to claim our 
adherence.164 
164 Habermas has broadly the same conception of the purpose of moral rules, and he suggests, in a 
passage that is dense and suggestive rather than wholly lucid, that the tie between the project of 
ensuring the future of morality as a way of life and ensuring of equal respect of each person may be 
even closer than this: that they imply one another. “From the perspective of communication theory 
there emerges a close connection between concern for the welfare of one’s fellow man and interest in 
the general welfare: the identity of the group is reproduced through intact relationships of mutual  
recognition.  Thus  the  perspective  complementing  that  of  equal  treatment  of  individuals  is  not 
benevolence but solidarity. This principle is rooted in the realisation that each person must take 
responsibility for the other because as consociates all must have an interest in the integrity of their 
shared life  context in  the same way. Justice  conceived deontologically  requires  solidarity as  its 
reverse side. It is a question not so much of two moments that supplement each other as two aspects 
of the same thing.  Every autonomous morality has to serve two purposes at one: it brings to bear the 
inviolability of socialized individuals by requiring equal treatment and thereby equal respect for the  
dignity of each one; and it protects the intersubjective relationships of mutual recognition requiring 
solidarity of individual members of a community, in which they have been socialized. … Moral 
norms cannot protect one without the other: they cannot protect the equal rights and freedoms of the 
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8.2.2 Articulating the good implicit in a moral regulation of society
In order to find the idea of regulation of life in accordance with moral rules 
attractive,  you must  believe in two things: first,  that  human beings are 
sufficiently  valuable to justify ascribing to them a dignity in at  least a 
bloodless sense; and second that that aim of a society regulated according 
to moral rules is worth achieving. 
The bloodless conception of the dignity of human beings is a baseline, 
beyond which we can think of the dignity of human beings in a more full-
blooded way. I shall discuss later how we can attempt to extend this full-
blooded understanding of the dignity of human beings so that it covers all 
human beings: but it is important at this stage to note that moral rules per 
se, do not depend on this full-blooded reading. 
The bloodless conception of the dignity of all human beings, as I have said, 
amounts  to  no more  than  seeing all  human beings  as  members  of  the 
cosmopolitan  community  of  morality.  Membership  of  this  community 
implies three things: i) we consider ourselves to be bound by moral rules in 
our dealings with them; ii) we consider them to be bound by moral rules in 
their dealings with us; iii) we consider them to have a voice in the ongoing 
discussion  as  to  what  moral  rules  we  should  adopt  for  the  general 
regulation of society. 
This bloodless account of the dignity of human beings should be seen as a 
slimmed down version of Kantian respect. It takes as its key idea respect 
for  each  human  being  as  a  rational  agent.  Kant  explains  this  in  the 
following terms: 
Every man has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow 
men and is in turn bound to respect every other. Humanity 
itself is a dignity; for a man cannot be used merely as a 
means by any man (either by others or even by himself) but 
individual without protecting the welfare of one’s fellow man and of the community to which the 
individuals  belong.”  (Habermas  1990a,  p.244)  However,  given  that  this  claim  is  not  strictly 
necessary to our project I shall not attempt to pursue it further.
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must always be used at the same time as an end. …. But 
just  as  he  cannot  give  himself  away for  any  price  (this 
would conflict with his duty of self-esteem), so neither can 
he  act  contrary  to  the  equally  necessary  self-esteem  of 
others,  as  men,  that  is  he  is  under  obligation  to 
acknowledge, in a practical way the dignity of humanity in 
every other man. Hence there rests on him a duty regarding 
the respect that must be shown to every other man. (MM, 
p.462)
This can be conceived as a more abstract form of the recognition we saw in 
chapter six: but rather than affirming to someone as a concrete individual 
we are affirming them as a rational, accountable person, and in so doing we 
are affirmed by them as a rational accountable person. When interacting 
with someone under the aegis of moral rules, this affirmation of them is 
funnelled into respect for them as a rational creature who must be treated 
according to generally valid rules.
On the second point, we presuppose the value of living together under 
moral rules and a conception of life in which living in harmony with one’s 
fellow human beings is a good in itself. It is difficult to articulate the point 
of  this  just  because  it  is  so  basic.  Scanlon  has  a  good  try,  from  the 
perspective of his theory of morality:
The contractualist ideal of acting in accord with principles 
that others (similarly motivated) could not reasonably reject 
is meant to characterize the relation with others the value 
and  appeal  of  which  underlies  our  reasons  to  do  what 
morality  requires.  This  relationship,  much  less  personal 
than  friendship,  might  be  called  a  relation  of  mutual 
recognition. Standing in this relation to others is appealing 
in itself – worth seeking for its own sake. A moral person 
will  refrain  from  lying  to  others,  cheating,  harming  or 
exploiting them, “because these things are wrong.” But for 
such  a  person  these  requirements  are  not  just  formal 
imperatives; they are aspects of the positive value of a way 
of living with others.
Duty is most familiar in its negative form, in the feeling of 
unwelcome constraint  and the  experience  of  moral  guilt. 
According to the account I am offering, the pain of guilt 
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involves,  at  base,  a  feeling  of  estrangement,  of  having 
violated the requirements of a valuable relation with others. 
So  understood,  this  familiar  negative  aspect  of  morality 
corresponds to a positive “pull”: the positive value of living 
with others on terms that they could not reasonably reject. 
(Scanlon 1998, p.162)
Admittedly this value is often occluded, and more often than not it is only 
when it is threatened with destruction or it turns out that our assumption 
that we have been living together justly with out fellow creatures turns out 
to be incorrect that we see how much we presuppose this value.165  
Hannah Arendt links this idea up in an interesting way with themes from 
the  theory  of  recognition:  for  her  the  most  important  thing  is  the 
communicative  space  that  exists  between  people  living  together  in 
conditions free from domination. This she calls power, and argues that it is 
the living soul of all political legitimacy:
Power is what keeps the public realm, the potential space of 
appearance between acting and speaking men, in existence. 
…  Only  where  men  live  so  close  together  that  the 
potentialities of action are always present can power remain 
with them, and the foundation of cities, which as city-states 
have  remained  paradigmatic  for  all  Western  political 
organization,  is  therefore  indeed  the  most  important 
material prerequisite for power. What keeps people together 
after  the fleeting moment of action has passed (what we 
today call “organization”) and what, at the same time they 
keep  alive  through  remaining  together  is  power.  And 
whoever,  for whatever reasons, isolates himself and does 
not  partake  in  such  being  together  forfeits  power  and 
becomes impotent,  no matter how great  his strength and 
how valid his reasons. (Arendt 1958, pp. 200-1)166
165 ‘Unlike friendship, morality is commonly seen as a form of constraint, not as a source of joy or 
pleasure in our lives. I am suggesting, however, that when we look at the sense of loss occasioned by 
charges of injustice and immorality we see it as reflecting our awareness of the importance for us of 
being “in unity without fellow creatures.”’ (Scanlon 1998, p.163)
166 It follows, as I have already suggested,  that moral rules must first of all prevent tyranny, as 
tyranny is the very negation of power. “Tyranny prevents the development of power, not only in a 
particular segment of the public realm but in its entirety; it generates, in other words, impotence as 
naturally as other bodies generate political power. This in Montesquieu’s interpretation, makes it 
necessary to assign it a special position in the theory of political bodies: it alone is unable to develop 
enough power to remain at  all in the space of appearance,  the public realm; on the contrary, it 
develops the germs of its own destruction the moment it comes into existence.” (1958, pp. 202-3)
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It is important to see all these moves for what they are: partial attempts to 
elucidate what lies at the centre of the project of morality – what Kant 
called the kingdom of ends.167 But rather than adopting a strictly Kantian 
interpretation  of  this,  we  have  filtered  it  through  our  different 
understanding of human life. 
8.2.3 How we should decide on what moral rules are valid 
On our pragmatist model, the only viable option to pursue in attempting to 
work out what the precise content of the rules we should adopt to ensure 
the continuance of morality as a way of life and the equal respect of all, is 
to rely on an ethics of argumentation (or, discourse ethics), that i) attempts 
to lay out the rules of a fair discussion as to the validity of moral norms and 
ii)  leaves  the  actual  validation  of  moral  norms  to  the  results  of  such 
substantive discussions.168 For there is nothing left to base the validity of 
moral norms on other than the agreement of those who are to have their 
conduct regulated by these norms.
Translating this thought into the moral realm, Habermas argues that our 
first principle of validation should be (D): ‘only those norms can claim to 
be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their 
capacity as participants in a practical discourse.’ 
Discourse is an idealized conversation oriented towards reaching mutual 
understanding. Robert Alexy provides the fullest working out of what such 
167 cf  G  pp.433-4: “For all rational beings stand under the laws that each of them should treat 
himself and all others never merely as a means but always at the same time as an end in himself. 
Hereby arises a systematic union of rational beings through common objective laws, i.e., a kingdom 
that may be called a kingdom of ends (certainly only an ideal), inasmuch as these laws have in view 
the very relation of such beings to one another as ends and means. ... Hence morality consists in the 
relation of all action to that legislation whereby alone a kingdom of ends is possible.”
168 Such an approach is in a sense deeply still Kantian, but it is rather the Kant of the Critique of  
Pure Reason  and of  What is Enlightenment  that is being appealed to. Cf (C1,  A738-9/B766-7): 
‘Reason must in all its undertakings subject itself to criticism; should it limit freedom of criticism by 
any prohibitions,  it  must  harm itself,  drawing upon itself  a damaging suspicion.  Nothing is  so 
important through its usefulness, nothing so sacred, that it may be exempted from this searching 
examination, which knows no respect for persons. Reason depends on this freedom for its very 
existence. For reason has no dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the agreement of free 
citizens, of whom each one must be permitted to express, without let or hindrance, his objections or 
even his veto.’ See also Onora O’Neill (1989, chapters 1 and 2).
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a discourse requires: I shall follow his codification of the rules of discourse 
here. 
The first set of rules ensure the logical consistency of arguments about 
norms: they are as follows.  
(1.1) No speaker may contradict him or herself.
(1.2)  Each  speaker  may  only  assert  what  he  himself 
believes.
(1.3) Each speaker who applies a predicate F to an object a, 
must also be prepared to apply F to any other object which 
is similar to a in all relevant respects.169
(1.4) Different speakers may not use the same expression 
with different meanings. (Alexy 1990, p. 163)
The purpose and validity of these restrictions should be self-evident: (1.1) 
follows from the basic rules of logic. (1.2) Is held to be constitutive of the 
process of  serious argumentation.  It  does  not  ‘exclude the utterance  of 
conjectures, it requires merely that they can be characterised as such.’ (ibid, 
p. 164) (1.3) Demands that each speaker must use terms consistently; (1.4) 
is designed to ensure that argument is not hampered by lack of common 
definition of key terms.170  
Next, there are requirements concerning the openness of the discourse:
(2) Every speaker must justify what he or she asserts upon 
request,  unless  she  can  provide  grounds  which  justify 
avoiding giving a justification.
(2.1) Anyone who can speak may take part in a discourse.
(2.2) (a) Anyone may render any assertion problematic.
(b) Anyone may introduce any assertion into the discourse.
169 As applied evaluative claims, this becomes (1.3′) “Any speaker may only assert such value 
and obligational judgments as he would equally assert in all situations which are the same in all  
relevant respects to the situation in which he or she makes the assertion.”
170 Doing  this  may  prove  problematic  and  require  conceptual  analysis  or  other  clarificatory 
procedures. The legitimacy of such procedures is encoded at (4.2).
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(c) Anyone may express his/her opinions, wishes and needs.
(2.3) No speaker may be prevented by constraint within or 
outside  discourse  from  making  use  of  his/her  rights 
established in (2.1) and (2.2). (Alexy 1990, p. 166-7)
The purpose of these rules is to ensure that any consensus that we come to 
as a result of such a process of discourse can fairly be said to be binding on 
all the participants. However these rules are problematic inasmuch as ‘it is 
precluded  on  factual  grounds  that  all  persons  utilise  their  rights 
standardised  in  (2.1)  and  (2.2)  and  it  can  be  questioned  whether  the 
absence of  constraint  demanded by (2.3) can ever be achieved’ (Alexy 
1990, p.167)
Therefore,  we must see rules as  idealisations  that  inform practice,  and 
which we attempt to make our actual practice conform to as closely as is 
feasible; not as things that can actually be achieved in an actual process of 
argumentation. It follows that we need to make some rules of the burden of 
argumentation which alleviate this problem in a reasonable way by making 
presumptions about what needs to be argued for and what does not. 
There are four central ideas here: first that we combine (1.3′) with (2) in 
such a way that the burden on argumentation must rest with anyone who 
wishes to argue for unequal treatment: 
(3.1) Whoever wishes to treat a person A differently from a 
person B is obliged to justify this.
Second, we assume, via what Perelman called the principle of inertia, that 
‘an interpretation of practice that is once accepted may not be given up 
again without reason.’171 It follows from this that if a statement or norm is 
presumed to be valid within a particular community, it can only be doubted 
if a reason for doubting it can be provided. 
Third,  although  (2)  allows  any  speaker  to  ‘problematize  any  assertion 
without restrictions’, we make the pragmatic rule that once a speaker has 
171 Alexy (1990, pp. 167-8); referring to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1970, p. 142).
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given argument in favour of a proposition, someone cannot ask for further 
justifications of that principle unless she has a couter-argument to show 
that this argument is deficient. Alexy formalizes these points as follows:
(3.2) Whoever attacks a statement or norm that is not the 
subject of discussion must provide a reason for doing so.
(3.3)  Whoever  has  put  forward  an  argument  is  only 
committed  to  further  arguments  in  the  case  of  a 
counterargument.
Fourth,  and  finally,  the  rules  under  2  allow  any  speaker  to  filibuster, 
distract the conversation down irrelevant parts and so on. Whilst this need 
not be a problem if it occurs occasionally, if it occurs often in could derail 
discourse. For this reason Alexy suggests 
(3.4)  Whoever  introduces  an  assertion  of  a  statement 
concerning  his  opinions,  wishes,  or  needs  into  the 
discourse, which as argument is not related to a previous 
statement,  has  to  justify  upon  request  why  he/she  has 
introduced this assertion of this statement.
We require further rules, by means of which we can switch to a more self-
conscious discourse in order to iron out any problems that might arise at a 
first level  approach:  these problems are first  of all,  disagreements over 
factual  premisses;  difficulties  with  different  speakers  using  terms  in 
different ways or in unclarities surrounding key terms; and last disputes 
about the very structure of discourse itself. This gives rise to the following 
rules:  
(4.1) It is possible at all times for any speaker to switch to a 
theoretical (empirical) discourse.
(4.2) It is possible at all times for any speaker to move to a 
linguistic-analytical discourse.
(4.3) It is possible at all times for any speaker to move to a 
discourse on discourse theory. (Alexy 1990, pp. 175-6.)172 
172 I have renumbered these; they appear as 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 in his account.
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Between them, these rules attempt to establish a framework within which 
we must proceed if we are to take the results of a discussion to be generally 
binding. It aims to be a theory of argumentation as such: but what makes a 
moral  norm discursively  redeemable  is  a  bit  more  complex.  Obviously 
valid moral norms must meet Habermas’ (D): ‘only those norms can claim 
to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in 
their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.’ But in and of itself 
this lacks sufficient content to delimit what we are attempting to achieve in 
arguing about moral norms. 
I have two modest suggestions as to how we should proceed: first,  we 
should adopt Habermas’ thesis about when a norm is morally valid: 
 A  norm  is  morally  valid  when  the  foreseeable 
consequences and side effects of its general observance for 
the interests and value orientations of each individual could 
be freely accepted jointly by all concerned’.173
Second, we keep in mind that  our task does not require us to create  a 
completely new system of moral norms ex nihilo: the tradition of morality 
provides us with two very important resources. There are a large number of 
precepts that have been worked over, argued for and modified in the course 
of the tradition, for example, those concerning the conditions under which 
it is permissible to lie. Following the principle of inertia, we can take such 
precepts  as  valid  until  such  time  as  a  convincing  objection  or 
counterargument is brought to them. Further, the tradition provides us with 
a vast storehouse of ideas and analogies which we can helpfully redeploy 
in our current discourse about moral rules.174 
173 However, Scanlon’s contractualist principle, which states that an act is morally permissible if it 
would be “permitted by principles that could not reasonably be rejected, by people who were moved 
to find principles for the general regulation of behaviour that others, similarly motivated, could not 
reasonably reject” (1998, p. 4) is also a plausible contender. 
174 A good starting  point  for  what  the  tradition  of  morality  can  bring  to  discourse  ethics  is 
Donagan’s The Theory of Morality (1977). Donagan is highly sensitive to the tradition of morality, 
writes within it consciously and puts forward an account of moral rules which aims to synthesize the 
results of this tradition.
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It is not my place here to usurp the role of such a discourse. It is sufficient 
for my purposes to have shown how, even on this pragmatist account of 
morality, we can still see the attractiveness of a society regulated by moral 
rules, and still have sufficient resources to explain how we can think of 
such rules as valid.
8.3 Believing in the dignity of all human beings in a full-blooded sense
I  shall  now  attempt  to  explain  how  we  can  extend  the  full-blooded 
conception  of  dignity  so  that  it  covers  all  human  beings.  The  initial 
problem in so doing is, as I have already indicated, that the story we put 
forward in the previous chapter seems to account for the dignity of only the 
hero; and it seems difficult to imagine how we could extend it to cover all  
human beings, for it is highly implausible to suggest that all human beings 
are heroic. 
This problem is based on a misunderstanding: the figure of the hero was 
introduced because he or she provides the most obvious example of the 
way in which we can and do find flesh and blood human beings valuable; 
that is, capable of justifying human life. I did not mean to suggest that the  
only way that we can experience other human beings as having this sort of 
value is through seeing them as heroes in some respect or other. 
I shall briefly consider the idea of the hero, and then go on to suggest how 
we should rethink the attempt to believe in the dignity of all human beings. 
What is special about the hero is that we  identify with her: we take her 
struggle  and her  courage  as  emblematic  for  our  own struggle,  and are 
inspired by it. In normal life, we have various emotional defences against 
identifying with people in this way: but the hero manages to disarm these 
emotional defences to being impressed by another. 
I think that further reflection shows that there are two ways in which we 
can understand our relationship to the hero: a false way and a true way. If 
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we understand  the  hero  falsely,  we  use  the  hero’s  story  as  a  way  of 
confirming  ourselves  in  our  own  worth:  we  identify  with  her  in  her 
struggle for existence only to the extent that we can assimilate what she has 
done into the pattern of our own life. In being impressed by her we are 
doing no more than to be impressed at our own possibilities: seeing the 
dignity of the hero can be no more than a veiled form of self-glorification 
or bravado.175 
The true way of appreciating the hero never lets its awe at the hero cloud 
its awareness that the hero is a different, concrete individual. It is aware of 
the varieties within heroism and the way life offers different opportunities 
for  heroism.  It  leads  not  toward  self-glorification  but  towards  an 
appreciation  of  different  people  in  their  concrete  individuality.  This 
conception of heroism leads towards a belief in the dignity of all human 
beings  rather  than  away  from it.  By  bringing  into  play  the  variety  of 
heroes, it nudges us in the direction of a greater curiosity about human 
beings and also a greater love for them.176 It is ultimately this curiosity and 
this love than we need to cultivate within ourselves if we are to believe in 
the dignity of all human beings. 
Suppose we back up a little now and ask a question about those whom we 
do  not see as justifying life through their very presence: what is it  that 
stops us from finding them valuable? The obvious answer is that we are 
seeing such people aright as the mediocre and uninspiring people they are, 
and that there is nothing more to be explained.
But this answer seem obvious only from a certain perspective. For there is 
another alternative that we find in the tradition of morality: namely the 
175 This is perhaps most obviously the case where violent and inadequate people identify with 
violent screen characters such as Rambo. Brian Keenan has an interesting discussion of the way his  
captors in Lebanon identified with Rambo and with the characters in the A-team. (Keenan 1992).
176 On this conception, what we need is not more Rambos or James Bonds, but more great listeners 
who are able to divine the contours of other people’s ordinary and individual lives and communicate 
them to us. In this regard, I would take the work of Studs Terkel (e.g. 1972, 1992) and Tony Parker 
(e.g. 1983, 1990) to be exemplary. 
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suggestion that it is the person’s self-absorption – inability to look beyond 
his own nose – that makes others seem uninspiring. On this view, what one 
finds interesting and inspiring is closely related to what one focuses one’s 
attention towards. (Love is considered to be the highest form of attention). 
If  one focuses one’s attention  exclusively on one’s  self  and one’s  own 
concerns, then it is only natural that one does not find the concerns and 
lives of others interesting or inspiring. However, if one spends less time 
focusing on oneself and more on others then one effortlessly finds them 
interesting and inspiring. On this view, the fact that one finds the majority 
of human beings dull and uninspiring is an indictment of you, not of those 
you find dull: it is your self-absorption rather than their mediocrity that is 
the problem. 
When this claim has been put forward in the past, it has usually been done 
within  a  realist  or  a  Platonist  framework,  which  ends  up  begging  the 
question against those who find their fellow humans dull.  I suggest we 
situate it instead within the framework of Williams James’ ethics of belief. 
I shall suggest that James shows us that we have every right to adopt this 
outward-focused approach to life, and that if we do so, we can see the hero 
as exceptional in a different way: not as superhuman and making the rest of 
humanity seem inadequate in comparison, but rather someone whose value 
as  a  human  being  is  just  particularly  difficult  to  ignore,  and  which 
penetrates even our normal willed blindness.
8.3.1 The right to believe in the dignity of all human beings
In ‘The Will to Believe’, Williams James argues that there are certain sorts 
of proposition that it is legitimate to believe, and to act on the basis of 
believing,  even  though one  has  not  been intellectually  coerced  into  so 
believing. There are  three classes of proposition to which he wishes to 
apply this right to believe. 
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Most  simply,  there  are  cases  where  we  have  to  act  without  a  full 
knowledge of the facts, because waiting to ascertain the full facts would be 
to miss the moment at which action was appropriate or would effectively 
involve a decision not to act; a decision that was just as unjustified as the 
one to act. Imagine for example I’m on a crowded tube train and I think I 
see a man removing the wallet from another man’s pocket.  I think  I saw 
him do it; but I’m not sure: was he just pushed into the other man by a jolt 
of the train? 
If I wait to see if there is any further evidence to confirm or disconfirm my 
thought, it’s odds on that one or the other man will get off, and I will have 
missed the moment for action:  by waiting to see,  I  will  in effect have 
decided not to challenge the would-be thief. Of course, if I speak up, I risk 
accusing an innocent man, offending him, perhaps even getting into a fight 
with him if he stands on his honour. I take it that situations involving this 
sort of uncertainty are relatively common in everyday life. 
James suggests that situations like this show us that there is a difference 
between two possible ethics of belief: one which has as its fundamental 
law we must know the truth, and the other, which has as its law we must  
avoid error:  ‘We may regard the chase for truth as paramount, and the 
avoidance  of  error  as  secondary;  or  we may,  on  the  other  hand,  treat 
avoidance of error as more imperative, and let truth take its chance.’ (1897, 
p.209) In the case we are considering, the truth favouring option would 
lead us to challenge the would-be thief, believing it worth the risk of being 
wrong: whilst the error avoiding option would lead us to not say anything 
unless we were absolutely sure. 
James  argues  against  the  error  avoiding  option  both  because  it  over-
estimates the danger of believing and acting on falsehoods and in addition 
impedes the search for truth:
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Our errors are surely not such awfully solemn things. In a 
world where we are so certain to incur them in spite of all 
our caution, a certain lightness of heart seems healthier than 
this excessive nervousness on their behalf. (1897, p.210)177
A second class of case where it is legitimate to exercise the will to believe  
is where we must take up a stance, but where no evidence we could have in 
our possession seems at all likely to coerce the intellect one way or the 
other.  For  James,  the  question  of  the  attitude  we are to  adopt  towards 
religion is of this sort.178 It is legitimate to choose to have religious faith at 
one’s own risk because  both  the opposing alternatives – agnosticism and 
atheism – are equally as unable to coerce the intellect, and choosing either 
will have an attending chance of losing the truth.179 Given this uncertain 
situation it is legitimate for each person to choose for himself, according to 
what he feels most drawn to, so long as he chooses at his own risk. 
Last, and most important for our purposes, there are cases where the will to 
believe applies in a  more radical  way. There are  cases where what  we 
believe and the sheer fact of our acting on it is not so much a matter of 
plumping for an interpretation under conditions of uncertainty, but partly 
makes the facts in question. Many situations involving the interrelations of 
human beings are of this kind. For example, whether you like me or not is 
not independent of the attitude I take up towards you in my dealings with 
you: if (like the error avoider) I await some sort of proof that you like me 
before I am willing to countenance being friendly towards you, we are far 
177 There is an ethical reason lurking only just below the surface: the truth favouring option is the 
hero’s choice; the error favouring one the coward’s choice. 
178 James gets to this conclusion by defining the crux of religion in the following rather thin way:  
the religious hypothesis says two things: (1) ‘the best things are the eternal things, the overlapping 
things, the things in the universe that throw the last stone, so to speak, and say the final word.’ (2) 
‘we are better off even now’ if we believe the first claim to be true. (1897, pp. 214-5) Given this  
slimmed down conception, it  is  at  least  plausible to imagine that the first claim ‘cannot yet be 
verified scientifically at all.’ (1897, p. 215)
179 “Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions,  
whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to 
say, under such circumstances, ‘Do not decide, but leave the question open,’ is itself a passional  
decision, - just like deciding yes or no, - and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.” 
(1897, p. 205)
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less likely to end up friends than if I start by acting on the faith that you 
will like me and will return my friendliness.180 
The general idea is that ‘the desire for a certain kind of truth here brings 
about that special truth’s existence; and so it is in innumerable cases of 
other sorts. Who gains promotions, boons, appointments, but the man in 
whose life they are seen to play the part of live hypotheses, who discounts 
them, sacrifices other things for their sake before they have come,  and 
takes risks for them in advance? His faith acts on the powers above his as a 
claim, and creates its own verification.’ (1897, p.213)
Belief in the dignity of human beings in a full-blooded sense is legitimate 
in both the last two senses of the will to believe: i) faith in the dignity of all 
human beings is not ruled out by any facts we might discover about the 
world, and ii) faith in the dignity of all human beings helps to create the 
conditions for its own verification: through presupposing that everyone is 
valuable and worthy of attention we most often find our presuppositions 
confirmed. 
Faith in the dignity of all human beings in the full-blooded does not rest on 
any alleged metaphysical facts – such as humans having an immortal soul 
or being made in the image of God. Nor does it invoke any special trait that 
might turn out not to be shared fully amongst humans, or to be shared too 
widely. All it relies on is the ability of humans to impress and inspire one 
another: this they can do through several means, most obviously through 
heroism. It does not strike me as plausible that any further facts discovered 
could show that we have no right to be inspired in this way by other human 
beings, any more than any further facts could show that we have no right to 
feel pity or anger.181 
180 “Whether you [like me or not] depends, in countless instances, on whether I meet you half-way, 
am willing to assume you must like me, and show you trust and expectation. The previous faith on 
my part in your liking’s existence is in such cases what makes your liking come. But if I stand aloof, 
and refuse to budge an inch until I have objective evidence… ten to one your liking never comes. 
(1897, p.213)
181 As I argued in the previous chapter, the dignity of human beings can still be a source of moral 
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Faith  in  the  dignity  of  human beings  is  like  trust:  by believing it  and 
spreading  this  belief  through  the  way  we  act,  we  alter  the  terms  of 
engagement on which we meet our fellow human beings. Human beings 
living in an environment where faith in the dignity of human beings is 
powerful tend to recreate the conditions of possibility for that faith by both 
acting in a way that is expressive of their own dignity and by respecting the 
dignity  of  other  human beings.  Conversely,  human beings  living in  an 
environment  where  faith  in  the  dignity  of  human  beings  is  weak  or 
nonexistent tend to recreate the conditions that make faith in the dignity of 
human beings difficult by both acting in a way that is undignified (mean 
spirited etc) and by not respecting the dignity of others. 
We have every right to believe in the dignity of human beings, then, for 
two reasons: first because there are no facts that stop us from doing so, and 
second,  because a  preliminary  faith  in  the  dignity  of  human  beings  is 
necessary if we are to create societies in which the dignity of human beings 
can readily be experienced. This is a case where ‘faith in a fact can help 
create the fact’ (James, 1897, p.214): certainly we cannot stand aloof from 
human beings, take little interest in others and wait to see if others really  
are interesting. One must take the plunge.182 
So it is a legitimate project to have a prior faith in the dignity of all human 
beings in this full-blooded sense. 
But experiencing the dignity of another human being involves openness: a 
willingness to bracket one’s preconceptions, what one thought one knew 
for sure, and risk real genuine contact. If we are insecure; if we fear being 
uplift and moral motivation, but by explaining the workings of dignity in an existential sense (that is, 
relative to the person’s understanding of the vulnerability of human life, and the other person’s 
courage in carrying on living in the face of this vulnerability) we obviate the need for any account of  
what is sacred in a human being, or of the special trait that gives human beings their dignity.
182 ‘We have a story in India about two men, one high-minded and generous, the other very selfish, 
who were sent to foreign lands and asked to tell what kind of people they found there. The first  
reported that he found people basically good at heart, not very different from those at home. The 
second man felt envious hearing this, for in the place he visited everyone was selfish, scheming and 
cruel. Both, of course, were describing the same land.’ Easwaran 1986, p. 66.
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exposed as fool’s gold by the touchstone of experience, then we will try 
our hardest to avoid situations where we must respond spontaneously to 
another  human being. If  we are afraid that really  meeting another  will 
make us doubt something that we thought we knew for sure, then we will 
avoid  really  meeting  them.  If  we  feel  that  we  need  to  hold  tight  to 
ourselves  to  stop  ourselves  spinning  off  centrifugally  into  a  thousand 
pieces, then we will avoid encountering another as possessing a dignity.183
Following this path can be painful and difficult so few try it; but if we 
pursue this path, then we can come to appreciate that much of our lives are 
usually spent in a willed blindness to the value and experiences of others. 
What marks out both curiosity about and love for human beings is that they 
involve a focusing our attention outwards – away from our selves and our 
own  concerns  and  onto  other  human  beings.  They  pour  interest  and 
appreciation into the world: but their effort is not wasted, but rather pays 
great dividends by making life much richer and more interesting. Where 
there  was  fear  and  self-loathing,  they  create  a  sense  of  freshness  and 
possibility.
The hero comes to seem exceptional in a different way: not as superhuman 
and making the rest of humanity seem inadequate in comparison, but rather 
someone whose value as a human being is  just  particularly difficult  to 
ignore, and which penetrates even our normal willed blindness. 
183 Cf Velleman “[Love] arrests our tendencies toward emotional self-protection from another 
person, tendencies to draw ourselves in and close ourselves off from being affected by him. Love 
disarms our emotional defences; it makes us vulnerable to the other. … Many of our defences against  
being emotionally affected by another person are ways of not seeing what is most affecting about 
him. This contrived blindness to the other person is among the defences that are lifted by love, with  
the result that we really look at him, perhaps for the first time, and respond emotionally in a way 
that’s indicative of having really seen him.” (1999, p.361)
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8.3.2 How to overcome our defences through the cultivation of love
Following this path leads to an ethic which takes as its key idea unilateral 
love  expressing  itself  in  spontaneous  generosity,  which  incorporates  a 
present-oriented conception to time, in which one attempts to live as fully 
and as generously as possible, holding nothing back. I consider in 8.4 how 
we should relate this conception of life back to that which finds expression 
in the attempt to construct moral rules.
The account of love that we need is one that reworks the Christian ideal of 
love as exemplified in the Sermon on the Mount. The two key features 
about this conception of love are, first and more familiarly, its unilateral 
nature: its willingness to make the first move and to love without needing 
this love to be returned.184 
Second, its present-oriented conception of time, that banishes both anxiety 
about  the  future  and  recrimination  about  the  past  so  that  the  present 
becomes an open space of possibility. Anxiety about the future is banished 
by placing one’s life in God’s hands: 185 
Rather than something futural, this is a  presential  time, a 
time  of  presencing,  which  lets  today  be  today.  Trusting 
oneself to God’s rule, the day is not drained of its time. 
Today  is  not  sacrificed  to  tomorrow,  spent  in  making 
oneself safe and secure against tomorrow. It is a temporality 
of trust, of trusting oneself to God’s rule, and in so doing to 
time and the day. (Caputo 1999, p.99) 
184 See for  example Matthew 5.43-8: “You have heard that it  was said,  ‘You shall  love you 
neighbour and hate you enemy,’ But I  say to you,  Love your enemies and pray for those who 
persecute you… For if  you love those who love you what reward have you? Do not even tax 
collectors do the same? And if you salute only your bretheren, what more are you doing than others? 
Do not even the Gentiles do the same? You, therefore, must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is 
perfect.”
185 Cf Matthew 6.25-27: “Therefore I tell you, do not be anxious about your life, what you shall eat 
or what you shall drink, nor about your body, what you put on. Is not life more than food, and the  
body more than clothing? Look at the birds of the air: they neither sow nor reap nor gather into  
barns, and yet your heavenly Father feeds them. Are you not of more value than they? And which of 
you by being anxious can add one cubit to his span of life?”
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And we are loosened from the grip of the past by the power of forgiveness: 
“Forgiveness keeps the net of social relationships open and makes possible 
what  Arendt calls “natality,” the fresh,  natal,  initiating power of a new 
action, new beginnings, new starts. Each day is a new day, a renewal of the 
day, a new gift.” (Caputo 1999, p.96-7). 
By trusting God’s rule one breaks the chain of time and 
frees the day, letting the day come-to-presence, tearing up 
the chain of time, freeing it from the circulation of debts 
and anxieties,  letting the day be a  “gift”.  Forget  what is 
owed to you in the past; forget what you owe to the future; 
tear up the chain of time and take today as a gift… It is, 
something new and freeing has begun now which is now 
with us and frees us from the past and future. (Caputo 1999, 
p. 101)
When we put these two elements – the unilateral love and the presential 
time – together, we get a way of living in which all the usual chains that 
bind us; via time and via other’s expectations of us are smashed, and all 
that is left is an outflowing of generosity and joy. 
I am not suggesting a return to a Christianity – even to a mystical, half-
deconstructed  form  of  it  however.  What  I  am  suggesting  is  a 
reappropriation of this ethic within a secular context. 
Rather  than  being  grounded  in  the  gift  of  God,  love  becomes  utterly 
groundless,  gratuitous,  and  is  embraced  in  its  very  gratuity.  Cupitt 
expresses this thought in a way that I am happy to agree with:
Life cannot be possessed or clutched at:  we should pour 
ourselves out and pass on, without hesitation or regret. We 
can  get  ourselves  together  only  by  leaving  ourselves 
behind.  That  is  solarity  –  to  live  by  dying  all  the  time, 
heedless, like the sun and in the spirit of the Sermon on the 
Mount.  Solar  ethics  is  a  radically  emotivist  and 
expressionistic reading of the ethics of Jesus (Cupitt 1997, 
p.90)
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Is such a love possible without an underlying Christian faith? For, on a 
classical Christian account this love wells up from an awareness of our 
status as God’s creatures and our dependence on God. 
I myself see no objection to treating belief in God as a ladder that we can 
push away once we have attained to the moral understanding implicit in 
this ethic. We could approach this thought from two directions: either from 
within  Christianity,  as  a  radicalisation  of  the  Christian  message  in  a 
direction  first  suggested  by  Christian mysticism and especially  Meister 
Eckhart, and most interestingly worked out in a series of works since 1980 
by Don Cupitt186 or from the direction of atheism, which would opine that, 
given that i) there is no God, and ii) people have in fact been able to act in 
accordance with the demands of a unilateral love nonetheless, then iii) the 
non-existence of God is therefore no barrier to the possibility of unilateral 
love; and iv) one can therefore practice this even without a belief in God.
8.4 Moral life
The account of moral rules and the full-blooded account of dignity should, 
I hope, complement rather than undermine one another. We have on the 
one hand, the project of trying to come to a mutual understanding about 
which rules we should use to regulate our life together; on the other, the 
project of attempting to restructure one’s way of interacting with human 
beings through a reworking of the Christian ideal of love. 
186 Cupitt publishes at least one book a year, and in addition is always moving in his thought, so it  
is a little difficult to recommend any one book as representative of his oeuvre. What we have is a 
journey, from a fairly orthodox Church of England position, to doubts becoming ever more radial,  
which he understood in a Kierkegaardian way, to a final break with any sort of realist account of  
Christianity  (1980).  Then in the mid-eighties,  an attempt  to  construct  an anti-realist  version of 
Christianity, to a break with even anti-realist Christianity towards a flirtation with an anti-realist 
reading of Buddhism, to a point where he now advocates utilising certain elements from Christianity 
and Buddhism in the service of interesting experiments in selfhood: “I am suggesting that we can and 
should now be uninhibited and eclectic in creating new religious meanings, practices, and narratives 
out of the materials available to us. The poetical theology will fiction and refection our religion, tell 
and retell the old stories. What will make it a theology will be its use in helping us to see ourselves 
and our  life with a greater clarity of moral vision, in helping us to be “easy, going” about the  
transience of everything, and in showing us how to live ardently.” (1997, p.120)  
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The first is a rule based ethics of mutual accountability; the second an 
overflowing ethics of generosity. This ‘solar ethics’ goes beyond anything 
that might be required on the basis of moral rules: it goes beyond rules, 
beyond mutual obligation into the ecstatic space of unilateral love. This 
unilateral  nature  of  it  is  its  greatness:  its  gratuitous  kindness  and 
appreciation makes it able to make the first move, to create the conditions 
for cooperation and mutual understanding out of hostility or indifference. 
But its weakness is its lack of consistency. 
The strength of moral rules is precisely their ability to bind people together 
into  a  community  of  understanding  through  which  tasks  can  be 
apportioned,  offenders  punished  and  so  on.  Their  weakness  is  their 
tendency to efface the importance of each individual and the differences 
between them and to slump down to a merely perfunctory level at which 
the universally shared expectations become little more than a figleaf for 
indifference to others. 
A life  of  true  moral  goodness  requires  both:  from the  creative  tension 
between them we create the true life. It would not, I suspect, be a life that 
Nietzsche would have been happy to have lived, but yet it  embodies a 
convincing reply to his claim that life needs to be justified, doing so both 
through the ardency of its solar living and through the structures of mutual 
recognition created through the moral rules it upholds. 
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AFTERWORD
The major difference between my account of morality and all the others we 
considered is that my account does not attempt to ‘ground’ morality – that 
is, attempt to show that there is an argumentative route from premisses no 
one could reasonably doubt to the validity of morality. Rather it is geared 
to showing the  legitimacy of confidence in morality and in finding ways 
that build this confidence in a realistic way. 
Whilst the three main pillars of morality – cosmopolitanism, reciprocity 
and the dignity of human beings are all still very much standing, morality 
as I have reconstructed it is much lighter than on the other accounts: there 
is no transcendent source of morality; no a priorism; no irremisible voice 
of duty. Rather we have a system that is human and fallibilistic all the way 
through;  a  system that  reconstructs  morality out  of  elements  of human 
beings  as  we  know  and  interact  with  them:  our  vulnerability;  our 
potentiality for faith and our willingness to reach a mutual understanding. 
How we interpret  this  change depends on how we view the project  of 
grounding morality: if we think that that project still makes sense, then one 
is likely to think that the structure I have erected is at best a temporary 
stop-gap, a way of showing that even though we do not currently have a 
sound argument  demonstrating  the  necessity  of  morality,  there  are  still 
some quite significant things that can be said in favour of the way of life of 
believing in morality. 
If, however, one thinks that the project of grounding morality has become 
intellectually bankrupt, then the structure I have erected will seem to be the 
only honest way of proceeding: to be the best way of ensuring a future for 
morality. 
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I have come over time to alter my position from the first interpretation to 
the second. I do not know what to say to make this interpretation plausible 
to others, or even how to fully explain my change of mind. It has a lot to do 
with the status one accords contingency in human life. Much of my earlier 
thought was connected to the question of how to overcome the contingency 
of human life – how to show that despite the fact that we human beings are 
the contingent result of a long process of natural selection, and despite the 
fact that the ideas that make up the core of morality have a history and 
undergo various transformations in this history, every human being ought  
to accept the moral regulation of life, because this is required by practical 
reason. 
The most obvious way to do this would be to construct an account at the 
level  of  the  right.187 And  so  I  spent  some  time  trying  to  construct  an 
account  of  practical  reason  that  would  allow  us  to  demonstrate  that 
everyone  ought  to  be  moral,  because  moral  standards  really  are  
normative.  But  a  combination  of  the  work  of  Nietzsche  and  Taylor 
undermined this hope in me, for reasons that I have set out in chapters 
three and five: no account at the level of the right can explain why we 
should take these purported moral truths seriously, and it is this question 
which is prior to that of the right. 
However, if we are working at the level of the good, as I hope the chapter 
on Taylor makes clear, it’s difficult to see how we could ground morality in 
default  of  an  ultimate  belief  in  God  or  in  some  other  metaphysical 
principle. 
I thus found myself in an aporia: I literally didn’t know which way to turn. 
So I backed up, and I began to unpick what it was that led me to want to  
achieve this certainty,  this ability to demonstrate that everyone must be 
187 One can bolster one’s confidence in a way of overcoming contingency by the analogy with 
mathematical  truths:  perhaps,  just  as  natural  selection  should  not  undermine  our  belief  in  the 
objectivity of mathematics, so it shouldn’t undermine our belief in the objectivity of moral truths.
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moral. In this I found Rorty’s thought helpful above all. Rorty suggests that 
what  lies  behind the  attempt  to  ground morality  is,  as  Nietzsche  says, 
resentment  at the more powerful getting away with committing outrages 
against the weaker:
The residual popularity of Kantian ideas of “unconditional 
moral obligation” – obligation imposed by deep ahistorical 
forces – seems to me almost entirely due to our abhorrence 
of the idea that the people on top hold the future in their 
hands,  that  everything  depends  on  them,  that  there  is 
nothing  more  powerful  to  which  we  can  appeal  against 
them. … We resent the idea that we shall have to wait for 
the strong to turn their piggy little eyes to the suffering of 
the weak, slowly open their  dried up little  hearts. (1993, 
p.182)
What we are really attempting to do in trying to ground morality is to 
construct a larger, more powerful stick with which to beat them:
We desperately hope there is something stronger and more 
powerful that will  hurt  the strong if they do  not  do these 
things – if not a vengeful God, then a vengeful  aroused 
proletariat or, at least, a vengeful superego or, at the very 
least,  the  offended  majesty  of  Kant’s  tribunal  of  pure 
practical reason. (1993, p.182)
If this is so, then “the confusion of ideals and power, is all that lies behind 
the Kantian claim that it is not only nicer, but more  rational,  to include 
strangers within our moral community than to exclude them.” (1993 p.182) 
At first I found this suggestion rather disquieting and irritating (as a piece 
of typical Rortian flippancy), but I have come over time to accept it as an 
interpretation of what led me towards the attempt to justify morality in the 
first place. 
This has freed me up to approach morality, and the arguments we give in 
favour of it in a different way: one that I hope it will gain in effectiveness 
from its greater honesty and self-awareness as to its own motives.
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I started this project with a deep worry, namely how to reconcile my will to 
believe in morality with my will to truth. I can report that I have at least 
succeeded in laying to rest my own worries: whether in so doing I have 
betrayed either morality or the will to truth I leave the reader to decide.
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